Tax-Planning vs. Coordination: The Dual Role of Internal Capital Allocation by Xing, Bin (Betty)
 
 
Tax-Planning vs. Coordination:  













presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 






Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2020 
 
 
©Bin (Betty) Xing 2020
ii 
 
Examining Committee Membership 
The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the 
Examining Committee is by majority vote. 
 
External Examiner: Xu Jiang 




Supervisor(s): Ken Klassen 
Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Waterloo 
 
 
 Joyce Tian 
Associate Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Waterloo 
 
 
Internal Member: Tony Wirjanto 
Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Waterloo 
 
 
Internal Member: Daniel Jiang 
Assistant Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Waterloo 
 
 
Internal-External Member: Lutz-Alexander Busch 
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, 







I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including 
any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 





In this thesis, I examine how a multinational corporation (MNC) allocates capital among its 
international subsidiaries. This capital allocation has both a managerial and tax-planning 
objective. On the managerial side, it serves to coordinate collaboration between two subsidiaries 
on an innovative opportunity. Because subsidiaries in different jurisdictions have different tax 
rates, this capital allocation also plays a role in international tax-planning. An analytical model 
reveals that the MNC trades off the benefits of collaboration on the innovative opportunity 
against the tax cost associated with doing do. I further examine the implication of this tradeoff on 
how an MNC changes its capital allocation in response to a tax cut. The model provides a 
counter-intuitive result that an MNC does not always increase the amount of capital allocated to 
the country giving a tax cut. This thesis contributes to our understanding of the interaction 
between the managerial and tax decisions of MNCs. It does so by studying the interaction in the 
context of the flow of subsidiary-specific intangible resources rather than the flow of physical 
goods. This thesis has implications for both managerial practices and tax policies. While the tax-
rate differential between subsidiaries provides tax-planning opportunities, it also creates a 
coordination cost that is external to the organization. Finally, the results from this model 
highlight the importance of considering the interconnectedness of an MNC in assessing the effect 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The international landscape that multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in creates 
unique opportunities and challenges. On the managerial side, by operating in different countries 
and environments, the subsidiaries of MNCs develop a unique set of expertise and capabilities 
that together provide the MNC unique comparative advantages. However, these opportunities 
also present challenges in the management of the capabilities that are dispersed across different 
subsidiaries. As a result, the ability of the headquarters to coordinate across subsidiaries plays a 
crucial role in the successful execution of a business strategy. On the taxation side, MNCs can 
access different tax rules and rates that create unique tax-planning opportunities. However, the 
tax-rate differential between subsidiaries can also introduce a coordination cost that is external to 
the organization. In this thesis, I study how a central allocation of capital from the headquarters 
can coordinate the contribution of subsidiary-specific expertise in collaboration on an innovative 
opportunity. This capital allocation decision also has a tax-planning objective, and I study the 
tradeoff between the two objectives of the capital allocation decision. I also study the tax policy 
implication of this tradeoff by examining an MNC’s capital allocation changes after a tax cut.  
Early theory in international business regarded a multinational corporation (MNC) as a 
hierarchy where there is a well-defined vertical flow of responsibilities, with formalized and tight 
control from the top (Williamson 1985, Chandler 1962). Although there is a delegation of local 
responsibilities, no lateral interactions occur among subsidiaries. However, as businesses grow 
globally, the interdependence among internal parties increases, and new theory has emerged to 
address the complexity in subsidiary relationships. Recent studies in business strategy emphasize 
the horizontal dependence and lateral relationships that international subsidiaries form with one 
another. As a result, the network view has become a widely accepted theory in modern 
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international business. Under this view, each subsidiary has a unique set of capabilities and 
expertise that serves its unique strategic role in its internal and external relationships, and the 
MNC forms new competitive advantages through accessing, connecting, and combining the 
capabilities that are dispersed across subsidiaries.  
 Within these networks that are interconnected through subsidiaries, coordinating 
resources is an important task (Barney 1991, Barney 2001, Peng 2001, Sirmon et al. 2011). 
Among the different types of resources, knowledge is the most important for forming new 
competencies through innovation (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000, Porter 1986, Teece 1981, 
Zander and Kogut 1995, Spender and Grant 1996, Simonin 1997), yet it is the most difficult to 
coordinate and manage across subsidiaries. First, subsidiaries often develop a new expertise and 
gain a strategic mandate through their own initiatives. Therefore, the headquarters does not have 
direct control over these specialized capabilities and expertise. Second, technical know-how, 
expertise, and experiences are tacit and non-transactable (Teece 1977, Szulanski 1996, 
Subramaniam and Venkatraman 2001, Dierickx and Cool 1989). Therefore, it is difficult to draft 
a formal contract with a subsidiary for providing its knowledge and intellectual input. Instead, 
identifying and providing opportunities for subsidiaries to work together on a common project 
and fostering lateral relationships are more effective ways to facilitate knowledge-sharing.  
The international operations of MNCs not only unlock unique business opportunities but 
also unlock unique tax-planning opportunities through different sets of tax rules and tax rates. 
Most studies in international tax focus on vertical relationships between two subsidiaries and do 
not address subsidiaries’ choices in forming lateral relationships. While a vertical relationship is 
appropriate to the traditional manufacturing setting where an upstream division supplies a well-
defined product to a downstream division, it does not address the interdependence among 
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subsidiaries governed by modern knowledge-driven business models. As described later in 
Chapter 2, recent studies have advanced our understanding on tax-planning strategies that 
involve intellectual property. However, these studies generally assume the headquarters’ control 
over subsidiaries and do not discuss the coordination challenge that the headquarters faces in 
knowledge management. One exception to this is Johnson (2006) who studies the joint 
investment from two subsidiaries into an intellectual property, but her focus is on the physical 
investment rather than the intellectual input that each subsidiary makes. Furthermore, her setup 
concerns a sequential development and does not address the coordination among subsidiaries that 
must provide their input at the same time in a collaborative project.  
In this thesis, I study the interaction between an MNC’s tax-planning and its coordination 
of knowledge-sharing across subsidiaries. In Chapter 3, I present the base model setup where the 
two subsidiaries’ choose to engage in a lateral collaboration with one another and study how 
capital allocation from the headquarters coordinates the choices by the subsidiaries. In my setup, 
the headquarters identifies an innovative opportunity that combines two areas of expertise within 
its knowledge network. Several studies find that although subsidiaries can be active in 
developing their own expertise, they are not necessarily aware of the resources available in other 
subsidiaries, so the headquarters plays an important role in identifying opportunities that connect 
the expertise from different subsidiaries to generate new competencies (Tallman and Koza 2010, 
Ambos and Mahnke 2010, Tran, Mahnke, and Ambos 2010, Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson 
1998).  
The two types of expertise are held at two different subsidiaries that have full control 
over whether to contribute their expertise. The two subsidiaries are not pure research divisions, 
and they both have profit-generating production capabilities, so a subsidiary may choose to work 
4 
 
on its own production instead of the collaborative project. If any subsidiary withholds its 
expertise, then the innovative opportunity cannot flourish. The need for coordination arises 
because even though the collaborative project is beneficial to the overall group profit, it may not 
be the best option for the subsidiaries. In my setup, the capital allocation from the headquarters 
between the two subsidiaries incentivizes them to provide their respective expertise. The 
coordination role of capital allocation is thus the effect of the central allocation of one type of 
resource (capital) on the coordination of another type of resource (subsidiary-specific 
knowledge). Furthermore, as is common in practice, the two international subsidiaries face 
different tax rates in their respective countries, allowing capital allocation to garner tax savings, 
and this is the tax-planning role of capital allocation.  
In this context, the first-best solution refers to the scenario when there is no conflict 
between the coordination and the tax-planning role of capital allocation. In the first-best scenario, 
the optimal allocation can garner the maximum tax savings available while offering an incentive 
for the two subsidiaries to collaborate on the innovative project. Solving the model reveals that 
the first-best solution is achievable only if the innovative opportunity offers a very high return 
that is incremental to traditional processes. For example, the innovation’s return must be at least 
twice the return of traditional processes to achieve the first-best solution, when the two 
subsidiaries have equal bargaining power and split the reward from collaborating on the 
innovative project equally. The exact threshold depends on the values of the parameters.  
When the first-best solution is not achievable, the tax-minimizing allocation cannot 
incentivize both subsidiaries to undertake the innovative opportunity. Although the low-tax 
subsidiary is tax-favored, allocating too much capital to a subsidiary can prevent the two 
subsidiaries’ collaboration. This is because the opportunity cost for investing in the innovative 
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project increases with the amount of capital a subsidiary receives. In the extreme case when a 
subsidiary is allocated no capital, its opportunity cost for participating in the innovative project is 
zero. With nothing to lose, the subsidiary welcomes sharing the reward of the innovative project. 
In the other extreme case, when a subsidiary has all of the capital, its opportunity cost for 
participating in the innovative project is the full enjoyment of the profit it can earn from its own 
traditional production. Sharing the reward of the innovative project with the other subsidiary is 
no longer appealing in this case when it can do much better on its own. For this reason, the 
headquarters incurs a higher tax expense if it wishes to incentivize the two subsidiaries to both 
work on the innovative project.  
Faced with a tradeoff between its tax-planning and its coordination objective, the 
headquarters must evaluate the benefit of the innovative opportunity against the tax cost 
associated with incentivizing the collaboration. If the incremental profitability of the innovative 
opportunity is not high enough to outweigh the cost, the headquarters optimally forgoes the 
opportunity and focuses only on tax savings. On the other hand, if the incremental profitability of 
the innovative opportunity is high enough to outweigh the cost, then the optimal allocation 
incentivizes collaboration with the lowest tax permissible.  
In Chapter 4, I make several extensions to the base model. In particular, I introduce a 
prototype stage where the subsidiaries test out ideas and make a prototype product. Success 
during the early stages of an innovation process is crucial, but these early stages often consist of 
explorations with ill-defined objectives, making it difficult to manage. Prior studies have 
documented many ways in which prototyping can help in managing these early stages. First, the 
innovation team can experiment with different designs and learn more about the technical 
requirements. Second, by building a functional product, the innovation team is forced to turn 
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conceptual ideas into executable plans. Finally, demonstrating the prototype to internal and 
external stakeholders helps boost confidence and support in addition to securing financing from 
internal and external sources.  
The intellectual contribution from both subsidiaries of their respective expertise is critical 
to the success of the prototype for several reasons. First, cross-functional collaborations are an 
effective way for the innovation team to access the relevant expertise. Second, collaboration 
during the prototype stage provides an opportunity for the innovation team to contribute and 
discuss ideas early on, preventing costly interdepartmental disputes at a later stage. Third, cross-
functional collaborations facilitate timely modifications and flexible use of the departmental 
resources. Finally, discussions that occur during these collaborations foster knowledge transfer 
and organizational learning.  
I incorporate several features of the prototype stage into my model. First, to reflect the 
difficulties faced during the early stages of an innovative process, the prototype effort has a 
probability of failure. Second, to reflect the importance of the collective effort, the prototype 
cannot succeed unless both subsidiaries provide their respective expertise. Third, the subsidiaries 
are not required to make an investment decision until they have completed the prototype stage. 
The innovation process demands different types of resources during different stages. In the early 
development stage, the commitment of intellectual resources and expertise plays a more 
prominent role, whereas in the later production stage, it is the commitment of capital resources 
which plays a more prominent role.  
Finally, the outcome of the prototype stage has an implication for the investment 
decisions. If the innovation team successfully demonstrates a functional prototype, then the 
innovation project is deemed to be a success that allows it to move along to the next stage, where 
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the two subsidiaries make their investment choice with the capital allocated from the 
headquarters. Otherwise, the prototype is not considered a success, and the innovative 
opportunity is no longer suitable. In this case, the only investment opportunity left is the 
traditional process. From the headquarters’ perspective, the observable outcome raises the 
question of whether it can improve its position by tying its capital allocation to the prototype 
outcome. I separately model the case when the headquarters uses the prototype outcome in its 
capital allocation and the case when the headquarters does not.  
These model extensions provide three key insights. First, compared with the base model, 
incentivizing a subsidiary’s intellectual contribution during the prototype stage faces the same 
issue that a subsidiary cannot be allocated too much capital. This is because each subsidiary’s 
payoff depends on its investment decision at the later stage. If a subsidiary anticipates being 
allocated so much capital that it is better off working alone than sharing, then it will refuse to 
contribute intellectually during the prototype stage. Second, the tradeoff between coordinating 
the collaboration and the tax costs associated with it is like that in the base model. However, the 
threshold above which the tradeoff is worthwhile increases with the probability of failure. This is 
to offset the lower expected payoff on the innovative opportunity due to the probability of failure.  
Finally, tying the capital allocation to the prototype outcome has advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantage is that it achieves a better expected payoff by allowing the 
headquarters to coordinate collaboration at a lower tax cost. However, because the capital 
allocation must incentivize both the intellectual contribution and the investment decision, the 
benefit is realized only if the headquarters can control the investment decision. On the other hand, 
tying the allocation to the prototype outcome means that the headquarters cannot allocate 
physical capital upfront. This presents a challenge for the headquarters to credibly commit to the 
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allocation it originally specifies, even after observing the prototype has failed. When the 
subsidiaries perceive that the headquarters would favor the low-tax subsidiary after it has 
observed the prototype outcome, it becomes impossible for the headquarters to coordinate 
collaboration with any allocation, which is a disadvantage of not committing physical capital 
upfront.  
In Chapter 5, I study the effect of certain tax policies on the subsidiaries’ preferences 
toward the collaboration and the tradeoff that the headquarters faces between the tax-planning 
and the coordination objective in the capital allocation decision. I focus on tax policies that 
reduce the corporate tax rate that apply to all types of income (a general rate reduction) or 
specifically to innovation-related income (such as a “patent-box” regime). This reduction in tax 
rates is usually from high-tax countries that hope to stay competitive with their tax systems to 
attract investment and create employment opportunities (Clausing 2009, 2016, 2007, Desai, 
Foley, and Hines 2003). More recently, high-tax countries have become increasingly interested 
in attracting capital and activities specifically related to innovation, in response to the growing 
innovation economy. For example, the patent-box regime offers favorable tax treatments to 
innovations and has now been implemented by thirteen European countries and several others.1 
Although the details of implementation differ from country to country, the main highlight of all 
patent-box regimes is a drastic reduction of the tax rate applied to income derived from 
innovations (Böhm et al. 2015, Bradley, Dauchy, and Robinson 2015).  
One of the most important stated policy objectives is to retain and attract capital 
investment, for both the general rate reduction and the patent-box regimes (Alstadsæter et al. 
 
1 Thirteen European countries have implemented the patent-box regime as of 2020. Outside Europe, China has 
implemented its version of the patent box regime, and lobbying effort and proposals continue circulating in both 




2015, Bradley, Dauchy, and Robinson 2015, Chen et al. 2018, Schwab and Todtenhaupt 2019). 
To better understand the effect of these tax policies on capital allocation, I compare the MNC’s 
optimal allocation before and after the policy change. I first study a general rate reduction where 
the country of the high-tax subsidiary reduces the tax rate applied to both the innovative 
opportunity and the traditional processes. I then study a specific rate reduction where the high-
tax country reduces the tax rate, but only the innovative project qualifies. I study the effect both 
under the base model setup and with the extensions introduced in Chapter 4.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, an MNC does not always increase its capital allocation 
to the country that introduces a rate reduction. More specifically, I find that whether the MNC 
increases, decreases, or maintains its capital allocation to the high-tax subsidiary depends on how 
valuable internal collaboration is. In general, a tax cut has two effects, although the exact 
outcome varies depending on the model and whether the tax cut is general or specific. First, by 
narrowing the tax-rate differential between the two subsidiaries, it reduces the tax cost associated 
with the coordination. Therefore, an innovative opportunity may not be worth pursuing before 
the tax cut but becomes worth pursuing after the tax cut. In this case, the headquarters starts 
allocating capital to the high-tax subsidiary following the tax cut, and the capital allocation 
increases for the high-tax subsidiary. On the other hand, the innovative opportunity may still not 
be worth pursuing even after the tax cut, so the headquarters focuses only on the tax-minimizing 
objective, and the capital allocation does not change in this case.  
The second effect of a tax cut is that it alleviates the incentive problem to collaborate on 
the innovative project. The tax cut enhances the appeal of collaborating on the innovative project 
for the low-tax subsidiary, by increasing the after-tax profit that the high-tax subsidiary can share. 
The headquarters can thus save more taxes while inducing collaboration, and in this case, the 
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capital allocation decreases for the high-tax subsidiary. This counter-intuitive result highlights 
the importance of considering the internal coordination within an MNC’s network of internal 
knowledge-holders in assessing an MNC’s response to a certain tax incentive.  
Comparing the specific rate reduction with the general rate reduction yields one 
additional insight. In the base model, the specific rate reduction has the exact same effect as the 
general rate reduction. This is because the two types of rate reduction change the headquarters’ 
tradeoff in the same way. Both the first and the second effects of the tax cut refer only to the tax 
rate applicable on the innovative project, which is a feature common to both rate reductions. On 
the other hand, in the model extensions, the benefit of the specific rate reduction is limited to 
successful innovations. As a result, the benefit from the specific rate reduction faces a risk of not 





Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 International Tax Literature  
 By operating in multiple jurisdictions, multinational companies access not only different 
markets but also different sets of tax rules and tax rates. This presents international tax-planning 
opportunities that are unique to multinational corporations. In general, multinational companies 
have two types of tax-planning strategy. The first type shifts income that would otherwise be 
taxed in a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction without changing the underlying 
economics of the MNC’s operation in these two jurisdictions, which is a strategy often referred 
in the literature as “paper shifting,” “tax-motivated income-shifting,” or simply “income-shifting.” 
I use these terms interchangeably in this study. The second type incorporates the tax incentives 
into the firm’s economic activities, which is a strategy referred as “real-shifting.”  
 One important method to accomplish paper shifting is through setting internal transfer 
prices. A corporation that transacts between two legal entities within the corporate group needs 
to decide on the transfer between the two entities. Because this transfer price represents revenue 
for one entity and cost for the other, it essentially splits the pre-tax profit between the two parties. 
For tax purposes, the tax system taxes income based on where it is legally (rather than 
economically) earned, so the MNC has the incentive to create a transfer price such that it results 
in a higher profit to the entity located in the low-tax jurisdiction, within the limits set by the tax 
authorities regarding transfer-pricing rules.  
 In addition to transfer-pricing, many other techniques exist to accomplish paper shifting. 
For example, intra-company financing arrangements often allow interest expense deduction in 
the high-tax entity and interest-income tax in the low-tax entity. The transfer of intellectual 
properties is another common technique that allows for royalty deduction in the high-tax entity 
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and royalty income tax in the low-tax entity. More aggressive strategies involve tapping into 
asymmetric tax treatments between two countries that result in no tax being paid in either 
jurisdiction. For example, a hybrid instrument can have its payment treated as an interest 
payment and deductible in one country, and at the same time treated as a dividend and non-
taxable in another country (Johannesen 2014).  
On the other hand, real-shifting entails allocating real assets and activities in low-tax 
jurisdictions, such that the economic income is taxed at lower tax rates. As discussed in the 
following subsections, the literature is rich with studies on paper shifting through transfer-pricing, 
but the area of real-shifting is underexplored. Due to concerns over aggressive paper shifting 
strategies, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) program, which is a massive program aimed at 
terminating certain loopholes that have resulted in opaque and aggressive income-shifting 
arrangements. As channels of paper shifting shrink, there has been increasing interest in real-
shifting strategies. For example, De Simone and Olbert (2019) find that multinational firms 
increase their use of real-shifting strategies when the cost of paper shifting strategies increase. 
My study contributes to this growing literature by studying a multinational corporation’s capital 
allocation decision in response to tax incentives, which is a real-shifting strategy, and how this 
strategy trades off its tax purposes against its managerial implications.  
 Existing literature on the intersection between tax and managerial considerations centers 
on the transfer-pricing decision in relation to income-shifting. Theoretical studies focus on the 
tradeoff between the tax and managerial implications of the internal transfer price. In the 
following subsections, I will discuss in detail the managerial considerations associated with a 
transfer-pricing decision, the tax implications of the transfer-pricing decision, and the interaction 
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between these two considerations that the literature has considered so far. I will also discuss in 
detail the empirical studies that have established the existence, determinants, and consequences 
of income-shifting, together with the various estimation methods.  
2.1.1 Transfer-pricing: Managerial importance 
Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, there has been significant growth in both 
organizational size and organizational forms. As multi-divisional firms became increasingly 
popular, the literature started to examine factors that contribute to centralized versus 
decentralized management. A popular argument for decentralization often hinges on the 
information asymmetry between the headquarters and the subdivisions. More recent studies in 
management recognize many other benefits of decentralization to achieve differentiation 
strategies for multinational companies. As discussed in Cook (1955), the transfer price between 
divisions plays a key role in ensuring that the right incentive is given. He discusses several 
transfer-pricing approaches and analyzes the pros and cons for each. 
Hirshleifer (1956) models a manufacturing subdivision that supplies products to the 
downstream parent purchaser. The approach that parent adopts to achieve the most efficient 
outcome depends on whether the manufacturing division can sell to an external market. He 
shows that if the external market exhibits perfect competition, then transferring at the market 
price is the most efficient. Hirshleifer (1957) models a situation where the revenue and cost of 
two divisions are indirectly related through production quantity, so demand changes in one 
division also cause changes in the marginal cost to the other. As a result, if each division 
maximizes its own profit, it is not optimal for the entire group because the changes in the 
marginal cost in the other division are not considered. He then shows that if the transfer price 
reflects the changes in the other division, it helps each division to internalize the overall 
organizational profit. An important assumption in the above studies is that the parent has 
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sufficient control to obtain the cost information from the subdivisions. As this feature is unlikely 
to hold in a decentralized organization, more recent studies have started to incorporate 
information asymmetry into their models.  
 Baldenius and Reichelstein (2006) model one central office and two subdivisions, one 
downstream and one upstream, each facing its own external market. In this structure, there are 
two types of information asymmetry: one exists between the central office and the divisions, and 
the other exists between the two divisions. More specifically, the manufacturing division can 
observe the realized condition of its own market and the purchasing division’s market, but the 
purchasing division can observe only the realization of its own market, while the central office 
can observe neither. The authors establish a relationship between the internal transfer price and 
the subdivision’s ability to respond to its external market. They find that transferring at the 
market price is not always efficient; instead, transferring at a discount is better when the 
manufacturing division has monopoly power in its external market. This is because when the 
manufacturing division faces the same price internally and externally, its internal supply 
subsidizes its production, so it has the incentive to over-supply the internal market instead of 
fully taking advantage of its external market. 
Other studies have examined the implication of internal price to the firm’s external 
relationships. Arya and Mittendorf (2007), for instance, show that one benefit of having a 
decentralized organization is to reduce the cost paid to external suppliers. In their model, the 
upstream division supplies one type of input to the downstream division that also needs to source 
another type of input from an external supplier. The downstream division then sells its final 
product in a competitive market following a Cournot market. The external supplier can observe 
the transfer price charged internally to the downstream division for the first type of input. A 
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higher internal price reduces the total residual profit available for the downstream division, so 
even with the same negotiation power, the external supplier gets a smaller share of the total 
profit available, allowing the firm to retain more profit within the organization. The authors 
highlight the point that even though decentralization does not directly improve the downstream 
division’s competitive position, it benefits the organization by improving the negotiation 
outcome with its external suppliers.  
Two studies examine the effect of a firm’s internal transfer price on its relationship with its 
external competitor in the context of forming collusions. Narayanan and Smith (2000) model a 
manufacturing parent and a purchasing subsidiary that sells a product to its own external market 
that can be either a monopoly or a Bertrand duopoly. They show that observing a higher internal 
transfer price charged to the purchasing subsidiary deters the other player in the duopoly from 
engaging in a price war. They suggest forming collusions instead of maintaining rivalry as a 
benefit of decentralization.  
Examining the same question but with different underlying assumptions, Chen and Shor 
(2009) show that under a Cournot market, collusions formed by firms through decentralization 
increase the profit for everyone in the collusion, but centralization remains the Nash Equilibrium 
without co-operation. Similar to the study of Narayanan and Smith (2000), in Chen and Shor 
(2009), decentralization allows the supplying division to charge an artificially high price so that 
the purchasing division must sell at a higher price in its final product market. If every firm 
decentralizes, then the market price will increase through a collusion of choosing 
decentralization. However, decentralization would no longer be a firm’s best response if there 
existed another firm that does not choose decentralization.  
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A critical assumption in the study of Narayanan and Smith (2000) is that the other player can 
observe the internal transfer price and the firm can credibly communicate its transfer price. The 
internal transfer price acts as a lower bound to the price that the purchasing subsidiary can charge 
in its external market, so that the other player has no incentive to set the price lower than the cost 
that the purchasing subsidiary has paid internally. There are challenges to an organization’s 
implementation of this assumption. One such challenge is that making the internal transfer price 
observable to competitors can encourage predatory behavior to the upstream division if the 
transfer price is too low. For example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) model predatory behavior 
in a two-period game where the headquarters’ allocation of resources to its subsidiary depends 
on the first-period performance. They find that a competitor can successfully attack if its rival’s 
performance in the first period is so bad that it receives no additional resources from its own 
headquarters in the second period.  
Another challenge is that the internal transfer price must not only be observable but also be 
sufficiently credible to the competitor. If the competitor senses that a different transfer price 
exists internally or that the purchasing subsidiary will be compensated in some other way, then 
this effect will disappear. Chen and Shor (2009) posit that the assumption of a Cournot market 
alleviates the concern about a credible commitment of the internal price, while Narayanan and 
Smith (2000) suggest a tax cost as a possible signal for the firm to credibly commit to such 
internal prices. For example, if a competitor observes a high transfer price between a purchasing 
division that is in a high-tax jurisdiction and a supplying division that is in a low-tax jurisdiction, 
then this high internal transfer price is more credible for tax reasons. On the other hand, the 
internal transfer price is less credible if the purchasing division is in a low-tax jurisdiction. 
However, this approach presents two limitations. First, its use is limited if the competitor has 
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reason to suspect that the firm may use a different managerial transfer price from its tax transfer 
price. Second, it remains an outstanding question as to whether and how a firm could release its 
tax transfer prices to parties other than the tax authorities.  
2.1.2 Transfer-pricing: Tax importance  
Halperin and Srinidhi (1987) model a transfer price as a determinant for production decisions 
and study how transfer price regulations for tax purposes distort production decisions. However, 
their model assumes a centralized organization. This is consistent with the relationship that 
governs the domestic parent and its foreign subsidiaries in the earlier stage of international 
business. In a follow-up paper, Halperin and Srinidhi (1991) consider a foreign supplying 
division that supplies an intermediate good to a domestic purchasing division. The transfer price 
between the two divisions is the same for incentive and tax purposes. They then consider three 
transfer-pricing methods and discuss the production quantity associated with each method. They 
show that without external constraints posed on the transfer price, the quantity produced would 
be optimal.  
Baldenius, Melumad, and Reichelstein (2004) consider the tax implications together with the 
managerial incentive that an internal transfer price provides. They model a decentralized 
organization where a foreign subsidiary supplies one type of product to a domestic subsidiary, 
and the foreign tax rate is lower than the domestic. They show that the transfer price that results 
in maximum tax savings can differ from the transfer price that incentivizes optimal production 
quantity. The intuition for this result follows that from Baldenius and Reichelstein (2006). 
Charging a high transfer price to the high-tax parent achieves more tax savings, but this high 
transfer price results in a marginal revenue so high that the foreign subsidiary loses its incentive 
to take full advantage of its external market. Instead, it over-relies on its sales to the internal 
market. They obtain an additional insight that differs from Hirshleifer (1956) by showing that the 
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incentive transfer price must exceed the cost to the supplying division to account for the tax 
considerations.  
Hyde and Choe (2005) study a similar context but focus on the interaction between the 
transfer price for accounting and for tax purposes. They model a domestic parent supplier and 
foreign purchasing subsidiary, but the domestic tax rate is lower than the foreign tax rate. The 
parent sells to both its external domestic market and its foreign subsidiary. The foreign 
subsidiary then sells to its market and maximizes its own accounting income after tax. They 
consider a sequential game where the parent moves first and decides on both the accounting and 
the tax transfer price. The parent also decides on the quantity that it sells to its own domestic 
market. The foreign subsidiary then decides on the quantity to purchase from the parent, the 
same quantity that it then sells in the foreign market. They first find that the tax-efficient transfer 
price would be too high to incentivize the foreign subsidiarity to purchase enough quantity to sell 
in the foreign market. This is a finding consistent with that of Baldenius, Melumad, and 
Reichelstein (2004). However, they then show that external shocks to the tax transfer price, such 
as regulation changes, change the accounting transfer price that is internal to the firm. Similarly, 
internal factors, such as increases in cost, that change the internal price also change the transfer 
price for external tax purposes. Essentially, if one price changes and results in an undesirable 
quantity change, the firm can mitigate this problem by adjusting the other price.  
Smith (2002b) considers a parent principal and a foreign subsidiary agent that decides on two 
sets of effort, one devoted to the product supplied to the parent, and the other devoted to its own 
market. The two sets of efforts are independent, and the two types of products are also 
independent in terms of their profitability. Smith (2002b) further incorporates a compensation 
scheme to the agent that is a joint function of the transfer price and the agent’s profit in its own 
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market. He separately considers the two cases where the transfer price for compensation 
purposes is the same as, or differs from, the transfer price for tax purposes. He finds that when 
they are the same, there is a tradeoff between the tax benefits and providing incentive for the 
agent.  
The tax motivation for setting internal transfer prices can affect a firm’s investment. Smith 
(2002a) models a centralized organization that makes a domestic and foreign investment. He first 
establishes the benchmark case when the transfer price for tax purposes is not tied to the 
investment level. In this case, the firm can optimize its investments without any concern for the 
tax consequences, consistent with Halperin and Srinidhi (1991). Smith (2002a) then considers 
the implication for a firm’s investment when the transfer acceptable to the tax authorities must be 
tied to the investment level. He shows that these transfer-pricing regulations distort investments 
as compared to the benchmark case. He further shows that the level of discretion allowed under 
each transfer-pricing method can either mitigate or exacerbate these distortions.  
Sansing (1999) compares the level of investment made between two independent parties and 
that made between two parties in a parent-subsidiary relationship. The independent relationship 
suffers from a hold-up problem, while the parent-subsidiary relationship suffers from an 
incentive alignment problem. He shows that because the level of investment differs between 
these two cases, the resulting transfer prices must also differ. This result presents challenge to the 
application of the “arm’s length” transfer price rule that tax authorities often require. Because the 
relationships are fundamentally different, the investment decisions that drive the transfer prices 
under the two systems cannot derive from comparable circumstances.  
Martini, Niemann, and Simons (2012) model a parent and two subsidiaries that face different 
tax rates. One subsidiary supplies an intermediate good to the other which then sells to its own 
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external market. They further assume that the supplying subsidiary cannot sell to its external 
market. In addition, the two subsidiaries make simultaneous investments that are either value-
enhancing or cost-reducing. The key issue in their study is whether the investments made by the 
two subsidiaries are optimal. They use the level of optimal investments derived when the 
headquarters dictates all decisions as a benchmark and compare it with decentralized decision-
making. They show that exogenous transfer-pricing rules required by the tax authorities can 
induce different levels of investment. These results closely resemble the hold-up problem and are 
contingent on several assumptions. First, no information asymmetry exists between the 
headquarters and the subsidiaries regarding the functional form of the investment decision and 
the realization of the investments. Second, the headquarters can decide and enforce the quantity 
produced. Finally, the transfer price is not a decision variable that the headquarters could use to 
incentivize investment decisions.  
In summary, an MNC’s transfer-pricing decision has important tax implications and serves 
various managerial roles such as incentivizing different production units to produce the optimal 
quantity, to internalize the incentive of the overall organization in its investment decisions, and 
to incentivize an optimal level of effort. However, these setups are most appropriate when 
physical goods are transacted and when there is a well-defined vertical supply chain. In addition, 
the literature has not considered other important decisions that multinational corporations make 
that bear both a tax and managerial consequence. My study contributes to this literature by 
considering a setup where the subsidiary relationship is characterized by the collaboration and 
flow of intangible knowledge rather than of physical goods. As discussed in Section 2.2, modern 
international business models emphasize the lateral relationships that subsidiaries form with one 
another, especially when knowledge integration forms a business’s core competence. In this 
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context, my study addresses the central allocation of capital resource, which is a decision that 
bears both a tax and a managerial consequence but has not been explored in the literature.  
2.1.3 Income-shifting: Theoretical basis and empirical findings 
 In general, two types of system exist concerning taxing the profit earned by the foreign 
subsidiaries of a multinational corporation. The worldwide system taxes such income as earned 
domestically but applies a foreign tax credit against the domestic taxes otherwise payable, while 
the territorial system exempts such foreign income from domestic taxation. With the territorial 
system, an income-shifting strategy achieves permanent tax savings, while with a worldwide 
system, income-shifting technically achieves only tax deferrals, until such time that the income is 
repatriated back home. This raises the question about how much benefit firms derive from the 
income-shifting that achieves only temporary tax deferrals. Prior to the Tax Cut and Jobs Acts 
(TCJA) reform of 2017, the U.S. had its worldwide system for a long time, yet a number of 
studies have documented that U.S. multinational companies engage in income-shifting behaviors 
(Dyreng and Markle 2016, Klassen and Laplante 2012b, Markle 2016). There is a long line of 
inquiry into the cost and benefits of income-shifting, even when the benefits seem only 
temporary.  
Under the worldwide system, a firm can either repatriate its foreign earnings and incur 
immediate taxes, or reinvest abroad and continue deferring taxes. Hartman (1985) and Sinn 
(1993) first modeled this decision. Hartman (1985) distinguishes mature from immature foreign 
operations and finds that a firm with a mature foreign operation is indifferent between 
reinvestment and repatriation when the after-tax foreign return equals the after-tax domestic 
return. More importantly, this decision is independent of domestic tax policies. Sinn (1993) 
incorporates the growth and maturity of a firm by considering a two-period model where the 
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corporation decides on the value of an initial investment in the first period and the value of 
reinvestment or repatriation in the second period.  
Weichenrieder (1996) extends the Hartman-Sinn model by allowing foreign 
reinvestments to be in financial assets. Altshuler and Grubert (2002) further extend the model to 
include strategies that use passive investments to achieve the economic equivalence of 
repatriation without incurring repatriation taxes. Klassen, Laplante, and Carnaghan (2014) 
extend Altshuler and Grubert (2002) to include the possibility of income-shifting and find that if 
the foreign required rate of return is low, then shifting occurs and reinvestment is better than 
repatriation; but when the required return is high, no shifting occurs and repatriation is better 
than reinvestment.  
Although earlier studies do not document income-shifting behaviors by U.S. 
multinational corporations (Collins, Kemsley, and Lang 1998), more recent studies provide 
corroborating empirical evidence of such behavior. Clausing (1998) and Clausing (2003) find 
that prices of intra-organizational transactions of U.S. multinational companies vary with tax 
incentives, namely the tax differential between the transacting parties. Clausing (2009) shows 
that the U.S. loses 35% of its 2004 corporate tax revenue due to income-shifting. Klassen and 
Laplante (2012b) find that U.S. firms have become more aggressive income-shifters over time. 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) find evidence of profit shifting in the European Union. Using 
data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg (2019) provide 
empirical evidence that U.S. multinational companies shift income through inter-company 
payments to low-tax subsidiaries. Markle, Mills, and Williams (2019) suggest that the real extent 
of shifting could even be higher than what is revealed in these measures, after accounting for any 
potential implicit taxes.  
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In addition to establishing empirical evidence for the existence of income-shifting, the 
literature also examines its determinants and consequences. Studies find that firms shift more 
income when they face better foreign reinvestment opportunities or have higher financial 
reporting incentives (Klassen and Laplante 2012a), when they have less financial constraints 
(Dyreng and Markle 2016), and when they are subject to a territorial tax system that does not 
impose domestic taxes on foreign income (Markle 2016). Studying an exogenous shock to firms’ 
financial reporting regulations, the implementation of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), De Simone (2016) finds that IFRS adopters engage in a more aggressive 
income-shifting strategy than non-adopters after mandatory IFRS adoption. Using affiliate-level 
data, De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017) document that while firms respond to tax 
incentives to shift income to low-tax subsidiaries when the subsidiaries are profitable, the 
opposite is true when the subsidiaries have losses. In other words, firms also respond to tax 
incentives to shift to high-tax subsidiaries that have losses. On the consequence side, De Simone, 
Klassen, and Seidman (2019) develop a firm-specific income-shifting measure and find that 
firms that engage in more tax-motivated incomes shifting respond to investment opportunities 
less efficiently than those that engage in less income-shifting.  
The above studies use direct empirical proxies that generally fall under two categories. 
The first method follows Hines and Rice (1994) who model pre-shifted income as a Cobb-
Douglas production function of inputs, and the degree to which the difference between the 
observed income and the output from the Cobb-Douglas function is correlated with jurisdictional 
tax rates is considered shifted income for tax reasons. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) enhance the 
model by including an affiliate-level tax incentive variable to better capture tax-motivated 
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income-shifting. With this method, any profit that is above the level predicted with economic 
factors and responds to tax incentives is considered tax-motivated income-shifting.  
The second approach builds on Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) who assume that a 
firm has the same profitability across all countries, absent income-shifting. They then define 
shifted income to be the correlation of the difference between foreign and total profitability that 
can be explained by tax incentives. Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) measure profitability by 
the return on sales and tax incentives by the difference between domestic and foreign tax rates 
(FTR). Klassen and Laplante (2012b) improve the  Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) model by 
using an instrumental variable and changing the annual FTR to a 5-year FTR measure. It is worth 
pointing out that the first method considers location-specific factors that may affect an affiliate’s 
profitability, but both methods treat the profitability across subsidiaries as independent of one 
another.  
Dyreng and Markle (2016) take a different approach by requiring the profits shifted to 
equal the profits shifted out. They propose estimating two simultaneous equations that the two 
directions must satisfy. Their method is based on the premise that reported pre-tax income is 
after shifting but reported sales are not. Their reason is that whereas the recognition of pre-tax 
income is based on the legal domicile of the income-earning entity, the recognition of sales is 
based on the location of third-party customers. Furthermore, income-shifting transactions change 
the legal entitlement of income among entities but not the location of external customers, so they 
only affect income but not sales.  
In addition to these direct measures of income-shifting, studies have also documented 
evidence of income-shifting with indirect measures. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) show that 
firms shift income to tax havens to defer U.S. taxes. Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) find that U.S. 
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firms who disclose their presence in tax havens bear less overall tax burdens than firms who do 
not disclose their presence in tax havens. Using indirect measures, the literature documents 
several consequences. When shifted income is subject to a future repatriation tax, companies 
tend to have an excessive cash holding offshore (Foley et al. 2007), and a high amount of trapped 
cash can translate into a low return on the foreign investments (Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson 
2016). Akamah, Hope, and Thomas (2016) find that firms with a heavier use of tax havens report 
geographic earnings at a more aggregate level. Williams (2018) find that U.S. jobs are more 
likely to be lost to countries with lower tax rates, suggesting that firms move not only income but 
also jobs to tax-favored jurisdictions.  
In summary, the empirical literature provides strong evidence that multinational 
corporations engage in income-shifting strategies. Determinants of such behaviors include a 
firm’s financial constraints, financial reporting regulations and incentives, opportunities in the 
foreign markets, and the tax status of a foreign affiliate. Firms that adopt income-shifting 
strategies likely have a presence in tax havens and create an opaque reporting environment. The 
empirical literature generally regards the multinational firm as an internally coherent decision-
maker and has not addressed the various players with different incentives that contribute to the 
observed behaviors. My study contributes to this literature by incorporating the coordination cost 
associated with managing the different internal parties and by studying how this coordination 
cost affects a firm’s response to tax incentives.  
2.1.4 Tax implications of intellectual properties (IP) 
With technology taking a more prominent place in international business strategies, the 
tax literature has also examined the tax incentives in relation to the development of IPs. The 
development and ownership of intellectual properties is another important tool to achieve 
income-shifting. By wholly or partially owning an IP, a low-tax subsidiary can receive large 
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amounts of future royalty payments to be taxed at its low tax rate. Several studies document that 
tax incentives for R&D are associated with higher IP ownership (Böhm et al. 2015, Bradley, 
Dauchy, and Robinson 2015, Ernst and Spengel 2011, Griffith, Miller, and O'Connell 2010, 2014, 
Karkinsky and Riedel 2012). My study contributes to this literature by establishing that the 
development process itself can also affect a multinational corporation’s response to surrounding 
tax incentives.  
Magelssen (2020) studies the effect of owning IP on a subsidiary’s innovative ability and 
quality. From a business strategy perspective, she theorizes that ownership of IP conveys income 
and decision rights to the subsidiary, so the subsidiary has greater autonomy to innovate. She 
finds that while ownership of IPs is positively associated with tax incentives, subsidiaries that are 
IP owners respond more efficiently to increases in local R&D opportunities than those that are 
not IP owners, suggesting that ownership of IP, even for tax reasons, improves the efficiency of 
local innovations. De Simone, Huang, and Krull (2019) show that while tax incentives explain 
paper income-shifting behaviors by multinational corporations that exploit domestic developed 
R&D, wage incentives are responsible for explaining real income-shifting behaviors of 
multinational firms that exploit foreign-developed R&D. Although both tax and wage benefits 
lead to the observation of higher foreign preferabilities, they find that the factor with the greatest 
benefits to be mainly responsible for explaining this phenomenon. Huang, Krull, and Ziedonis 
(2019) document that tax incentives provide additional benefits for multinational firms to include 
cross-border partners in developing patents.  
De Simone and Sansing (2019) model a situation where a U.S. parent company owns pre-
existing IP to be further developed with a foreign subsidiary. The U.S. parent decides on the 
method for joint development, and the subsidiary does not provide any input into this decision. 
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They discuss situations under which the parent company would use a cost-sharing arrangement. 
Under a cost-sharing arrangement, the MNC could take advantage of the information asymmetry 
on the expected value of the IP to the tax authority. However, the tax authority might pursue an 
audit that challenges the MNC’s assessment. They show that the MNC prefers the cost-sharing 
arrangement when its incremental benefit is high, when the tax authority’s information 
asymmetry is high, and when the cost of enforcement is high.  
Reineke and Weiskirchner-Merten (2020) consider a domestic headquarters and two 
subdivisions, where the domestic division faces a higher tax rate than the foreign division. The 
headquarters has existing IP that the two subsidiaries can use without any further development. 
The headquarters decides on the ownership of this IP and the royalty rate that the owning party 
charges. They omit the price at which ownership transfers from the headquarters to the 
subsidiaries. After the headquarters’ decision, each subsidiary then takes action regarding the use 
of this IP. One subsidiary’s use generates a benefit to the other subsidiary that does not depend 
on the other subsidiary’s action. Furthermore, this externality is purely coincidental and not 
controlled by any action of the subsidiary, so the two subsidiaries are independent of each other 
in this sense. They show that the tax benefits derived from the ownership and royalty payment 
decisions are subject to the non-owning subsidiary’s under-investment of effort, which, in turn, 
affects its coincidental externality conferred to the other subsidiary. A critical assumption in 
Reineke and Weiskirchner-Merten (2020) is that the return from one’s own effort does not 
depend on the effort of the other. There is no joint project which the two subsidiaries develop 
together and there is no issue of sharing any profits from a joint development, unlike the 
relationship-specific investment considered in the case of the hold-up problem.  
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Whereas most studies focus on the effect of tax incentives on the use of IP, my study 
focuses on the development of IP and specifically considers the active contribution of each 
subsidiary in the innovation process. As discussed in Section 2.4, cross-functional collaborations 
are critical to the success of an innovation. I incorporate this key element of the development 
process by studying a situation where without one subsidiary’s active contribution, the other 
subsidiary cannot pursue the innovative opportunity alone. Furthermore, my study extends this 
literature by offering a prediction on the responsiveness of capital allocation to tax incentives, 
which is a decision that has not been addressed in this literature. Finally, the differential 
responsiveness depends on the coordination needs within an MNC.  
2.2 International Business Literature  
 The development in the international business literature has strongly influenced the setup 
in my study. In this section, I will discuss in detail how this literature has evolved in its view of 
the multinational entity and the theory’s implications for the parent-subsidiary relationship and 
the relationships that subsidiaries form with one another. The parent-subsidiary relationship has 
evolved as subsidiaries develop new mandates and accumulate new expertise and resources. 
Several review papers, such as Westney and Zaheer (2009) and Tallman and Yip (2009), discuss 
the challenges and opportunities that the complexity of the multinational environment presents to 
the parent-subsidiary relationship, and how they differ from those present in purely domestic 
firms (Paterson and Brock 2002, Tallman and Yip 2009, Westney and Zaheer 2009). They 
synthesize both external and internal factors that the literature has documented to influence the 
parent-subsidiary relationship.  
2.2.1 Factors that determine the parent-subsidiary relationship  
 Roth and O'Donnell (1996) adopt a principal-agent framework to study factors that 
contribute to an agency issue at the subsidiary level. The authors use the extent of an incentive-
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based compensation to proxy for the severity of the agency issue at the subsidiary level. 
Surveying more than 100 firms, the authors propose and test several of its main determinants. 
First, the difference between the culture in the country of the headquarters and the culture in the 
country of the subsidiary creates obstacles for the headquarters to learn about the local condition 
of the subsidiary, thus increasing information asymmetry between the two parties. Second, 
managerial discretion is often given to subsidiaries that share interdependent processes to allow 
for effective and timely decision-making. These subsidiaries are often part of a complex supply 
chain where it is difficult to separate one party’s input from another in the output. This means 
that direct monitoring is not possible because each subsidiary’s action cannot be traced directly 
to an outcome. Furthermore, a subsidiary has a greater decision power if it possesses specialized 
knowledge that is critical to a value-adding activity, especially in firms that are heavy on 
research and development. Finally, the organizational culture can influence the degree that the 
subsidiary identifies with and commits to the parent company, and organizational identity and 
commitment motivate the subsidiary to adopt more of the overall organizational goal.  
 Ghoshal and Nohria (1989, 1994) find that the parent-subsidiary relationship is not 
simply an organizational construct but varies greatly across subsidiaries within the same 
organization. They document that when the local environment that a subsidiary operates in is 
complex, local knowledge becomes relatively more important, and the subsidiary has greater 
influence in decision-making. They also find that subsidiaries that are endowed with more 
resources are less likely to submit to the central management. Resource-independent subsidiaries 
are often also independent on other fronts. Furthermore, being the holder of valuable assets, 
tangible or intangible, makes the subsidiary important not only to the MNC but also to the local 
economy, and thus confers power to the subsidiary in the decision-making process. Finally, the 
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authors find that in managing a subsidiary that has power, coordination is a more desirable 
managerial approach than giving direct orders. 
  Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) introduce a novel management theory that uses network 
theory to explain the difference in the parent-subsidiary relationships within a multinational 
entity. They characterize the parent-subsidiary relationship based on two resource allocation 
patterns. The first characteristic is whether resources are concentrated in one location or are 
scattered all over the organization, which the authors term “dispersal.” With a dispersed 
allocation, the organization often has repeated functions and expertise at different locations. The 
second characteristic is whether one location’s function can supply the worldwide need of the 
organization in that one area, which the authors term “specialization.” The researchers then study 
the effect of a subsidiary’s role within its external network on the relationship it has with the 
parent. If a subsidiary operates in an environment where key external stakeholders form a tight 
relationship, then success in that local market requires the subsidiary to be a member of the close 
circle that connects with all the external stakeholders. In this case of a high “within density,” the 
subsidiary is equipped with multiple functions, and the organization adopts a high-dispersal and 
low-specialization strategy. However, this challenge can be overcome if the expertise can be 
easily accessed from another location, which the authors term an “across density” of the external 
network. In this case, the organization is free to specialize and optimally locates special 
resources at important hubs that serve multiple locations.  
 Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) further consider how a subsidiary’s network properties 
influence its bargaining power and decision-making autonomy. In an environment where the 
subsidiary forms a closed interaction with key external stakeholders (high within density), it 
becomes indispensable for the organization to access its market. The external barrier of entry 
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then becomes the subsidiary’s own protection and power to seek resources and independence. To 
explain the effect of the across density, the authors model the multinational entity as a network 
where each unit (including the parent) represents a node, and an edge exists between two nodes 
if the two units interact with one another. To effectively serve external stakeholders, some 
subsidiaries build connections with many other subsidiaries and become critical hubs that are 
indispensable for the organization to connect internal resources and expertise. The importance of 
these hubs allows them to possess many resources and become more independent from the parent.  
 O’Donnell (2000) compares the two theories in terms of their ability to explain the 
parent-subsidiary relationship. Under the first theory, that the author terms “agency theory,” the 
headquarters uses a more direct monitoring when the subsidiary’s local advantage is low and 
incentive schemes when the subsidiary’s local advantage is high. The author theorizes that a 
subsidiary’s local advantage and its specialized skillsets create more information asymmetry 
between the headquarters and the subsidiary, making monitoring more difficult and delegation 
more appropriate. Under the second theory, that the author terms “interdependence theory,” the 
parent-subsidiary relationship depends on whether the subsidiary has a stronger reliance on the 
headquarters or on other subsidiaries. The author theorizes that the headquarters uses a vertical 
and formal control when the subsidiary’s reliance is more toward the headquarters, and it uses 
horizontal and social methods when the subsidiary’s reliance is more toward other subsidiaries. 
Collecting questionnaires from 255 parent-subsidiary pairs, the author finds that interdependence 
theory explains the variation in the parent-subsidiary relationships better than agency theory.  
2.2.2 Active role of subsidiaries: Initiatives  
 The above studies show that a subsidiary’s role within an organization can be assigned 
according to the organizational strategy. On the other hand, there are other studies which also 
32 
 
show that subsidiaries can be active in forming the organization’s competitive advantage and 
shaping its strategy (Burgelman 1983, Prahald 1976, Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings 1993, Birkinshaw 
1997, Birkinshaw, Morrison, and Hulland 1995, Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995). Furthermore, 
there are studies which show that subsidiaries can act as entrepreneurs that actively identify 
opportunities that fit with their own value proposition and act upon these opportunities (Cantwell 
and Mudambi 2005, Delany 2000, Rugman and Verbeke 2001). The result of such initiatives 
strengthens the multinational organization’s overall competitive position. The initiative in turn 
could help the subsidiary to gain more influence in the key decision-making processes (Ambos, 
Andersson, and Birkinshaw 2010).  
  Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings (1993) consider the advancement of organizational mandates 
as an iterative process between top-down and bottom-up reforms. In a more recent paper, 
Cuervo-Cazurra, Mudambi, and Pedersen (2019) combine the two perspectives to explain the 
evolution in the parent-subsidiary relationship. They posit that both the relinquishment of control 
from headquarters and the accumulation of power through resources have contributed to the 
increased scope in subsidiary roles and responsibilities.  
 Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) discuss how the literature has evolved in its view of the 
organizational structure of multinational entities. They discuss that earlier theory regarded the 
multinational as a hierarchy where there is a well-defined vertical flow of responsibility, with 
formalized and tight control from the top (Williamson 1985, Chandler 1962). However, with 
more studies dedicated to subsidiary activities, subsequent researchers have found that 
subsidiaries can acquire mandates and develop expertise on their own. Furthermore, subsidiaries 
often interact with one another and form lateral relationships, and there are studies which 
propose a horizontal framework that addresses the interdependence among subsidiaries of the 
33 
 
multinational’s complex internal supply chain (Porter 1985, Prahalad 1987, Prahald 1976). As 
discussed in Porter (1989), this interdependence means that the return from one subsidiary’s 
investment may be jointly determined by its own investment and the investment or action of 
another subsidiary.  
 Birkinshaw (1997) describes four types of initiative that a subsidiary may undertake and 
examines characteristics that are associated with each type. The first type is when the initiative 
mainly enhances the subsidiary’s ability to serve the local market. With this type of initiative, no 
major hurdle exists for the headquarters to entrust the subsidiary with local responsibilities. The 
second type is when the initiative reduces the cost of a certain process or function that serves the 
entire organization. With this type of initiative, the subsidiary must possess a reputation or 
demonstrate to the headquarters its competitive advantage over other subsidiaries in the specific 
area. The third type is when the initiative allows the company to unlock new markets globally. 
With this type of initiative, the subsidiary is often recognized as the expert in the relevant area 
and has high autonomy and low interference from the headquarters. The final type is a 
combination between the second and third types, where the headquarters identifies such global 
opportunities and allows for a bidding process among subsidiaries. Among the 39 companies 
interviewed, more than a third of the companies have subsidiaries that contribute at the global 
level. This finding brings an important perspective that the intellectual capabilities held at the 
subsidiaries can collectively form a multinational organization’s value proposition.  
 Several other related studies provide empirical evidence that supports the active role of 
subsidiaries. Cantwell and Mudambi (2005), for instance, find that subsidiaries that possess 
expertise engage in research and development that enhance the overall competence of the 
organization. Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson (1998) survey 229 foreign subsidiaries of large 
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multinational manufacturing companies and find that initiatives taken by subsidiaries can result 
in the development of new competencies that grant the organization access to a new market 
worldwide. Rugman and Verbeke (2001) confirm this finding and further study the process 
through which expertise developed in one subsidiary for one purpose allows the subsidiary to 
contribute to subsequent projects across location boundaries. Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson 
(1998) find that subsidiaries with special resources are more likely to contribute to and lead the 
overall organizational strategy. They further find that subsidiary-level culture, not just the overall 
organizational culture, matters regarding whether a subsidiary takes such initiatives. Birkinshaw 
and Morrison (1995), collecting questionnaires from 126 subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, find that subsidiaries that contribute outside of their own local market can make 
decisions that concern both their operations and their strategies. 
2.2.3 Coordination as the most important function for headquarters  
 The parent-subsidiary relationship is important not only to the headquarters but also to 
the good functioning of subsidiaries. Taking the perspective of the subsidiary, Lunnan et al. 
(2019) survey 104 subsidiary managers and find that subsidiaries expect the headquarters to 
coordinate well and provide the necessary support to carry out their functions. Insufficient 
information, either due to purposeful withholding or ignorance in communication, hinders and 
delays decision-making for subsidiaries. They further discuss that renegotiations and changes of 
previously agreed upon arrangements also lead to waste and inefficient allocation of resources. 
This is a cost that the headquarters may not even recognize. The authors find that coordination 
mechanisms and empathy can improve the subsidiary’s perception of the headquarters.  
 As subsidiaries become more dispersed and independent and receive less direction from 
headquarters, some researchers have begun revisiting the question of what is the essential value 
that the headquarters bring. As discussed in Ambos and Mahnke (2010) and Tallman and Koza 
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(2010), although subsidiaries can self-guide in their own responsibilities, they do not necessarily 
know the expertise available in other subsidiaries. In this case, the key advantage of the 
headquarters is its bird’s-eye view that allows it to see the distribution of resources across all 
locations. A key function for the headquarters is to identify opportunities that combine the 
specialized resources from various locations and to arrange for subsidiaries to work together and 
share their resources. Another key function for the headquarters is to gather information globally 
and disseminate it to subsidiaries that cannot otherwise access the information, as suggested in 
Egelhoff (2010).  
2.2.4 Knowledge management among multinational subsidiaries 
 Resource management among international subsidiaries is an important aspect that 
multinational entities must address to thrive in their complex environment (Barney 1991, Barney 
2001, Peng 2001, Sirmon et al. 2011). Among the different types of resources, knowledge and its 
integration are at the core of the existence of multinational entities (Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000, Porter 1986, Teece 1981, Zander and Kogut 1995, Spender and Grant 1996), and yet 
knowledge is the most difficult to manage. Knowledge exists in the forms of technical know-
how, expertise, and experiences that are tacit and non-transactable (Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
This characteristic of knowledge creates significant barriers for its sharing and transfer, 
especially through formal processes (Teece 1977, Szulanski 1996, Subramaniam and 
Venkatraman 2001).  
 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) point out that many multinational companies have adopted a 
“differentiation strategy” (p. 44), where each subsidiary develops a unique niche according to its 
strength, and the niche is specific to the local market or serves a specific function within the 
organization. As a result, some subsidiaries become sole holders of critical intangible assets such 
as information, relationships, knowledge, and expertise. For initiatives that require these 
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resources, the subsidiaries then are often the leader, instead of the headquarters. They find that a 
coordination strategy is more effective than direct control in mobilizing this type of resource, and 
that interactions and collaborations among subsidiaries can promote the sharing of these 
resources. Gupta and Govindarajan (1994) show that subsidiaries can innovate on their own and 
their innovation objectives in connection with other subsidiaries are consistent with their 
differentiated strategic roles within the multinational network, which is a concept discussed in 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990). 
 The implication of the above discussion is that knowledge is often scattered across 
subsidiaries, yet it is a collection and integration of all available knowledge and expertise which 
composes the multinational’s core competence. The dispersion and non-transactability of 
knowledge make it especially important for the headquarters to facilitate and oversee the transfer 
and sharing among subsidiaries (Ambos and Mahnke 2010, Ciabuschi, Martín, and Ståhl 2010, 
Tran, Mahnke, and Ambos 2010).  
 In general, there are two types of knowledge, that which can be described and encoded 
easily, such as facts and procedural documentations, and that which is tacit in nature and cannot 
be transcribed easily. As discussed in Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and Zander and Kogut (1995), 
it is the latter type that allows companies to sustain competitive advantage because competitors 
may observe the final product but cannot reverse-engineer to recreate the product. However, it is 
also this latter type that creates difficulties for knowledge-sharing, even among parties internal to 
the organization. Tacit knowledge is important not only to the overall organization but also to the 
subsidiary that seeks an innovative opportunity (Sheng and Hartmann 2019). Szulanski (1996) 
and Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) find that barriers to effective learning among subsidiaries 
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include the perceived value of the knowledge being shared, the recipient’s attitude and ability 
toward learning, and the relationship between the origin and the receiving subsidiaries.  
  Hedlund (1994) finds that with tacit knowledge, collaborative horizontal management is 
more effective than formal vertical management. The objective is to combine knowledge through 
providing opportunities for subsidiaries to interact and work with one another. Subramaniam and 
Venkatraman (2001) find that the ability to connect the necessary and relevant skillsets across 
international subsidiaries is an important determinant of the multinational’s ability to innovate 
for multiple markets. They further find that teaming up subsidiaries from different locations is an 
effective way of combining knowledge and facilitate organizational learning. Mahnke and 
Venzin (2003) confirm the value of such teams but find that the headquarters’ oversight is 
important to ensure that these teams have the right incentive to collaborate toward the overall 
organizational goals.  
 Ciabuschi, Martín, and Ståhl (2010) report similar findings on the immense value that the 
headquarters brings through its function of coordinating knowledge-sharing. They discuss three 
tools that the headquarters can use to accomplish this task: allocating appropriate and adequate 
resources, delegating the appropriate types of decision rights, and minimizing direct monitoring 
in the process. Mahnke, Venzin, and Zahra (2007) discuss the headquarters’ role in facilitating 
and consolidating the opportunity identification activities that are dispersed across subsidiaries. 
They argue that the unpredictable behavior and interests of the other parties involved could 
greatly hinder this process. As a result, the headquarters plays an important role in incentivizing 
the different parties to act in one accord. They find that in addition to designing the incentives, 
the headquarters’ commitment to them also affects the incentives’ effectiveness.  
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 The need for coordination from the headquarters also arises to balance power between 
subsidiaries endowed with a higher amount of IP and those endowed with a lower amount. Ram 
and Pietro (2004) find that if the subsidiary develops a significant intangible property that is of 
value to the business, it gains bargaining power to share more in internal resources. This power 
plays out not only in the vertical relationship with the headquarters but also in the horizontal 
relationship with other subsidiaries. The authors combine survey data, patent data, and financial 
reports and find support that subsidiaries endowed with knowledge possess power to influence 
group decisions. They proxy the transfer of knowledge to the parent in the form of dividends and 
royalties paid to the parent.  
 Dellestrand and Kappen (2012) examine the headquarters’ involvement from the 
perspective of subsidiary differences. They discuss the importance of headquarters’ involvement 
in the transfer of innovation projects between subsidiaries. They examine 169 such transfers and 
find that the extent of human and organizational resources dedicated by headquarters to these 
transfers varies significantly across organizations. They posit that headquarters’ involvement and 
mitigation are especially needed when the transferrer and transferee subsidiaries are not familiar 
with one another and face information asymmetry. Their main construct is the distance between 
the two subsidiaries in four dimensions: geography, culture, language, and local environment. 
They find that greater distance leads to a significantly higher amount of resource dedicated from 
the headquarters to the transfers.  
2.2.5 Competition among subsidiaries  
 Stein (1997) models a situation where the headquarters has limited capital resources 
available for allocation. The implication is that the optimal amount allocated to one project is not 
only a function of its own profitability but also the profitability of other projects. When the 
headquarters adopts a winner-picking strategy in its capital allocation, subsidiaries access the 
39 
 
same pool of capital and must compete. As a result, the capital allocated to one subsidiary has an 
opportunity cost that equals the profit that could be earned in another subsidiary. This 
opportunity cost is an important consideration for the headquarters’ capital allocation decision in 
my study.  
 Procher and Engel (2018) examine an inter-temporal relationship between international 
divestment. They build on existing theory on competition among subsidiaries and argue that 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries do not compete on the same ground. They find that within the 
multinational network, domestic subsidiaries are more likely to compete with domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries with foreign. They provide empirical evidence for this competition by 
documenting that domestic divestment is strongly associated with current-period domestic 
investment and vice versa, whereas the respective foreign investment/divestment does not matter. 
Similarly, prior-period foreign investment is shown to be strongly associated with current-period 
foreign divestment and vice versa, whereas the respective domestic investment/divestment does 
not matter. Birkinshaw and Lingblad (2005) conceptualize the competition among subsidiaries as 
the extent of similarities between their tasks or the ways through which they add value. They 
theorize that subsidiaries that face blurred definitions of boundaries are more likely to face 
competition, because they are also more likely to share similarities. They find that this occurs 
when subsidiaries face ambiguous external opportunities and operate in less mature markets.  
 In summary, a major development in the international business literature is the shift from 
treating the multinational group as a vertical hierarchy to treating it as an interrelated network. 
This development reflects differentiation among subsidiaries that lead to the development of 
subsidiary-specific resources in the form of knowledge, expertise, and connections to local and 
global partners. The literature further documents that subsidiary initiative and autonomy often 
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lead to subsidiaries gaining their own niche and becoming the owner of their subsidiary-specific 
resources. The access and integration of these subsidiary-specific resources are important to the 
creation of new organizational competencies. As a result, the headquarters plays a crucial role in 
coordinating the different subsidiaries to contribute their respective expertise. Taken together, 
the multinational corporation has a unique opportunity to innovate with subsidiary collaborations 
but also faces a unique challenge to coordinate cross-subsidiary activities. This unique 
opportunity and challenge are at the heart of this thesis. My study concerns a setting where each 
subsidiary has its own subsidiary-specific expertise, and a unique innovative opportunity exists 
but requires expertise from both subsidiaries. The headquarters plays a crucial role in the 
coordination of the two subsidiaries’ actions, because each subsidiary is the owner and has full 
control rights over its own subsidiary-specific knowledge.  
2.3 Joint Investment  
 In this section, I review the literature concerning joint investment made by two parties. 
This literature ties closely with my thesis, because the setup that I examine in this thesis includes 
two parties that interpedently make an investment decision in addition to their respective 
intellectual contribution decision. As discussed at the end of this section, whereas most studies in 
this literature concern the amount of investment a party makes without an opportunity cost, my 
study addresses the type of investment a party makes with an opportunity cost that equals the 
profits otherwise earned on the other project.  
2.3.1 International joint venture  
In this thesis, I examine the coordination issue among international parties in the context 
of a multinational corporation, but the coordination issue is also present in other forms of 
conducting international businesses such as international joint ventures. Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2002) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) find that U.S. firms became less likely to use IJVs 
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over the fifteen-year period up until their studies. They attribute the decline to the increasing 
coordination cost associated with IJVs caused by three main factors. First, the international joint 
venture (JV) partner may have different business objectives than the local JV partner. Second, 
the international JV partner may be concerned with the appropriation of intellectual property by 
the local JV partner. Finally, the transfer price that is optimal for incentive or tax reasons for the 
international JV partner may not be optimal for the local JV partner. 
A key advantage of international collaboration is to access new expertise relevant to the 
local market held by the foreign party. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) find that IJVs are 
desirable when most of the activities conducted by the foreign affiliate are with foreign (local) 
parties. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) examine the relationship between tax-planning and the 
cost to coordinate with an external JV partner by comparing reported profitability at the affiliate 
level of wholly owned versus partially owned affiliates. They find an overall negative association 
between reported profitability and the affiliates' tax rate but find a less negative association for 
partially owned firms. The authors find that royalties payments to the parent are significantly 
higher for wholly owned affiliates than partially owned affiliates. The authors interpret the result 
as having more transfers of IP with wholly owned than with partially owned affiliates. While the 
result is interesting, there is some concern regarding its interpretation. While the evidence could 
suggest a higher use of IP by wholly owned affiliates than partially owned ones, one must not 
confuse the use of IP with its transfer. Recent studies show that whether to transfer an ownership 
of IP to local subsidiaries (especially those located in low-tax jurisdictions) is an important 
consideration in an MNC’s tax plan (De Simone, Huang, and Krull 2019, Schwab and 
Todtenhaupt 2019). Furthermore, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) find that affiliates located in 
countries that have a higher tax-rate differences are associated with a higher likelihood of being 
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wholly owned than partially owned. They posit that wholly owned affiliates can better facilitate 
tax-planning.2  
Reviewing the literature, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) point out the moral hazard 
problems JVs face and the scenarios where they are efficient. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer 
(1987) model a situation where each partner has a private intrinsic value toward a shared asset. 
The authors propose a bidding process that efficiently allocates value to each partner. Hart and 
Moore (1998) model the choice of two ownership structures, one with an outsider owner and the 
other owned by members of the group (such as a cooperative). They find that the cooperative 
performs better only if each member has the same outside option and values the product in the 
same way.  
The IJV being considered by these authors are between a U.S. firm and a local partner. 
There are situations where the IJV is between two international partners located in different 
countries and a local party. The tax objectives of the two international partners may differ and 
lead to different preferences over where to retain after-tax earnings and where to locate the 
developed intellectual property. The incentive and coordination issues when there are three 
parties involved in the IJVs have not been addressed in these papers. 
 Aghion and Tirole (1994) model a research division with a sole purpose of developing an 
intellectual property and a financing party who benefits from the intellectual property. A key 
feature in their model is that the innovative outcome cannot be specified ex-ante. The exact 
features of the product are unknown, even to the innovation team, before the product is built. I 
make the same assumption in my model based on the ill-defined nature of an innovative 
endeavor. However, the issue that Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider is the ownership right that 
 
2 These papers do not consider situations where the ownership of the foreign affiliate is not even high enough to 
qualify for the foreign affiliate definition (for example, less than 10% as in Canadian tax law), where the income is 
treated as investment income, and there is no tax deferral.   
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entitles all residual use of the property, motivated by the incomplete contract on the use of the 
intellectual property, in the sense of Hart and Moore (1988). In Aghion and Tirole (1994), the 
two parties move simultaneously where the research division decides on the level of effort 
exerted into the development, and the financing party decides on the level of investment toward 
the project. As in a standard principle-agent setup, the level of effort is unobservable and non-
contractable. The authors consider both the case where the financing party’s investment is 
contractable and that where it is not. The key finding from their model is that if the research unit 
is given the ownership right, then it will exert an optimal level of effort, but there might be 
under-investment from the financing party. On the other hand, if the financing party receives the 
ownership right, then the research unit may not exert the optimal level of effort.  
I make the same assumption as Aghion and Tirole (1994) on the non-contractibility of the 
innovative output due to its ill-defined nature. In addition, the action from the parties that 
conduct the research is non-observable and non-verifiable in both Aghion and Tirole (1994) and 
my model. Finally, in the case where the research division owns the IP, the value created is split 
in half between the financing party and the research division. Consistent with the sharing rule 
used in Aghion and Tirole (1994), the two subsidiaries in my model share the reward from the 
innovative project equally. 
 Rubinstein (1982) models the negotiation between two parties on the split of a pie but 
incorporating the utility of time. He shows that when payoff is discounted by time, the negotiated 
outcome is a function of the difference in the discount factor between the two parties. Because 
the discount factors are known constants, each party’s share of the pie is a constant value. 
Furthermore, if the two parties have the same discount factor, then as it approaches one, the 
sharing rule approaches one half. One example where this could happen is when the time 
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between offers is negligible, then the discount for that negligible time would also be negligible, 
as suggested in Aghion and Tirole (1994). The sharing rule being a constant (one half for 
simplicity) is not only an intuitive choice in the Rubinstein (1982) sense but also consistent with 
the industry standard. Surveying joint venture partners in practice, Caves, Crookell, and Killing 
(1983) and Barton, Dellenbach, and Kuruk (1988) find that equal sharing between partners is 
very common, and that most sharing falls between twenty and fifty percent.  
Despite having similar assumptions regarding the innovation process, my model departs 
from Aghion and Tirole (1994) in two major ways. First, unlike in Aghion and Tirole (1994) 
where the financing party and the research team may be in different organizations, the 
headquarters and the two subsidiaries must be located in the same organization in my model. 
Therefore, the key purpose for a capital allocation is to coordinate actions from the two 
subsidiaries, and the headquarters is not only a financier but also a central planner. Second, the 
investment in Aghion and Tirole (1994) is used for the sole purpose of research, but in my model, 
once the capital is allocated to the subsidiary, the subsidiary can dedicate it to an innovative 
project or use it in traditional processes. Even though the use of the capital is observable, it can 
be used on the innovative project only if it passes through a prototype stage and enters into a 
production stage.  
2.3.2 Multiplayer actions: Investment, effort, and capital allocation  
In this thesis, I study a scenario where the headquarters is responsible for allocating 
capital but is not a production unit itself. The subsidiaries each make their investment decision 
independently. Therefore, the headquarters’ capital allocation must anticipate each subsidiary’s 
action after the subsidiary receives the capital in its choice of a project to invest. One study, 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000), as discussed in more detail below, provides a rationale for why 
capital allocation is a more effective incentive mechanism to divisional managers than a 
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compensation contract. Similarly to the study of Scharfstein and Stein (2000), my study 
considers capital allocation the main tool the headquarters has to achieve coordination. However, 
the reason for my study is that the subsidiaries have enough autonomy to decide on an 
investment choice that maximizes their own subsidiary profits, as suggested in the international 
business literature above.  
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) model a situation that explains why division managers 
receive capital allocation as an incentive rather than cash compensation in a two-tiered 
framework. The first tier is between the shareholders and the CEO, and the second tier is 
between the CEO and the divisional managers. The investment inefficiency is in the form of 
over-allocation to under-performing divisions that perhaps should otherwise be dissolved and 
under-allocation to over-performing divisions. This form of inefficiency cannot be simply 
explained by empire-building or keeping pet projects by the CEO because given limited 
resources the CEO themselves faces, they would still allocate to the best performing empire. The 
authors posit that second-tier agency concern alone cannot justify the preference of capital 
allocation over cash compensation. Rather, the first tier between the CEO and shareholders plays 
a significant role on how the CEO then addresses their agents (the subsidiary managers in my 
context).  
Several studies examine the coordination between two parties, as discussed below. For 
example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) model one principal and two agents in their study. The 
two agents work on two joint projects. Each agent decides on its own level of effort to spend on 
each of the two projects and incur a private cost. The agent can observe its own effort but not the 
effort of the other, while the principal can observe neither. However, they can observe the 
outcome of the project that is a function of each agent’s effort into the project plus random noise. 
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The principal needs to decide the reward for each agent based on the outcome. Under the base 
case scenario, the two agents are not allowed to contract with each other, so they independently 
maximize their own utility. The principal maximizes a total outcome minus the payments to the 
agents. This serves as a benchmark. They then consider the possibility of contracting between the 
two agents. One agent can agree to pay the other an amount based on some decision rules. They 
then show that this contract results in collusion only if the decision rule concerns their private 
information on effort. Therefore, under certain scenarios, the principal is better off not restricting 
contracts between agents because they share private information with each other. However, 
under other scenarios, the principal is better off restricting contracts between agents to prevent 
collusion. 
Another example is Holmstrom (1982), who models a team effort where multiple agents 
share the reward of the outcome of a joint project. He shows that the overall group profit cannot 
be maximized if the entire profit is divided up. This is because a team member can free-ride on 
the effort of the other members. On the other hand, when there is no guarantee that the entire 
profit will be split, the maximum group profit can be attained. The group can self-administer to 
withhold a certain portion of the profit if the maximum group profit is not attained. However, the 
self-administration may not effectively pose this threat. For this reason, he argues that the benefit 
of having a principal who manages the team is that the principal can credibly withhold a portion 
of the profit. He further points out that the role of the principal is solely for the coordination 
purpose. If the principal engages in any productive activities, then their productivity is subject to 
the free-rider problem again.  
My study shares several similarities with these studies. First, my thesis also considers a 
problem that involves the actions of two independent parities. Second, the main purpose of the 
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headquarters is to coordinate the actions of the two parties such that the overall organization 
profit is maximized. However, in contrast to these studies, the headquarters’ capital allocation in 
my study must incentivize each subsidiary’s investment not only in a monetary sense, but also in 
an intellectual sense. Furthermore, the solution proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) 
focuses on the side contract between the two parties, and the solution proposed by Holmstrom 
(1982) is for the principal to withhold group profit. In contrast, the main mechanism in this thesis 
is the ex-ante capital allocation to the two subsidiaries rather than the ex-post profit split between 
the two parties.  
2.3.3 The hold-up problem and incomplete contracts  
 Both the transfer-pricing literature and the literature on IP development show interest in 
the hold-up problem. In general, the hold-up problem arises when multiple (usually two) parties 
make a value-enhancing investment but at least one party invests less than its optimal level, 
known as the under-investment problem. The problem arises because the investing party is 
receiving only a portion of the its marginal profit, and it is less than its marginal cost at the 
optimal investment level (Williamson 1985, Schmitz 2001). Both the transfer-pricing literature 
and the IP development literature have considered situations where the outcome depends on the 
investment input of two parties. This situation is susceptible to one party making an insufficient 
investment, so the literature has examined how a transfer price and ownership of the developed 
IP could affect the hold-up problem. There are many scenarios under which the under-investment 
problem could occur, and the literature on the hold-up problem is rich in documenting these 
many scenarios and proposing solutions applicable to each.  
 In the context where the hold-up problem occurs within divisions of the same firm,  Edlin 
and Reichelstein (1995) model an upstream and a downstream division of the same firm that 
simultaneously make a value-enhancing or cost-reducing investment that can be observable but 
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not verifiable. The two divisions make the investment decision before the state of nature is 
realized. If the quantity produced that will be transferred between the two divisions and 
eventually sold externally and the transfer price are negotiated after the state of nature is realized, 
there is a hold-up problem. This is because the investment will be sunk at the time of negotiation 
when the divisional profit is determined. As a result, there is no guarantee that the other division 
will make a sufficiently large investment to render its own division’s investment worthwhile. 
The authors propose that an upfront contract with renegotiation solves this problem. If the two 
divisions sign a contract that specifies a quantity and a transfer price to be traded after the state 
of nature is realized, there is a guarantee to both divisions that enough quantity will be traded to 
make their investments worthwhile. Furthermore, the renegotiation after the state of nature is 
realized generates only better outcomes but not worse ones. This is because the two parties can 
fall back to the original contract, which prevents the two divisions from being totally unprotected.  
 The solution proposed in Edlin and Reichelstein (1995) applies in the context of physical 
production, where the quantity produced is contractable. Johnson (2006) extends the work of 
Edlin and Reichelstein (1995) by studying the investment decision in the context of IP, where the 
product cannot be fully described ex-ante and thus is not contractable. In  Johnson (2006), the 
upstream and downstream divisions sequentially invest into an intellectual property. Johnson 
(2006) compares and evaluates three transfer-pricing methods with respect to the hold-up 
problem. In the first method, the headquarters specifies a royalty rate prior to the divisions’ 
investments and this shows that both divisions would under-invest. In the second method, the 
two divisions negotiate a transfer price after the first division’s investment is made. With this 
method, the downstream division does not have a hold-up problem because its decision is made 
after the negotiation, so its investment is not sunk. However, the upstream division would still 
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under-invest because its investment is sunk at the time of negotiation. The solution that Johnson 
(2006) proposes is with the third method that involves specifying an upfront royalty rate that is 
open for renegotiation after the first division’s investment but prior to the second division’s 
investment. Similar in spirit to Edlin and Reichelstein (1995), the upfront royalty rate provides 
protection to the first division’s investment while the renegotiation provides protection to the 
second division’s investment, thus removing the hold-up problem for both parties.  
 In the context of two independent parties, Hart and Moore (1988) model a seller and 
buyer that make simultaneous investments into an asset. Trade between the two parties occurs if 
the buyer’s valuation of the asset exceeds the seller’s cost. The buyer’s valuation depends on its 
own investment, so does the seller’s cost depend on its own investment, but the investment made 
by each party is not verifiable. Furthermore, the two parties cannot contract on an outcome for 
each state of the world that could be realized (an incomplete contract). Finally, because the 
investment decisions are made prior to the realization of the state, but trade occurs only after the 
realization, the seller’s investment is unprotected, resulting in a hold-up problem.  
 A critical assumption in Hart and Moore (1988) is that even though the court can verify 
whether the trade takes place, it cannot determine the reason if there is no trade. In other words, 
the court cannot determine whether it is the buyer or the seller that withholds investment for no 
trade to occur. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) relax this assumption by allowing the court to verify 
whether a delivery is made by the seller. Under this assumption, the two parties could enter an 
option contract that gives the seller the right to sell the asset after their investments. Because the 
court could verify whether the seller makes the delivery, it could verify whether the seller 
exercises its option and thereby enforce the option contract. The option acts as protection to the 
seller’s investment and resolves the hold-up problem.  
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 Finally, Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) approach the hold-up problem from an ownership 
structure perspective. Their setup involves two independent parties that make a sequential 
investment into an asset, but only one party owns the completed asset in the end. Traditionally, 
ownership by one party results in under-investment by the other party, while joint ownership 
results in under-investment by both parties. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) propose that instead of 
fixing the ownership choice up front, the first investor could own the asset initially, but the two 
parties could agree to have an option for the second investor to acquire ownership of the asset for 
a price. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) show such an option eliminates the hold-up problem (under 
certain assumptions), because the optimal price is high enough that the first investor is better off 
making an efficient investment expecting to sell the ownership later on. At the same time, the 
price is set such that the second investor would make an efficient investment and is better off 
acquiring ownership, given the first investor has made an efficient investment.  
 Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) combine an agent’s effort with their investment decision 
under the principal-agent framework. In the two-period setup, an agent chooses their effort in 
each period and makes an investment decision only in the first period. Neither the effort nor the 
investment is observable. The observable cash flow for each period reflects both the current 
period’s effort and the first-period investment. As a result, the principal cannot distinguish the 
effect of the effort from that of the investment. The authors show that by matching the current-
period result to current-period effort, a noisy current-period signal could help the principal to 
disentangle the moral hazard problem from the investment problem, making this leading signal a 
useful performance measure to determine the agent’s compensation. They further show that if a 
second agent is hired in the second period, the first agent does not reap any benefit from their 
investment in the first period and thus would under-invest. The authors show that the leading 
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signal is necessary to resolve the hold-up problem by rewarding the first agent for their 
investment decision.  
My model distinguishes itself from the hold-up problem in several ways. First, in my 
model the headquarters allocates a fixed amount of capital between two subsidiaries, so there is 
no under-investment from HQ’s perspective. This is because the headquarters is not a production 
unit; in particular, any unallocated capital does not earn a return, so HQ would allocate all 
available capital to a project. Second, the subsidiary faces a choice between two projects, so the 
investment in the innovative project has an opportunity cost. The key issue in my model is not 
the amount of capital that each subsidiary chooses to invest, but rather the return that is realized 
through its choice of the project. Finally, my setup includes both a moral hazard problem and an 
investment problem, but the investment problem concerns the type of investment rather than the 
amount. The moral hazard problem in my model occurs prior to the investment decision, in 
contrast to Dutta and Reichelstein (2003). Furthermore, the prototype outcome allows the 
headquarters to incentivize effort in the first stage using an observable outcome before the 
investment decision.  
2.4 Innovation and research and development  
 Innovation and research and development (R&D) is right at the intersection of the 
business and tax worlds. Innovation has become increasingly important to multinational 
corporations, and as shown in Section 2.2, the coordination of innovation processes is of special 
interest to the business literature. At the same time, innovation is also of special interest to the 
tax literature. As discussed in Section 2.1, a key consideration to tax policy-makers is the 
promotion of innovation and R&D, and the organization of IP can be a powerful tax-planning 
strategy. However, the literature has not explicitly considered the innovation processes that are 
critical to the success of innovation efforts. In this section, I discuss the importance of success 
52 
 
during the early stages of an innovation project, which is the motivation for considering a 
prototype stage in my model.  
Success during the early stages are critical to the success of innovation projects but are 
also most difficult to manage (Cooper 1988, 1997). For manufacturing industries, resources 
dedicated to these early stages account for 40% of total resources, both financial and non-
financial (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988, Mansfield and Rapoport 1975). Innovation researchers 
often term these stages as the “fuzzy front-end,” which is a notion first introduced by Smith and 
Reinertsen (1992). The front-end refers to the processes and activities prior to a massive 
production and a market introduction, and the term fuzzy points to the ill-defined nature of this 
stage. One of the challenges with new product development is that the newness of the product 
means that there are no existing formal processes and specifications. Studies have devoted much 
attention to finding best practices and factors that contribute to success during this early stage.  
 Khurana and Rosenthal (1997) further categorize the front-end activities into “foundation” 
factors that pertain to the whole organization and “project-specific” factors. They further 
characterize the front-end activities into three processes: opportunity identification, product 
conceptualization, and product definition. Surveying more than 75 managers from 11 companies 
that are experienced in a new product development, they find that most companies struggle with 
providing a clear description of the new product in these initial steps. Furthermore, they find that 
foundational factors play an important role in moving the innovative project forward. First, a 
successful innovation roots itself in a firm’s overall strategy and core competence, so a clear 
vision from senior managers and the headquarters is vital. Second, ineffective resource allocation 
and coordination by senior managers is a major stumbling block to the innovation team, 
especially for cross-functional projects. In surveying 161 businesses that frequently engage with 
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new product developments, Cooper (1998) reports similar findings that commitment of adequate 
resources, such as capital, personnel, and technology, from senior managers and m other 
departments that provide critical input, proves to be a key ingredient for a successful strategic 
plan.  
The importance of success during the early stages makes prototyping appealing (Leonard 
and Rayport 1997, Schrage 1999). Smith and Reinertsen (1992) suggest that pilot and prototype 
products can facilitate the drafting of concrete plans and deadlines. Furthermore, the prototype 
stage allows ideas and concepts to transform into actual output. Elverum and Welo (2014) 
discuss three main benefits associated with prototyping. First, this step serves as a reality check 
to the idea-generation stage. The prototype step reveals the technical requirements and allows the 
innovation team to narrow down an executable plan. Second, successfully building a prototype 
boosts confidence among internal decision-makers and helps secure internal financing. This step 
reduces the uncertainty associated with the realization of the idea and allows the innovation team 
to present a more convincing case. In addition to securing internal financing, Audretsch, Bönte, 
and Mahagaonkar (2012) document that a successful prototype also increases the likelihood of 
obtaining an external financing. Third, prototyping provides a great learning opportunity for the 
innovation team, to gain a deeper understanding of the project and a deeper appreciation for each 
other. Thomke (1998) documents that innovation teams garner more extensive learning from 
iterative prototypes.  
In a case study, Bogers and Horst (2014) find that collaborations during the prototype 
stage help translate vague ideas into a detailed product specifications. Furthermore, the 
collaborative input enhances the functionality and marketability of the prototype. In the context 
of customization for external customers, Terwiesch and Loch (2004) show that eliciting 
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customers’ input in reviewing prototypes allows the design team to better understand customers’ 
desires that are otherwise difficult to communicate absent a prototype. Bogers and Horst (2014) 
further document that cross-functional collaborations during the prototype stage allow input from 
different functions and foster cross-functional learning and communication. Finally, cross-
functional collaborations provide flexibility over the design process, which has been shown to 
reduce the risk of failure (Thomke 1997). Activities that involve multiple functions typically 
require formal structured steps and are time-consuming. However, cross-functional 
collaborations provide the advantage of a flexible sequence of steps and a shorter wait time 
between each step. 
 Collaborations during the prototype phase are not only critical to providing the complete 
set of expertise required but are also critical to knowledge-sharing and organizational learning. 
Mascitelli (2000) focuses on “breakthrough” innovations that are original and involve a high 
level of creativity. These innovations often generate a competitive advantage that leads to 
sustaining profitability and a stable market share. Mascitelli (2000) posits that the most important 
aspect to this type of innovations is “tacit knowledge” (p. 181), the subtle intuition that lies 
beneath the “conscious thoughts” (p. 181) that results from the accumulation and integration of 
knowledge, information, and through experiences.  
Given the importance of tacit knowledge to breakthrough innovations, organizations are 
interested in developing this asset among innovation teams. Research on tacit knowledge shows 
that education and formal training are not effective methods of acquiring and sharing tacit 
knowledge. Rather, in-person interactions through research collaborations are more effective at 
promoting the sharing of tacit knowledge. This aspect of tacit knowledge makes subsidiary-
specific expertise less mobile (Sheng and Hartmann 2019). Furthermore, tacit knowledge is 
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difficult to test and is generally not observable, further supporting the argument that intellectual 
contribution is a hidden action (Spender and Grant 1996, Gibbons 1994). Finally, Mascitelli 
(2000) finds that prototyping activities provide an ideal platform for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge through experiences and personal interactions. 
The importance of cross-functional collaborations motivates the setup in my model where the 
two subsidiaries each possesses a different expertise, and the innovative opportunity can be 
pursued if both subsidiaries contribute to the innovative project. The importance of managing the 
early stages of an innovation process motivates the inclusion of a prototype stage. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the innovative project faces a risk of failure during the prototype stage, and it 
cannot move into the production stage unless it first succeeds at the prototype stage. Finally, 




Chapter 3. Base Model 
 
3.1 Model Setup 
As with standard models, my model has a multinational corporation (MNC) that has a 
headquarters (HQ) and two wholly owned international subsidiaries, denoted respectively as H 
and L. The location of HQ is not critical in my model, but the locations of the two subsidiaries 
are. Namely, subsidiary H operates in in a high-tax jurisdiction that charges a corporate tax rate 
of 𝜏 + ℎ  where ℎ > 0 , while subsidiary L operates in a low-tax jurisdiction that charges a 
corporate tax rate of 𝜏. In the base case, the tax differential between the two subsidiaries is 
denoted as ℎ. To study the effect of an exogenous tax event, in Chapter 5, the model considers 
the introduction of a tax cut from a high-tax country that reduces the tax differential from ℎ to 𝑘.  
The model has three players, the headquarters and the two subsidiaries, that are involved 
in a sequential game with the following timeline. At Time 0, HQ has a certain amount of capital 
(𝜆) to be allocated. It identifies an innovative opportunity and learns about its prospect in terms 
of a pre-tax return 𝛽 + 𝛾 , where 𝛾  is the profitability the innovative opportunity generates 
incrementally to the existing process that earns a baseline return of 𝛽 . This innovative 
opportunity requires each subsidiary to contribute its own unique expertise. At this point, HQ 
decides whether the innovative opportunity is worth pursuing. If HQ pursues the opportunity, 
then it incentivizes the two subsidiaries to collaborate on the innovative project through its 
capital allocation between the two subsidiaries. On the other hand, if HQ chooses not to pursue 
the opportunity, then the capital allocated to each subsidiary goes to the subsidiary’s traditional 
production. Its objective is then to maximize the total group payoff.  
After HQ allocates 𝜆𝐻 and 𝜆𝐿 to the high-tax and low-tax subsidiaries, respectively, the 
two subsidiaries move simultaneously and decide whether to undertake the innovative 
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opportunity, with each subsidiary maximizing its own payoff. Once a subsidiary makes its choice, 
both the capital allocated to the subsidiary and any subsidiary-specific resources that are relevant 
to the project will be devoted to the project of the subsidiary’s choice. If a subsidiary chooses not 
to contribute to the innovative project, its default is to continue with traditional processes. In this 
case, the subsidiary earns a return of 𝛽  and keeps all the profits. On the other hand, the 
innovative opportunity earns a higher return of 𝛽 + 𝛾, but the two subsidiaries must share the 
total reward from the innovative project. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of events.  







This setup captures the horizontal structure of the MNC where each subsidiary is 
endowed with its own subsidiary-specific expertise, and the success of the innovation requires 
both sets of expertise. When both subsidiaries choose the innovative project, they work together 
and share their respective expertise on the common project. HQ could use capital allocation to 
coordinate an outcome where both subsidiaries participate in the innovation. When the capital 
allocation provides an incentive for both subsidiaries to contribute their knowledge to the 
innovative project, knowledge-sharing occurs among the subsidiaries through their collaboration. 
 To illustrate the advantage of an internal collaboration in the process of innovation, I 
provide a stylized example below. Suppose that a firm is in the healthcare industry and one of its 
hospital clients approaches the firm for a new patient-monitoring technology. If the firm can 
Time 0: HQ learns about an 
innovative opportunity and 
decides whether to pursue it 
Time 2: Each subsidiary 
decides whether to undertake 
the innovative project 
Time 1: HQ allocates 
capital between the two 
subsidiaries  
Time 3: Payoffs are 




successfully deliver the technology, not only will it win the contract with the hospital, but also 
the pilot-testing at the hospital will significantly enhance the success of commercializing the 
product for senior homes in the future. Suppose that the Canadian subsidiary has data and 
knowledge on patient behavior, but the U.S. subsidiary has the machine-learning technique of 
picture processing. The new technology aims at accurately detecting motion and alerting about 
abnormal behaviors. The success of the new product requires adapting a picture processing 
technology to a patient behavior, which represents a combination of the expertise from both 
subsidiaries.  
 At the time of the capital allocation, HQ cannot dictate the project choice made by the 
subsidiaries. As discussed in my review of the literature, if a subsidiary develops and owns 
special knowledge (Birkinshaw 1997, Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson 1998), then the knowledge 
is accessible by other members of the organization only if the subsidiary willingly shares it 
(Cantwell and Mudambi 2005, Rugman and Verbeke 2001). This is because the tacit nature of 
knowledge presents difficulties for HQ to manage it through formal processes. Because the 
intellectual contribution from the subsidiary is both unobservable and unverifiable, it is 
impossible to write formal contracts on it (Beaudry and Schiffauerova 2011, Katz and Martin 
1997, Gnyawalị, Singal, and Mu 2009, Leiponen and Helfat 2010, Regnell et al. 2009). Second, 
the literature generally considers it difficult to trace the use of capital for one purpose versus 
another (Dutta and Reichelstein 2003, Hart and Moore 1988, 1999, Johnson 2006). In the 
stylized example above, if the Canadian subsidiary spends money to recruit patients for more 




The tacit nature of knowledge also presents challenges to use other control systems. First, 
because the intellectual contribution must occur before a product is developed, it is invisible and 
ill-defined, making it non-transferrable (Zander and Kogut 1995, Mascitelli 2000), so the 
problem cannot be solved with a traditional transfer-pricing model (Baldenius, Melumad, and 
Reichelstein 2004, Choe and Hyde 2008, Hiemann and Reichelstein 2012, Hirshleifer 1956).3 
Furthermore, direct involvement by HQ in a creative taskforce is generally not advisable. Studies 
document that teaming up subsidiaries to engage in activities together is an effective way to 
facilitate knowledge-sharing, but giving direct orders is not effective (Hedlund 1994, 
Subramaniam and Venkatraman 2001, Mahnke and Venzin 2003, Mahnke, Venzin, and Zahra 
2007). Furthermore, behavioral research documents that creativity must be self-initiated and can 
be hindered by direct monitoring (Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson 2008, Kachelmeier 
and Williamson 2010, Amabile et al. 1996, Amabile and Pratt 2016, Grabner 2014), further 
limiting HQ’s interventions through monitoring (Son, Cho, and Kang 2017). 
The setup in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) motivates the setup in my model. 
Although the focus of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) is quite different from mine, the 
structure of their model appeals to the problem I intend to study. The focus of their paper is to 
explain the reallocation of capital from a less profitable division to a more profitable one, 
whereas my focus is on the distortion that taxation creates in the subsidiaries’ preferences toward 
a collaboration opportunity that influences how an MNC responds to tax incentives with regard 
to its capital allocation. In my setup, the pre-tax return is the same across the two subsidiaries, so 
tax is the only factor that contributes to the difference in the after-tax returns between the two 
subsidiaries. 
 
3 It also means that the headquarters cannot purchase the necessary expertise from each subsidiary and then combine 
the expertise to conduct the innovation itself. 
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Suppose that HQ pursues the innovative project, then its capital allocation must induce 
both subsidiaries to choose the same project. HQ’s capital allocation decision can be described 
with the following linear program LP-Base, where HQ maximizes total payoff, but each 




  (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) 
subject to 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻  (1) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿  (2) 
𝜆𝐻 + 𝜆𝐿 = 𝜆 (3) 
𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿 ≥ 0 (4) 
 If HQ induces both subsidiaries to choose the innovative project, then the project earns a 
return of 𝛽 + 𝛾 , where 𝛽  is the baseline return on the existing production and 𝛾  is the 
incremental return earned by the innovative effort. The total capital allocated toward the 
innovative project is 𝜆, but it is allocated to the two subsidiaries. Profit earned from the capital 
allocated to the high-tax subsidiary 𝜆𝐻 is subject to the high-tax jurisdiction’s tax rate of 𝜏 + ℎ, 
and profit earned from the capital allocated to the low-tax subsidiary 𝜆𝐿 is subjected to the low-
tax jurisdiction’s tax rate of 𝜏, so the tax-rate differential between the two jurisdictions is ℎ. The 
tax consequences are strictly determined by the capital contribution of each party. This is 
consistent with the practice of many tax authorities that determine the appropriate taxable 
income in each jurisdiction based on the investment made in that jurisdiction.  
Inequality (1) is the incentive-compatible constraint for the high-tax subsidiary, and 
inequality (2) is the incentive-compatible constraint for the low-tax subsidiary. These constraints 
ensure that the payoff for joining the collaboration exceeds the payoff for working alone for both 
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subsidiaries. The right-hand-side (RHS) of inequality (1) represents the payoff that the high-tax 
subsidiary earns by working alone, and equals the baseline return  𝛽  that it earns with its 
traditional processes, multiplied to its capital investment of 𝜆𝐻, after paying taxes at a rate of 𝜏 +
ℎ. The left-hand-side (LHS) of inequality (1) represents the payoff that the high-tax subsidiary 
earns by collaborating on the innovative project and is simply its share of the total after-tax 
payoff. Similarly, the LHS of inequality (2) represents the payoff that the low-tax subsidiary 
earns from collaborating on the innovative project.  
 The two subsidiaries negotiate with one another regarding each party’s share of the total 
reward from the joint project before HQ makes its allocation decision. The total reward available 
to share is the net profit after paying all expenses and relevant taxes. The parties negotiate based 
on the intrinsic value perceived by each party of its intellectual contribution with its respective 
bargaining power. Furthermore, because the negotiation occurs prior to the capital allocation, 
this negotiation cannot refer to the capital contribution but solely to the intellectual contribution. 
This setup is similar in sprit to Halperin and Srinidhi (1991) who study the effect of internal 
transfer-pricing between two parties on their production decisions. Citing several other studies, 
Halperin and Srinidhi (1991) maintain that having the two parties negotiate the split of the after-
tax pie achieves a higher firm value than having HQ dictate a split.  
As discussed in Aghion and Tirole (1994) and shown in Rubinstein (1982), when the two 
subsidiaries have similar bargaining power, a split of one half will be reached under a Nash 
bargaining process. I do not explicitly model this process but take the outcome of the process as 
given. Let the bargaining outcome be 𝜔 ∈ (0,1) that is the low-tax subsidiary’s share and 1 − 𝜔 
that is the high-tax subsidiary’s share. Furthermore, both subsidiaries bring an important and 
valuable intellectual contribution, so their split must be within a reasonable range. Although it is 
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not possible to price these contributions, each subsidiary contributes an irreplaceable part of the 
innovation process. In other words, 𝜔 ∈ [𝜔,𝜔], with both the lower and upper bounds (𝜔,𝜔) 
strictly between 0 and 1.  
The most important assumption in my setup regarding  𝜔  is not whether the two 
subsidiaries bargain for it or HQ assigns it, but rather that it must be within a reasonable range. 
Although it is not possible to price or transact these intellectual contributions, each subsidiary 
has an intrinsic value that it assigns to its own contribution, especially when the expertise is 
developed within the subsidiary. Furthermore, because each subsidiary’s contribution is both 
irreplaceable and indispensable to the innovation process, each must receive a reasonable share 
for its contribution.  
I note two observations about this process. First, this split does not refer to the capital 
allocation from HQ because they are two different types of resources that are managed in 
different ways. Capital is centrally owned and can be easily transferred, whereas knowledge is 
locally owned and is not easily transferrable. HQ cannot force upon the local owner of the 
knowledge as to how it ought to value and use its knowledge. However, it could use the 
transferrable resource to coordinate the sharing of the non-transferal resources. Second, from the 
subsidiary’s perspective, even though it can enforce the sharing of the reward through 
interventions by HQ, it cannot enforce the investment choice made by the other subsidiary. Once 
the capital has been allocated, it is impossible to trace and verify the use of capital for one 
purpose versus another.  
Equation (3) captures the budget constraint where the allocation between the two 
subsidiaries adds up to the total budget available for the innovative project. Here, 𝜆 represents 
the total capital that HQ sets aside for this specific project. Because only the two subsidiaries 
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have the expertise relevant to the project, the capital is allocated between only these two 
subsidiaries. What matters in this setup is not the amount of capital to be allocated but rather the 
split between the two subsidiaries of whatever is available. This means that any unallocated 
capital from this project earns a zero return, so the budget constraint is at equality. Finally, 
equation (4) captures the non-negativity constraint.  
3.1 Model Solution  
Proposition 1 the solution to LP-Base is the following:  
1. If 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, (𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿) = (0, 𝜆) 
2. If 𝛾 ≤
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, (𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿), where 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
 This solution is the optimal allocation if HQ chooses to induce collaboration. This is not 
the final solution yet because HQ still needs to compare the benefit of including collaboration 
with the tax cost associated with it. The next proposition discusses this comparison.  
 To understand this result, note that the most tax-efficient allocation is to allocate all the 
capital to the low-tax subsidiary. However, this allocation is not always incentive-compatible for 
the low-tax subsidiary to collaborate on the innovative project. This is because although the 
innovative project earns a higher return, the payoff from its capital investment must be shared 
with the high-tax subsidiary. On the other hand, by not collaborating on the innovative project, 
the low-tax subsidiary keeps all the profits it earns from its traditional project. This presents us 
with two scenarios. First, if the incremental return on the innovative project is so high that it 
offers a higher payoff even after sharing, then the low-tax subsidiary will choose to work 
together no matter what the capital allocation is. The first case of Proposition 1 captures this 
scenario. Second, if the incremental return is not high enough, then allocating all the capital to 
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the low-tax subsidiary is not incentive-compatible. In this case, HQ would allocate the maximum 
amount of capital to the low-tax subsidiary while preserving its incentive-compatible constraint. 
This maximum amount is 𝑠𝐿 as stated in the second case of Proposition 1.  
The key insight here is that a subsidiary cannot be allocated too much capital. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, to the low-tax subsidiary, working together is appealing when its capital 
allocation is high but unappealing when its capital allocation is low. The party that welcomes a 
sharing arrangement is the one that brings little but receives much. This occurs when the capital 
allocation is low. The payoff that it can earn from its own low amount of capital is low, but the 
payoff it shares from working together is high. On the other hand, the party that opposes a 
sharing arrangement is the one that brings much but receives little. This occurs when the capital 
allocation is high. In this case, the payoff it can earn from its own capital is high, but the payoff 
it shares from working together is low.  















Payoff from collaborating 
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I make several observations regarding 𝑠𝐿. First, the tax-rate differential between the two 
subsidiaries exacerbates the problem. One can see this effect by observing that 𝑠𝐿 decreases in  
ℎ. In other words, the low-tax subsidiary is more likely not to collaborate when the tax-rate 
differential between the two subsidiaries is high. To see this result, suppose that the capital is 
allocated equally between the two subsidiaries. Without a tax-rate differential, sharing would be 
equally appealing to both subsidiaries. However, when the two subsidiaries are subject to 
different tax rates, sharing is no longer equally appealing to both. The low-tax subsidiary has 
more after-tax profits to offer and thus finds sharing (through collaboration) with the high-tax 
subsidiary less appealing. The higher the tax differential is, the less appealing collaboration 
becomes to the low-tax subsidiary. Therefore, from the subsidiaries’ perspective, the tax-rate 
difference is not neutral to their incentives toward working together on the efficient project.  
Second, the problem is less severe if the low-tax subsidiary shares a higher portion of the 
total after-tax pie, and one can see this by observing that 𝑠𝐿 increases in 𝜔. A higher 𝜔 increases 
the payoff for collaborating on the innovative project and makes this project more appealing. 
This allows the low-tax subsidiary to favor the sharing arrangement even if it is given a higher 
amount of capital. Third, a higher incremental return offered by the innovative project mitigates 
the problem, and one observe that 𝑠𝐿 increases in 𝛾. A higher return makes collaborating on the 
innovative project more appealing and allows a higher amount of capital to be allocated to the 
low-tax subsidiary while maintaining its preference for the innovative project. In fact, when 𝛾 is 
so high, one is back to the first case where the low-tax subsidiary prefers collaborating on the 
innovative project regardless of the amount of capital it receives. Finally, a higher return offered 
by the traditional process exacerbates the problem, and one can observe that 𝑠𝐿 decreases in 𝛽. A 
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higher 𝛽 makes working alone more attractive relative to working together, and the rationale is 
exactly the opposite to that for 𝛾. Table 1 summarizes the above discussion.  
Table 1. Effect of increase in parameters on the maximum incentive-compatible allocation 
Increase in 
parameter 
Description of parameters Effect on 𝑠𝐿 
ℎ Tax-rate differential between the high- and low-tax 
subsidiary  
decrease 
𝜔 The low-tax subsidiary’s share of the total reward from 
collaborating on the innovative project  
increase 
𝛾 The incremental profitability on the innovative project that 
must be worked on together 
increase 












𝛽, HQ induces collaboration, and the optimal allocation is:  




2. (𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) if 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ




The final allocation depends on whether inducing collaboration is worthwhile. When 𝛾 is so 
high that even the tax-minimizing allocation is incentive-compatible, there is no tax cost 
associated with inducing collaboration. This is the first-best scenario where HQ achieves both 
the maximum tax savings and coordination toward collaboration. However, when the first-best 
solution is not available, there is a tax cost associated with coordinating toward collaboration. To 
induce collaboration, HQ must allocate capital to the high-tax subsidiary and pay higher taxes on 
the return earned with this capital. HQ trades off the benefit of collaboration against the tax costs 
associated with it. If it is too costly to induce collaboration, then HQ will optimally forgo 
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collaboration and focus only on the tax-planning objective. Case 2 of Proposition 2 describes this 
case.  
On the other hand, if the benefits outweigh the tax costs, HQ induces collaboration at the 
lowest tax cost. The objective to coordinate the two subsidiaries to collaborate on the efficient 
project interacts with the tax-planning opportunities to create an interior solution. As shown in 
Proposition 1, HQ allocates as much capital as possible to the low-tax subsidiary while 
maintaining its preference for working together on the innovative project over working alone on 
the traditional project. The optimal allocation therefore is to allocate 𝑠𝐿 to the low-tax subsidiary 
and the remaining amount to the high-tax subsidiary, where 𝑠𝐿 is the point above which the low-
tax subsidiary flips its preference.  
Note that the tax-rate differential between the two subsidiaries is not “tax-neutral” from 
the perspective of HQ’s capital allocation, and it reduces the set of optimal allocations that 
support internal collaborations. First, without the tax-rate difference, HQ would always induce 
the two subsidiaries to work together on the efficient project. However, because of the tax cost 
associated with the tax-rate differential, collaboration is not always worth inducing. Second, 
without the tax-planning opportunities, the MNC would be indifferent among all allocations that 
induce collaboration. However, the tax-rate difference causes HQ to prefer allocations that favor 
the low-tax subsidiary. 
In summary, the base model illustrates the tradeoff between a multinational corporation’s 
tax-planning objective and its coordination objective. The base model considers a situation 
where an innovative opportunity requires expertise from two subsidiaries. The capital allocation 
could coordinate the outcome where both subsidiaries choose to participate in the innovation 
68 
 
project. However, the allocation that achieves the coordination purpose does not always 




Chapter 4. Model Extension 
 
 In Chapter 3, I develop a base model that does not separate the development stage from 
the production stage of an innovation project. Hence, it combines the subsidiary’s intellectual 
contribution decision with its investment decision. Furthermore, the base model assumes no risk 
associated with the innovation project. To better reflect the reality of an innovative process, I 
introduce a prototype stage that allows subsidiaries to test ideas before moving into mass 
production. Prototyping is a common step in many innovation processes because of its benefits 
to managing the fuzzy front-end. Typically, an innovative project does not move into the 
production stage unless it first succeeds at the prototype stage. This encourages the innovation 
team to develop concrete ideas before going too far with its resources.  
Introducing a prototype stage expands the model in several ways. First, the return on the 
innovative project is no longer assumed to be risk-free. The probability of failure at the prototype 
stage reflects the risky nature of an innovative endeavor. Second, the prototype stage can 
produce an observable outcome. If success can be clearly distinguished and verified from failure, 
then the capital allocation can depend on the prototype outcome. This allows me to compare the 
case when the prototype outcome is contractable versus when the prototype outcome cannot be 
distinguished or verified. Finally, the critical input during the prototype stage is the intellectual 
contribution from both subsidiaries. However, the soft nature of the intellectual contribution 
prevents it from being observable or verifiable. On the other hand, the critical input during the 
production stage is capital investment. This setup separates a subsidiary’s decision to contribute 
intellectual resources from its decision to invest capital resources, allowing me to disentangle the 
two incentive problems and to further relax assumptions about the investment decision.  
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4.1 Model Setup 
The corporate structure follows the setup in the base model in Chapter 3 where a 
multinational corporation (MNC) has a headquarters office and two wholly owned international 
subsidiaries, denoted as H and L, respectively as before. Subsidiary H is located in a high-tax 
jurisdiction with a corporate tax rate 𝜏 + ℎ where ℎ > 0, while subsidiary L is located in a low-
tax jurisdiction with a corporate tax rate 𝜏. In the base case, the tax differential between the two 
subsidiaries is ℎ. A tax cut that reduces the tax rate differential from ℎ to 𝑘 will be introduced in 
Chapter 5 to study how the capital allocation changes following a tax cut.  
The three players are the headquarters and the two subsidiaries, as in the base model, but 
they engage in a sequential game with the following modified timeline. At Time 0, HQ identifies 
an innovative opportunity and learns about its prospect in terms of its pre-tax return of 𝛽 + 𝛾, 
where 𝛾  is the profitability the innovative project generates incrementally to the traditional 
production that earns a pre-tax return of 𝛽. At this time, HQ decides whether the innovative 
opportunity is worthwhile pursuing. It compares the tax cost associated with inducing 
collaboration on the innovative project with the incremental benefit of the project. HQ moves 
again at Time 1 and decides on the capital allocation. Model 1 extends the base model in the 
following way. HQ allocates the capital upfront just as in the base model, but the innovative 
project faces a risk of failure at the prototype stage. The upfront allocation assumes that the 
prototype outcome cannot be contracted upon. In Model 2, I relax this assumption and allow the 
prototype outcome to be observable and verifiable, so that HQ’s Time 1 decision entails an 
upfront contract that specifies a set of capital allocations for each prototype outcome. Figure 3.1 




Figure 3 Timeline of events 















Prototype stage: The Time 2 intellectual contribution  
After learning about HQ’s capital allocation decision, the two subsidiaries decide at Time 
2 whether to contribute intellectually, so the intellectual contribution occurs during the prototype 
stage. The nature of R&D activities varies greatly, from the less concrete stages, such as problem 
identification that involves information-gathering and idea-generation, to more concrete stages, 
such as implementing a solution to the problem. The prototype stage occurs when the innovation 
team identifies a possible solution and implements it in the production of a sample product. Badri 
et al. (1997) describe the R&D process as an interactive one between problem identification and 
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prototype development. Several studies recommend starting the prototype stage early because it 
allows the innovation team to conduct feasibility tests and turn abstract ideas into executable 
plans (Audretsch, Bönte, and Mahagaonkar 2012, Elverum and Welo 2014). Studies also show 
that the product development stage accounts for 40% of total innovation expenditures for 
manufacturing industries (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988, Mansfield and Rapoport 1975). It is 
also the prototype stage that requires the most contribution of expertise and intellectual 
capacities from the team members.  
In the model setup, success during the prototype stage requires expertise from both 
subsidiaries, and is doomed to fail if either of the subsidiaries withholds its expertise. If both 
subsidiaries contribute intellectually during the prototype stage, then the prototype has a 
probability of 𝑝 to succeed and a probability of (1 − 𝑝) to fail. On the other hand, if a subsidiary 
chooses not to contribute intellectually, the prototype will surely fail. The setup has two 
implications. First the intellectual contributions from both subsidiaries at the prototype stage are 
critical to the success of the project. Second, when the prototype fails, one cannot distinguish 
whether the failure is due to a subsidiary withholding its expertise or simply due to chance, even 
after both subsidiaries provide their expertise. In other words, each subsidiary’s intellectual 
contribution is a hidden action, and there is no direct link between a subsidiary’s action and an 
observable outcome.  
The intellectual contribution is not contractable for several reasons. First, as discussed in 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Johnson (2006), the intellectual input is difficult to specify. The 
ill-defined nature of an innovative endeavor precludes HQ from specifying a certain outcome on 
which a penalty can be imposed if it is not achieved by the subsidiaries. The input is especially 
ill-defined during the prototype stage, during which the exact input required is not clear even to 
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the team members themselves (Regnell et al. 2009, Beaudry and Schiffauerova 2011). Second, 
because the intellectual contribution from each subsidiary takes the form of knowledge and 
expertise, it is usually not observable (Gnyawalị, Singal, and Mu 2009, Leiponen and Helfat 
2010). Third, even in situations where some soft information might be observed, the subsidiary’s 
intellectual contribution is usually not verifiable by a third party. A supervisor may observe a 
brainstorming session and still cannot tell whether a team member is withholding knowledge and 
expertise (Farris 1972). Furthermore, subjective evaluations from team members often contain 
self-serving biases that reflect mere feelings and personal preferences (Flynn 2006). Finally, a 
direct monitoring could hinder the creative process. Behavioral theory suggests that an 
innovative effort must be self-initiated, so quantity-based and extrinsic incentives are generally 
ineffective (Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson 2008, Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010, 
Amabile et al. 1996, Amabile and Pratt 2016, Grabner 2014, Son, Cho, and Kang 2017).  
The setup implicitly assumes that HQ is somewhat familiar with the innovation process, 
so is knowledgeable about the feasibility and marketability of the innovation project. HQ can 
learn about the prospect of the innovative project independent of the subsidiary’s actions. In 
organizations where HQ acts as the strategic leader in the innovation process, HQ is 
knowledgeable about the innovation opportunities and can be the initiator of the process. In other 
organizations however, HQ can heavily rely on innovation elicitation from subsidiaries, and the 
subsidiaries’ choices of whether to contribute intellectually could affect HQ’s ability to learn 
about the innovative opportunity. In my setup, HQ understands the distribution of knowledge 
among its subsidiary network and is in the best position to identify innovative opportunities. 
Furthermore, it also understands the risk associated with the innovative opportunity, so the 
probability of success is public knowledge.  
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Prototype stage: The Time 3 realization 
After each subsidiary makes the decision regarding its intellectual contribution, they start 
developing the prototype. If the prototype succeeds, then the innovation project moves to the 
production stage. If the prototype fails, then the innovation project is scrapped. As discussed in 
the literature review section, the early stages of the innovation process is critical to successful 
delivery of the innovation product to the market (Smith and Reinertsen 1992, Cooper 1997, 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987, Kim and Wilemon 2002), and experimenting during the 
prototype stage allows the innovation team to solidify ideas and test design feasibility (Elverum 
and Welo 2014, Bogers and Horst 2014). If the project does not meet the technical requirements 
during the prototype stage, then it is not feasible for a massive production.  
The model allows the prototype outcome to be observable by all three parties. The two 
subsidiaries that are directly involved in the prototype effort can certainly observe its outcome, 
and HQ can request a demonstration of the progress made. However, whether the outcome is a 
success or a failure can be subjective and difficult to verify. In situations where a success can be 
clearly distinguished from a failure, the prototype outcome is verifiable. For example, a new 
drug must pass a certain number of trials to be considered a success, or a contract with the 
hospital requires the hospital’s approval of an initial demonstration. On the other hand, in 
situations where the line between success and failure is blurry, the prototype outcome is not 
verifiable. For example, a movie team may present its idea through a synopsis and receive an 
evaluation, but the evaluation can be very subjective as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, or a 
software team could produce a functional program, but it could be extremely user-unfriendly.  
In Model 1, I assume that the prototype outcome is not verifiable, so the capital allocation 
cannot depend on it. In this case, HQ allocates capital upfront as with the base model but faces a 
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risk of failure for engaging in innovation. Model 2 relaxes this assumption and allows the 
prototype outcome to be verifiable, so the capital allocation can depend on it. I present the 
formulation and result for each setup and discuss advantages and disadvantages in the model 
comparison section.  
Time 4 Investment  
After the prototype outcome is realized, the subsidiaries make their investment decisions 
with the amount of capital allocated from HQ. If the project fails at the prototype stage, then the 
innovative opportunity vanishes, and the only investment option is traditional production. 
Because the traditional project is well-established, it earns a return of 𝛽 . Furthermore, the 
traditional project can be completed alone, and the return does not depend on the other 
subsidiary’s investment choice. On the other hand, if the project succeeds at the prototype stage, 
then the subsidiary has a choice of whether to invest its capital into the innovative or into the 
traditional project. The innovative project earns a return of 𝛽 + 𝛾 only if both subsidiaries invest 
their capital in the innovative project. If one subsidiary does not invest in innovation, it is not 
beneficial for the other subsidiary to invest in innovation either, because it cannot complete the 
innovative project alone. Therefore, from HQ’s perspective, the capital allocation must 
incentivize both subsidiaries to invest in innovation.  
The prior literature generally considers investment decisions to be non-contractable, 
because the complete states of investment outcomes are difficult to specify ex-ante and 
impossible to verify (Johnson 2006, Grossman and Hart 1986, Myers 1977, Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales 2000). Furthermore, a subsidiary often makes many investments and engages in 
numerous activities, so it is difficult to separately track the activities for each investment (Dutta 
and Reichelstein 2003). In the context of managing foreign subsidiaries, studies have found that 
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formal contracts are less effective at governing intangible assets than tangible assets (Galbraith 
and Kay 1986, Morrison and Roth 1992). The literature generally documents a lack of visibility 
on the subsidiary’s investment decision, especially in organizations where subsidiaries are 
dispersed both geographically and functionally (Roth and O'Donnell 1996, Bartlett 1998, 
Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). In organizations where the interdependence is low among 
subsidiaries, it might be possible to establish a direct relationship between the subsidiary’s 
decision and a specific outcome, especially if the subsidiary is responsible for a single step 
within a supply chain (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990, Ghoshal and Nohria 1994). In such 
organizations, the investment decision might be observable, but it remains unclear whether the 
investment decision is verifiable by court.  
In Model 4, I further relax this assumption and allow the Time 4 investment decision to 
become contractable. If HQ can track each subsidiary’s investment and verify its return, then 
once it observes the prototype’s success, it can tell whether a subsidiary has made an investment 
in the innovative project. Once the prototype succeeds, if a subsidiary’s investment earns only 
the baseline return, then HQ knows that the subsidiary has not invested in innovation. In that 
case, HQ could specify different amounts of allocation based on the investment outcome it 
observes once the prototype succeeds. Permitting the Time 4 investment to become contractable 
essentially eliminates the Time 4 incentive problem, because HQ could penalize the subsidiary 
that does not invest in innovation after the prototype has succeeded.  
Table 2 summarizes the features for each model extension and illustrates the progression 
of each model extension in relaxing the assumptions one at a time. The base model has none of 
the additional features. Model 1 introduces a risk of failure of the innovative project while 
holding other features the same. Model 2 further relaxes the assumption and allows the prototype 
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outcome to become observable by HQ and verifiable. Model 3 builds upon Model 2 and further 
relaxes the budget constraint, so that HQ needs not allocate all the available capital to the 
subsidiaries. In addition to allowing the above features, Model 4 also allows the Time 4 
investment to become contractable, and thus is the most general version of all of the models 
considered in this thesis.  







Times 4 Investment 
Contractable 
Base Model  No No No No 
Model 1 Yes No No No 
Model 2 Yes Yes No No 
Model 3 Yes Yes Yes No 
Model 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
4.2 Model Solution and Discussion 
To determine whether the innovative opportunity is worthwhile pursuing at Time 0, HQ 
must know its expected payoff if it induces both subsidiaries to collaborate on the innovative 
opportunity, and then compares it to the expected payoff if it forgoes the innovative opportunity. 
As with the base model, HQ must evaluate the tax cost associated with inducing collaboration 
against the incremental benefit of the innovative opportunity. Therefore, I first solve for HQ’s 
optimal expected payoff if it chooses to pursue the innovative opportunity. This problem can be 
formulated with a linear program adjusting for each model’s assumptions. After solving each LP, 
I compare its optimal solution with the maximum payoff to HQ if it forgoes the innovative 
opportunity, to determine whether the innovative opportunity is worth pursuing. I state the 
optimal allocation for each of the model extensions.  
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4.2.1 Model 1 
 As with the base model, HQ allocates physical capital at Time 1 and wishes to induce 
both subsidiaries to contribute intellectually to the prototype at Time 2 and again to invest in the 
innovative project at Time 4, then the allocation must be incentive-compatible  these two choices. 
This problem can be formulated with the following linear program (LP-1), where HQ’s capital 
allocation maximizes the total expected payoff subject to the incentive-compatible constraints of 
both subsidiaries. Let (𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿) denote the amount of capital that HQ allocates to the high-tax and 




  𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) 
subject to  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻  (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿  (4) 
𝜆𝐻 + 𝜆𝐿 = 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿 ≥ 0 (6) 
 Inequalities (1) and (2) are the Time 2 incentive compatibility constraints for subsidiary H 
and L, respectively. These inequalities ensure that, for both subsidiaries, the expected payoff for 
contributing intellectually during the prototype stage exceeds that for not contributing. If both 
subsidiaries contribute intellectually, the prototype has a probability 𝑝  to succeed and a 
probability 1 − 𝑝  to fail. However, if either subsidiary withholds its contribution, then the 
prototype will surely fail. Knowing this, HQ must incentivize both subsidiaries to contribute 
intellectually. Therefore, if a subsidiary contributes, it expects to receive its share from the 
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innovative project with probability 𝑝, and to earn the baseline return from its traditional project 
with probability 1 − 𝑝. On the other hand, if a subsidiary decides not to contribute, then the 
prototype surely fails, and the subsidiary earns its payoff from the traditional project.  
Inequalities (3) and (4) are the Time 4 incentive compatibility constraints for subsidiary H 
and L, respectively. Once the prototype succeeds, the subsidiaries have the choice to invest the 
capital allocated from HQ into either the innovative or the traditional project. Therefore, HQ’s 
allocation must incentivize both subsidiaries to choose innovation with their investment choices. 
Inequalities (3) and (4) ensure that once the subsidiaries observe prototype success, its payoff for 
investing in the innovative project exceeds that for investing in the traditional project. 
Inequalities (5) and (6) ensure that HQ allocates all the capital between the two 
subsidiaries and can be viewed as the standard budget constraints. Note that these constraints 
must be binding. As discussed in Chapter 3, the total amount of capital available is what HQ 
decides to set aside for this specific project, and unallocated capital does not earn any return. 
What matters is not the total amount of capital to be allocated, but rather the split between the 
two subsidiaries.  
Proposition 1.1  the solution to LP-1 is the following:  
3. If 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, (𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿) = (0, 𝜆) 
4. If 𝛾 ≤
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, (𝜆𝐻, 𝜆𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿), where 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
 The interpretation of this result is like that documented in the previous chapter. The first 
case represents the first-best scenario where the tax savings are maximized and both subsidiaries 
choose to undertake the innovative opportunity. This occurs when the innovative project offers 
an incremental return that is so high that both subsidiaries naturally prefer it over their traditional 
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projects. However, when the incremental return is not so high, the first-best solution is not 
available, and HQ must induce both subsidiaries to collaborate on the innovative project with its 
capital allocation. HQ does so at the lowest tax cost possible, and the second case presents the 
optimal allocation that achieves this. Note that this optimal allocation takes the same value as the 
base case. This is because the allocation that incentivizes the Time 4 investment decision also 
incentivizes the Time 2 intellectual contribution decision.  








𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile, and the optimal allocation is:  




2. (𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) if 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ




After HQ computes the maximum expected payoff for pursuing the innovative opportunity, it 
then compares it with the maximum expected payoff for not pursing this opportunity. When the 
first-best solution is not available, coordinating collaboration on the innovative project has a tax 
cost, so HQ trades off the benefit of this opportunity against the tax costs associated with 
coordination. If the benefit does not outweigh the cost, HQ optimally forgoes the innovative 
opportunity and focuses only on the tax-planning objective. This occurs when the innovative 
opportunity’s incremental profitability 𝛾 is not high enough, 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽. On the other 
hand, if the benefit outweighs the tax cost, HQ induces collaboration on the innovative project at 
the lowest tax cost possible with an optimal allocation as stated in Proposition 1.1.  
I make two observations about the result. First, as 𝑝 decreases, the bound to which inducing 
collaboration is worthwhile increases. This is because a lower probability of success reduces the 
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expected benefit of the innovative project, requiring a higher threshold of profitability 𝛾  to 
compensate for the loss in expected benefit because of the lower probability of success. Second, 
when 𝑝  equals one, the decision to contribute intellectually guarantees the success of the 
prototype, and the result is the same as the base model. From the subsidiary’s perspective, not 
contributing earns a profit from the traditional project, while contributing has a chance of earning 
a different payoff from the innovative project. Clearly, taking the bet is worthwhile if and only if 
its payoff from the innovative project is higher. One may rearrange constraints (1) and (2) and 
observe that that they are equivalent to constraints (3) and (4).  
4.2.2 Model 2  
 This model extension relaxes the assumption about the prototype outcome and allows the 
outcome to be observable and verifiable by HQ. Consequently, HQ could write a contract that 
specifies the amount of capital to be allocated to each subsidiary depending on the prototype 
outcome at Time 3. HQ writes a contract at Time 1 for a set of allocation that will occur at Time 3. 
Let (𝜆𝑠
𝐻, 𝜆𝑠
𝐿) be the amount of capital that HQ specifies to allocate for a successful prototype, and 
(𝜆𝑓
𝐻, 𝜆𝑓
𝐿) be the amount of capital that HQ specifies to allocate if the prototype fails. This new 







𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿) 
Subject to.  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻  (3) 
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𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿  (4) 
𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑓





𝐿 ≥ 0 (7) 
Again, inequalities (1) and (2) are the incentive compatibility constraints for the Time 2 
intellectual contribution. However, because the allocation could differ depending on the 
prototype outcome, the payoff under prototype success is calculated by using 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 and 𝜆𝑠
𝐿, and the 
payoff under prototype failure is calculated by using 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐿.  
Inequalities (3) and (4) are the Time 4 incentive compatibility constraints for the two 
subsidiaries, H and L, respectively. Note that if the prototype fails at Time 3, the innovative 
opportunity is gone, and the only project that a subsidiary can invest in is the traditional one. In 
that case, there is no more decision to be made regarding the investment, so the game ends at 
Time 3. On the other hand, if the prototype succeeds at Time 3, then each subsidiary has a choice 
between the innovative and the traditional project to invest the capital it receives. As a result, the 
allocation that HQ specifies must provide the appropriate incentive for both subsidiaries to invest 
in the innovative project at Time 4. However, for the reasons stated above, the Time 4 incentive 
constraint is only relevant if the prototype succeeds at Time 3. Therefore, the payoffs used in the 
inequalities related to the Time 4 investment are computed with reference only to 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 and 𝜆𝑠
𝐿, the 
capital allocation under the prototype success case.  




𝐿∗) to LP-2 can be described as: 








𝐿∗) = (0, 𝜆, 0, 𝜆). 
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𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
where 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
An important observation here is that unlike Model 1, Model 2 allows the allocation to 
differ across the two prototype outcomes. However, at the optimal solution, the allocations are 




𝐻∗. Furthermore, this optimal 
allocation coincides with that of Model 1. Through the option to allocate differently across 
prototype outcomes, HQ can seemingly incentivize the Time 2 intellectual contribution at a lower 
cost. However, this benefit cannot be unlocked because the Time 4 incentive constraints still 
restrict 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 from becoming larger. As we shall see in Model 4, when the allocation is free from the 
Time 4 incentive problem regarding each subsidiary’s investment, the benefit of contracting on 
the prototype outcome can be realized.  

























𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) if 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ




Again, when the benefit of inducing collaboration on the innovative project is not high 
enough, HQ optimally forgoes collaboration and focuses only on the tax-planning objective. In 
this case, the capital allocation needs not refer to the prototype outcome because HQ already 
forgoes the innovative opportunity. The second case corresponds to when the benefit is high 
84 
 
enough that collaboration is worthwhile inducing but not high enough that it incurs no cost. In 
this case, HQ allocates the maximum amount of capital to the low-tax subsidiary while 
maintaining its preference for the innovative project. Under this case, the optimal allocation is 
the solution to the LP-2, as discussed in Proposition 1.2. 
4.2.3 Model 3  
In this extension, Model 3 relaxes the budget constraint so that that HQ needs not allocate 
all the capital available for the project. The revised linear program is LP-3, and Proposition 1.3 








𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿) 
subject to  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻  (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿  (4) 
𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑓





𝐿 ≥ 0 (7) 




𝐿∗) to LP-3 can be described as: 








𝐿∗) = (0, 𝜆, 0, 𝜆). 
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𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
where 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
 
Relaxing the budget constraints results in the same optimal solution as before, as one can 
see that these constraints are binding in the new LP. Because any unallocated capital does not 
earn any return, it is in HQ’s interest to allocate all the capital to a productive use. Furthermore, 
allocating all the capital does not conflict with either subsidiary’s incentive. One can observe that 
although the constraints related to the low-tax subsidiary are binding, the constraints for the 
high-tax subsidiary have slack. In other words, HQ can allocate the maximum amount of capital 
allowed by constraints (2) and (4) to the low-tax subsidiary and the remainder to the high-tax 
subsidiary. Because the solution to LP-3 is the same as the solution to LP-2, and the maximum 
payoff for not inducing collaboration is the same between the two models, the optimal allocation 
result for Model 3 is the same as that for Model 2. One may refer to Proposition 2.2 for this 
result that I do not restate here.  
4.2.4 Model 4  
Finally, Model 4 further relaxes the assumption on the Time 4 investment decision and 
allows HQ to contract upon the investment outcome. HQ could specify a different allocation if 
the prototype succeeds but a subsidiary does not invest in the innovative project. Let (𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) 
be the amount of capital that HQ specifies to allocate to each subsidiary if the prototype succeeds 
and the subsidiary invests in innovation. Similarly, let (𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 ) be the amount of capital that 
HQ specifies to allocate to each subsidiary if the prototype succeeds but the subsidiary invests in 
traditional project. Finally, as with the previous model, let (𝜆𝑓
𝐻, 𝜆𝑓
𝐿) be the amount of capital that 
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HQ specifies to allocate to each subsidiary if the prototype fails. The only investment option is 
the traditional project when the prototype fails, so whether a subsidiary invests in innovation or 











 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 )
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿) 
subject to  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻  
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻   (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿   (4) 
𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 (6) 
𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑓







𝐿 ≥ 0 (8) 
 Inequalities (1) and (2) are the incentive compatibility constraints for the Time 2 
intellectual contribution and are the same as in LP-2. However, inequalities (3) and (4) now 
allow HQ to specify an allocation that penalizes the subsidiary that does not invest in innovation 
after the prototype succeeds.  
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Proposition 1.4.  






𝐿∗) to LP-4 can be described as: 
1. If 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔







𝐿∗) = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) 
 where 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗  can take any value in the feasible region 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗ ≤ 𝜆 
2. If 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔







𝐿∗)  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇









𝐿∗  can take any value in the feasible region 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






As with the previous model setups, the first case corresponds to the first-best solution 
when the incremental return offered by innovation is so high that both subsidiaries naturally 
prefer it. For the second case, from HQ’s perspective, the benefit of contracting on the 
investment outcome is that the capital allocation only needs to incentivize the Time 2 intellectual 
contribution without worrying about the Time 4 investment decisions. As a result, after the 
prototype succeeds, HQ is free to allocate all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary to achieve the 
maximum tax savings. However, the subsidiary’s action regarding its intellectual contribution 
remains hidden, and the Time 2 incentive problem remains. As a result, HQ cannot achieve the 
first-best outcome and must allocate a smaller amount of capital to the low-tax subsidiary if the 
prototype fails. In fact, if the low-tax subsidiary receives all the capital under both prototype 
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outcomes, then it clearly has an incentive to withhold its intellectual contribution and let the 
prototype fail, so that it can invest in the traditional project and keeps all the profit.  
Unlike the previous models, the optimal allocation for Model 4 does not depend on the 
extent of the tax-rate differential between the two subsidiaries. As shown in Case 2, the optimal 
allocation makes no reference to parameter ℎ. The optimal allocation associated with the success 
outcome does not refer to ℎ, because it is simply the tax-minimizing allocation. With the Time 4 
investment being contractable, once HQ observes prototype success, it can allocate all the capital 
to the low-tax subsidiary without worrying about its investment incentive. To derive the optimal 
allocation associated with failure, the Time 2 incentive constraint requires that the expected 
payoff under failure does not exceed that under success. At the optimal solution, the allocation 
under failure equates the expected payoff associated with the two outcomes, to the low-tax 
subsidiary. Because the allocation for success does not refer to ℎ, the allocation for failure does 
not refer to ℎ either.  
I make two other observations about this result. First, the upfront contract allows HQ to 
assign different allocations for different prototype outcomes. After relaxing the Time 4 
investment constraint, the optimal allocation is indeed different between the two prototype 
outcomes. Compared with Model 2, where the benefit of having different allocations is limited 
by the Time 2 constraints, the allocation in Model 4 is no longer limited by the Time 4 constraints. 
Second, as discussed earlier, the option to allocate differently across prototype outcomes should 
confer HQ the ability to incentivize the Time 2 intellectual contribution at a lower tax cost. 
Indeed, if the prototype succeeds, HQ can garner all the tax savings simply by allocating all the 
capital to the low-tax subsidiary. Furthermore, if the prototype fails, the optimal allocation to the 
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low-tax subsidiary is higher in Model 4 than in Model 2, and thus induces the Time 2 
contribution at a lower tax cost.  























𝐿∗) = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) 
where  
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇















𝐿∗)  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇








max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






HQ compares the incremental return with the tax costs associated with inducing collaboration 
on the innovative project. By contracting the amount of capital allocation on the outcome of the 
prototype, HQ can induce collaboration and incurs no tax cost if the prototype succeeds. 
However, HQ still incurs a tax cost to induce collaboration if the prototype fails. HQ compares 
the expected tax costs to the expected benefits of the innovative project. When 𝛾 is high enough, 
HQ induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost, and the optimal allocation is the solution to the 
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LP-4, as stated in Proposition 1.4. On the other hand, when 𝛾 is not high enough, HQ forgoes the 
innovative project and allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary and minimizes taxes.  
4.3 Model Comparison and Credible Commitment  
In this section, I compare and discuss the results obtained for the different model 
extensions. I discuss the implications for relaxing each assumption and the advantages and 
disadvantages of contracting capital allocation on the prototype outcome.  
4.3.1 Model comparisons  
 The result for each model specification has two important aspects. First is the threshold 
on of the incremental profitability that is required from the innovative opportunity, above which 
inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile; hereinafter, the inducing threshold. The lower the 
threshold, the smaller the tax cost associated with inducing collaboration is, because the 
threshold represents the required rate of return that offsets the tax costs associated with inducing 
collaboration. Second is the optimal allocation amount that induces collaboration. When the first-
best solution is not available, inducing collaboration cannot coincide with tax minimization. 
However, among all the collaboration-inducing allocations, the higher the amount allocated to 
the low-tax subsidiary is, the higher the expected payoff associated with inducing collaboration 
is. Therefore, comparing the optimal allocation amounts across models also compares the 
expected payoff associated with inducing collaboration across the models. Table 3 summarizes 
the inducing threshold and the optimal allocation for each model.  
Table 3. Model comparison 
Model 
Specification 
Inducing Threshold (𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒) Optimal allocation to induce collaboration  
Base Model (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 
(𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
Model 1 (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 
(𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
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Model 2 (1 − 𝜔)ℎ







= (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
Model 3 (1 − 𝜔)ℎ







= (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
Model 4 (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝜔)ℎ















In terms of the optimal allocation amount, Model 1 has the same optimal allocation as the 
base model. As explained earlier, from the subsidiary’s perspective, taking a bet in the 
innovative project is worthwhile only if the innovative project offers a higher payoff than the 
subsidiary’s traditional process. Therefore, an incentive-compatible allocation from the base 
model would also be incentive-compatible in Model 1. Introducing a risk of failure of the 
innovative project does not change the subsidiary’s incentive, so the optimal allocation from the 
base model still provides the relevant incentives for the Time 2 intellectual contribution and the 
Time 4 investment decisions in Model 1. This is because the base model’s optimal solution 
allocates the maximum amount of capital allowed by the low-tax subsidiary’s incentive 
constraints.  
Comparing the optimal allocation between Model 2 and Model 3, one can see that 
contracting the amount of capital on the prototype outcome does not improve the allocation 
outcome. HQ can allocate still only up to 𝑠𝐿  the low-tax subsidiary to maintain its incentive 
compatibility constraints. Furthermore, HQ is restricted by this upper bound both when it 
specifies for the success outcome and when it specifies for the failure outcome. Therefore, 
relaxing the assumption on the contractility of the prototype outcome alone does not achieve a 
higher overall payoff. This is because the allocation must still incentivize both subsidiaries to 
invest in innovation after the prototype has succeeded. This incentive constraint limits HQ’s 
ability to allocate too much capital to the low-tax subsidiary.  
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Indeed, when the Time 4 investment decision becomes contractable, as in Model 4, 
contracting the allocation on the prototype outcome becomes beneficial. By imposing a large 
enough penalty to the subsidiary that chooses not to invest in innovation even after the prototype 
succeeds, HQ can enforce the subsidiaries to make the right investment choice, so that the capital 
allocation is free from the incentive problem at Time 4. As a result, HQ could specify an 
allocation of all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary if the prototype succeeds, thereby 
minimizing taxes while coordinating collaboration. However, HQ cannot specify the same tax-
minimizing allocation for the failure case. To incentivize both subsidiaries to contribute 
intellectually at Time 2, the allocation must distinguish between the success case and the failure 
case. The allocation must ensure that each subsidiary’s payoff associated with a success must be 
greater than its payoff associated with a failure, otherwise a subsidiary is better off not 
contributing intellectually and simply letting the innovation fail. Finally, one can check that the 
limit on 𝜆𝑓
𝐿∗is greater than 𝑠𝐿, the limit obtained in the other model setups. Taken together, the 
expected payoff for inducing collaboration is the highest in Model 4.  
Proposition 3 The comparison of the inducing threshold across models is the following: 
1. 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3 
2. 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4 < 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3 
3. The comparison between 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4 and 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 depends on 𝑝, and in particular, 
a. if 𝑝 >
1−𝜏−ℎ
2−2𝜏−ℎ
, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4 < 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒, and  
b. if 𝑝 <
1−𝜏−ℎ
2−2𝜏−ℎ
, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4. 
Where 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the inducing threshold for the base model, and 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑖 is the inducing 
threshold for Model 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3,4}. 
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Proposition 3 provides the statement of the comparison of the inducing threshold across the 
different models. The first comparison shows that the inducing threshold of Model 1 is higher 
than that of the base model. This higher required rate of return is to compensate for the lower 
expected benefit of inducing an innovative collaboration due to a probability of failure. 
Furthermore, the inducing thresholds for Models 1, 2, and 3 are the same. This is because the tax 
cost associated with inducing collaboration is the same across the three models, as discussed 
above. The second comparison shows that Model 4 has a lower inducing threshold than Models 1, 
2, and 3. This is because the allocation in Model 4 is free from the Time 4 incentive problem, so 
the optimal allocation achieves a higher expected payoff associated with inducing collaboration. 
The higher payoff in turn reduces the threshold on its required rate of return to offset the tax 
costs associated with inducing collaboration.  
The comparison between Model 4 and the base model depends on the probability of success. 
On the one hand, compared with the base model, the innovative project in Model 4 faces a risk of 
failure. The prospect of earning a lower return reduces the expected payoff associated with 
inducing collaboration in Model 4 that in turn increases the required return on the innovative 
project for it to be worthwhile. On the other hand, Model 4 achieves a higher payoff when the 
prototype succeeds by attaining the full the tax savings. This should reduce the required return on 
the innovative project for it to be worthwhile. The net of the two opposite effects depends on the 
probability distribution between the two outcomes. When the probability of success is high, the 
higher payoff obtained with a success outweighs the lower payoff associated with a failure, 
resulting in a net positive effect and a lower inducing threshold. When the probability of a 
success is low, the net effect is negative, and the inducing threshold is higher.  
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4.3.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the upfront contract   
Contracting the capital allocation on the prototype outcome depends on HQ’s ability to 
credibly commit to allocate capital according to the contract, even after observing the prototype 
outcome. However, if the prototype has already failed, HQ clearly has an incentive to then 
allocate more to the low-tax subsidiary for tax reasons. At this point, the innovative opportunity 
is gone, and the effort and action from the subsidiaries are sunk. Furthermore, HQ still has full 
control over the capital, and neither subsidiary can enforce the original contract. Therefore, 
nothing prevents HQ from allocating a higher amount of capital to the low-tax subsidiary than 
specified in the original contract. The low-tax subsidiary certainly welcomes such an 
arrangement.  
If the contract is subject to a credibility threat, and that the subsidiaries perceive that HQ 
cannot credibly commit to the original contract, then let (𝑐𝑓
𝐻, 𝑐𝑓
𝐿) be the amount of capital that the 
subsidiaries perceive HQ would allocate after observing the prototype failure. To distinguish 
from the decision variables to HQ, note that these amounts are fixed constants that are perceived 
by the subsidiaries. With the setup of Model 2, this problem can be formulated with the 





𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿) 
subject to  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐻  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻  (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠





𝐿 = 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝑠
𝐻, 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≥ 0 (6) 
Proposition 4.1 If 𝑐𝑓
𝐿 > 𝑠𝐿 and 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, then (LP-2-C) is infeasible.  
Next, I examine the effect of the credibility threat with the setup of Model 4. The 







𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 )
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿)) 
subject to  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝑐𝑓
𝐿  (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿)  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿  (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻   (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿   (4) 
𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 (5) 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑇





𝐿 ≥ 0 (6) 




𝜆 and 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, then (LP-4-C) is infeasible.  
 The above two propositions describe what happens if HQ cannot credibly commit to the 
original contract. Knowing this, the low-tax subsidiary has a reason to perceive that upon 
observing a failed prototype, HQ would allocate to it an amount that is higher than the original. 
In this case, it is impossible for HQ to specify an allocation 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 and 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 that provides both the 
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Time 2 and the Time 4 incentives. This is because the allocation that incentivizes an intellectual 
contribution at Time 2 must ensure that the payoff associated with a success exceeds that with a 
failure. If the low-tax subsidiary now perceives a higher amount of allocation and thus a higher 
payoff under the failure case, to maintain the Time 2 incentive, the allocation must also increase 
under the success case. However, the allocation under the success case is already at the 
maximum allowed by the Time 4 investment incentive under Model 2 and the maximum allowed 
by the budget constraint under Model 4.  
 Comparing contracting versus not contracting on the prototype outcome when the 
investment decision is not contractable (i.e., Model 1 versus Model 2), one can see that the total 
expected payoffs are the same. However, not contracting on the prototype outcome (Model 1) is 
not subject to the credibility threat. HQ commits to an allocation through giving up physical 
capital upfront. Comparing contracting versus not contracting on the prototype outcome when 
the investment decision is contractable (i.e., Model 1 versus Model 4), contracting on the 
prototype outcome has an advantage that results in a higher expected payoff. However, such a 
contract is subject to the credibility threat that could make it impossible for HQ to incentivize 
collaboration. In conclusion, if the Time 4 investment decision is not contractable, then it is 
better to commit capital upfront. There is no additional benefit but a potential cost for contracting 
on the prototype outcome. On the other hand, if the Time 4 investment decision is contractable, 
then it is beneficial to contract capital allocation upon the prototype outcome only if HQ can 
credibly commit to such an arrangement.  
4.4 Summary of Model Extensions 
In summary, Chapter 4 extends the base model in several ways. First, Model 1 introduces 
a prototype stage and incorporates a risk of failure associated with the innovative opportunity. 
Model 2 separates the intellectual contribution decision from the investment decision. This better 
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reflects the difference in the type of resources that is critical to different stages of the project. 
Furthermore, Model 2 relaxes the assumption on the prototype outcome and allows the outcome 
to be contractable. The solution to Model 2 shows that relaxing this assumption alone does not 
improve the overall payoff because the Time 4 constraints associated with the investment 
decisions are still restricting the capital allocation. Model 3 relaxes the budget constraint and 
obtains the same result because HQ is not a production unit itself. Finally, Model 4 further 
relaxes the Time 4 investment decision and allows HQ to impose a penalty on the subsidiary that 
does not invest in the innovative project after the prototype has succeeded. Interestingly, the 
first-best solution is still not achievable, because HQ cannot know whether a subsidiary has 
contributed intellectually when the prototype fails.  
Comparing the different models considered in Chapter 4, one can see that contracting on 
the prototype outcome has advantages and disadvantages. Contracting on the prototype outcome 
is beneficial only when HQ can enforce investment into the innovative project after the prototype 
has succeeded. However, contracting on the prototype outcome could face a credibility threat 
because it is in the interest of both HQ and the low-tax subsidiary to allocate a higher than the 
original amount of capital to the low-tax subsidiary after the prototype fails. In such a case, HQ 
cannot incentivize collaboration with any allocation. This is a disadvantage for contracting on the 





Chapter 5. Exogenous Tax Policy Change 
 
Prior studies document that countries compete on their corporate income taxes to attract 
investment and to create jobs through increased business activities (Clausing 2009, 2016, 2007, 
Desai, Foley, and Hines 2003). Facing competition from low-tax jurisdictions, many high-tax 
countries have reduced their corporate income tax rates. The literature has not addressed how 
internal managerial practices of MNCs can cause them to respond differently to a tax policy 
change. In this thesis, I study the interaction between an MNC’s coordination of lateral 
collaborations among its subsidiaries and its capital allocation response to a tax incentive. 
A tax incentive may be general and apply to all types of income, or it may encourage a 
specific type of activity for a specific sector. I first consider a general corporate tax reduction 
that does not distinguish the type of income or the type of income-generating activity. For 
example, Canada’s General Rate Reduction (GRR) offers a 13% rate reduction on corporate 
income and has been in place since 2000. The GRR lowers the typical business Canadian 
corporate tax rate from 45% to 32%, depending on the province. The most recent U.S. tax reform 
(Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017) provides a flat corporate tax cut from 35% to 21%, plus state 
taxes. In the context of the model, these policies reduce the tax rates on income earned from both 
the innovative project and the traditional one. I examine the circumstances under which the high-
tax subsidiary receives more capital allocation after the tax cut.  
Suppose that a high-tax country reduces its tax rate from 𝜏 + ℎ to 𝜏 + 𝑘, where 𝑘 < ℎ, 
and this reduction applies to both the innovative and traditional projects. Applying the same 
technique that solves the base case, I solve for the MNC’s capital allocation after the tax cut. Let 





where the subscript 𝑘 denotes the allocation after the tax-rate reduction that narrows the tax-rate 
differential from ℎ to 𝑘.  
5.1 Effect of a General Rate Reduction on an MNC’s Capital Allocation – Base Model 
I first consider a general rate reduction that applies to both the innovative and traditional 
projects. In this section, I state the result under the setup of the base model as outlined in Chapter 
3. Lemma 1 states the optimal allocation after a general tax cut under the base model. Note that 
this is a straight application of Proposition 2 from the base model.  
Lemma 1  
The base model optimal allocation (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗) after the general tax reduction is characterized by:  
1. (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘












𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) if 
(1−𝜔)𝑘
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)𝑘





𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 
The next proposition compares the allocation before and after the tax cut and 
characterizes how a capital allocation to the high-tax subsidiary changes in response to the tax 
cut. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the tax cut does not always result in an increase in capital 
allocated to the high-tax subsidiary.  
Proposition 5  
The base model capital allocation changes after the general tax reduction are characterized by: 
1. When 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔




















𝐻∗ < 𝜆𝐻∗. 
Proposition 5 offers three insights. First, an MNC may optimally choose not to change its 
behavior because of the tax policy. The first case of this proposition describes two scenarios 
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when this happens. In the first scenario, the capital allocation is free from any incentive issues, 
so HQ induces collaboration on the innovative project with no tax cost, both before and after the 
tax cut. Here, even though the tax-minimizing strategy allocates all capital to the low-tax 
subsidiary, the return that the innovative project offers is high enough for the low-tax subsidiary 
to prefer collaborating on it. This is the first-best scenario that does not change with the tax cut.  
The second scenario under which the MNC does not change its capital allocation occurs 
when the incentive of the tax policy is not strong enough to offset the MNC’s internal 
coordination cost. One effect of the tax cut from the high-tax country is that it reduces the tax 
cost associated with inducing collaboration by narrowing the tax-rate difference between the two 
subsidiaries. One can see that the threshold above which the innovative project is worth inducing 
(i.e., the inducing threshold) is lower after the tax cut. However, the innovative opportunity is 
still not worth pursuing if its incremental return is not high enough to generate a benefit that 
offsets the cost, even at a reduced amount. In this case, HQ would not induce collaboration on 
the innovative project, and it optimally allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary, both 
before and after the tax cut. The second scenario in Case 1 corresponds to this situation. One 
would not expect a change in the capital allocation from the MNC in this case.  
The second insight is as follows. Because the tax cut reduces the tax cost of inducing 
collaboration on the innovative project, it could be that the innovative opportunity is not 
worthwhile pursuing before the tax cut but becomes worthwhile with the help of the tax cut. This 
occurs when the incremental return on the innovative project does not meet the inducing 
threshold prior to the tax cut but meets the inducing threshold that has been lowered by the tax 
cut. The extent of the reduction of the inducing threshold increases with the extent of the tax cut. 
The higher the tax-rate reduction, the more tax cost it alleviates from inducing collaboration, and 
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the more likely inducing collaboration is worthwhile. In algebraic terms, a smaller 𝑘 corresponds 
to a lower inducing threshold.4 
The third insight is as follows. If the innovative opportunity is worth pursuing even 
without the help of the tax cut, then it is surely worth pursuing after the tax cut. However, in this 
case, HQ optimally allocates more to the low-tax subsidiary and less to the high-tax subsidiary, 
contrary to conventional wisdom. This is because the tax cut offered by the high-tax country 
alleviates the incentive problem and reduces the coordination cost that are internal to the MNC, 
which turns out to be an unintentional effect of the policy. By increasing the after-tax profit that 
the high-tax subsidiary can bring to the collaboration and share with the low-tax subsidiary, the 
tax cut effectively makes collaboration more appealing to the low-tax subsidiary. As a result, the 
tax cut expands the set of incentive-compatible allocations, allowing HQ to induce collaboration 
at a lower tax cost, through allocating more capital to the low-tax subsidiary. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, the tax cut creates an upward shift in the low-tax subsidiary’s payoff from collaboration, 
pushing 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 to the right of 𝑠𝐿.  
  
 
4 In this model, I specifically consider cases when 𝑘 > 0. I note that in the case when 𝑘 = 0, there is no longer any 
tax cost associated with inducing collaboration, so collaboration is always worthwhile inducing. In algebraic terms, 
the inducing threshold becomes zero.  
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In summary, the effect of the tax cut is twofold. First, it reduces the tax cost associated 
with inducing collaboration, and second, it alleviates an incentive problem by making 
collaboration more appealing to the low-tax subsidiary. Therefore, the MNC’s response to the 
tax cut depends on how the tax cut changes the MNC’s tradeoff between tax savings and 
inducing collaboration. The model shows that the MNC decreases its capital allocation to the 
high-tax subsidiary when the innovative opportunity is worth pursuing prior to the tax cut. On 
the other hand, the MNC increases its capital allocation to the high-tax subsidiary when the 
innovative opportunity offers a return that worth inducing only with the help of the tax cut.  
5.2 Specific Tax Reduction and the Patent-Box Regime – With the Base Model 
Next, I consider a tax cut from the high-tax country that applies only to the innovative 
project. In recent years, the patent-box regime has become increasingly popular in Europe, and 
13 European countries have implemented the regime as of 2020. Outside Europe, China has 
introduced its own patent box, while lobbying effort continues in Canada and the U.S. for similar 
regimes. One of the two main policy objectives is to attract innovative resources and boost 
𝜆𝐿 
𝑠𝐿 
Payoff from collaboration 
before tax cut 
Payoff from working alone 















innovative activities within the country that implements the regime (Alstadsæter et al. 2015, 
Bradley, Dauchy, and Robinson 2015, Chen et al. 2018). The other objective is to protect the tax 
base and retain income that might otherwise be shifted to lower-tax countries. 
Studies document that patents ownership increases for a country that implements a 
patent-box regime following the implementation, consistent with firms responding to the tax 
incentive with their patent location choice, both for developed and acquired patents (Alstadsæter 
et al. 2015, Bradley, Dauchy, and Robinson 2015, Bradley, Ruf, and Robinson 2018, Böhm et al. 
2015). However, the regime’s effect on capital investment and innovative activity is inconclusive. 
While Chen et al. (2018) find an overall increase in fixed assets in subsidiaries located in patent-
box countries after the implementation of a regime, Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2019) document 
that a country’s innovative capital is affected by the introduction of a patent-box regime in 
another country. However, the literature on patent-box regimes has not considered an MNC’s 
internal coordination cost as a factor that affects the policy’s effect on an MNC’s capital 
allocation. My study contributes to this literature by studying how an MNC’s capital allocation 
addresses the need for subsidiaries to collaborate on an innovative opportunity.  
A patent-box regime taxes income from innovation-related activities at a significantly 
lower rate than from other corporate income. Unlike traditional R&D tax incentives that 
subsidize the input cost on innovation efforts, the patent-box regime reduces the tax rate on 
income earned from the output of an innovation effort. As such, the tax benefit rewards only 
successful innovations but not those that fail. For these reasons, in the base model, the tax 
reduction from the high-tax country applies only to the innovative project, and in the model 
extensions, the tax reduction applies only if the two subsidiaries successfully develop the 
prototype and invest in the innovative project.  
104 
 
Suppose that the high-tax country reduces its tax rate 𝜏 + ℎ to 𝜏 + 𝑘, but only for income 
earned on innovations. The innovative opportunity qualifies for the tax reduction, but the 
traditional project remains taxed at 𝜏 + ℎ. Lemma 2 characterizes the optimal allocation after this 
specific tax reduction for the base model.  
Lemma 2 
The base model optimal allocation (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗) after the specific tax reduction is characterized by: 
1. (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘












𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) if 
(1−𝜔)𝑘
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)𝑘





𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 
Note that the optimal allocation after the specific rate reduction is the same as in the case 
of a general rate reduction. The first case corresponds to the first-best solution when the tax-
minimization objective does not conflict with the coordination objective. HQ maximizes tax 
savings by allocating all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary, and the two subsidiaries 
collaborate on the innovative project. This is true regardless of whether there is a tax cut and 
whether the tax cut is general or specific.  
To see why the specific rate reduction as the same effect as the general one in Cases 2 
and 3, let us revert to the two effects of the tax cut. The first effect reduces the tax cost associated 
with inducing collaboration, but this benefit is relevant only when HQ incentivizes both 
subsidiaries to work on the innovative project. In other words, this first effect depends solely on 
the high-tax subsidiary’s tax rate on the innovative project, and this rate is the same between the 
two types of tax cut. Therefore, the first effect (i.e., the Case 2 result) is the same for both types 
of tax cut. The second effect alleviates the incentive problem by making collaboration more 
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appealing to the low-tax subsidiary. Neither type of tax cut changes the low-tax subsidiary’s 
payoff for working alone, while both types of tax cut increase the payoff for working together. 
This payoff is increased to the same extent because it refers only to the tax rate applicable to the 
innovative project, and whether there is a corresponding tax cut on traditional production is 
irrelevant. 
I then compare the capital allocations before and after the specific rate reduction to study 
the MNC’s capital allocation changes in response to the specific tax rate reduction. Proposition 6 
states the result.  
Proposition 6  
The base model capital allocation changes after the specific tax reduction are characterized by: 
1. When 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔




















𝐻∗ < 𝜆𝐻∗. 
 
Because the specific tax reduction has the same effect on the optimal allocation as the 
general rate reduction, its effect on the changes in capital allocation is also the same as the 
general rate reduction. One can see that Proposition 6 is the same as Proposition 5, for the base 
model.  
5.3 Effect of a General Rate Reduction – Model Extensions  
I revisit the results of the general tax-rate reductions for the model extensions as outlined 
in Chapter 4. Lemma 1.1 states the optimal allocation after a general rate reduction for Model 1 
in Chapter 4, where the innovative project faces a risk of failure, the prototype outcome is not 
contactable, so HQ allocates physical capital upfront to the subsidiaries. One can apply 




For Model 1, the optimal allocation (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗) after the general tax reduction is characterized by:  
1. (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘












𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) if 
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔𝑘





𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 
Next, I compare the optimal allocation before and after the general rate reduction to 
derive the changes in capital allocation. Proposition 5.1 states this result.  
Proposition 5.1  
For Model 1, the capital allocation changes after the general tax reduction are characterized by: 
1. When 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔




















𝐻∗ < 𝜆𝐻∗. 
As with the result obtained for the base model, the effect of the general rate reduction is 
twofold. The first effect reduces the tax cost associated with inducing both subsidiaries to 
collaborate on the innovative project. Aa a result, the innovative opportunity that does not meet 
the inducing threshold prior to the tax cut might meet the reduced threshold after the tax cut. HQ 
starts inducing collaboration only after the tax cut by allocating more capital to the high-tax 
subsidiary. On the other hand, the incremental return on the innovative opportunity may be so 
low that it does not even meet the reduced threshold after the tax cut. HQ forgoes collaboration 
and maximizes tax savings both before and after the tax cut, and the optimal capital allocation 
does not change in this case. Note that the inducing threshold after the general tax cut of Model 1 
is higher than that of the base model (i.e., comparing with Proposition 5). This higher inducing 
threshold reflects a higher requirement on the innovative profitability posed by the possibility of 
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innovation failure. The second effect of the tax cut makes collaboration more appealing to the 
low-tax subsidiary by offering a higher amount that the high-tax subsidiary can share. This effect 
alleviates the internal incentive problem, allowing HQ to allocate even more to the low-tax 
subsidiary. This occurs when the innovative opportunity warrants the coordination cost, even 
before the tax cut.  
 Model 2 relaxes the verifiability assumption of the prototype outcome, so that it becomes 
contractable, and HQ can design an upfront contract that specifies an allocation for each 
prototype outcome. Lemma 1.2 states the optimal allocation after the general rate reduction for 
this model specification. For this general rate reduction, one can apply Proposition 2.2 to derive 
this result with the reduced tax rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘.  
Lemma 1.2 




𝐿∗ ) after the general tax reduction is 
characterized by:  
1. If 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘

















𝐿∗ ) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) if 
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔𝑘






𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 
I then compare the optimal allocation before and after the general rate reduction to derive 
the changes in capital allocation. Proposition 5.2 states this result for Model 2. 
Proposition 5.2 
For Model 2, the capital allocation changes after the general tax reduction is characterized by: 
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1. When 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, even after the 
general rate reduction, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile 
only after the general tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘,𝑠
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑘,𝑓
𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝐻∗. 




















In the case where the innovative opportunity is not worthwhile pursuing even with the help 
of the tax cut, the capital allocation does not need to induce collaboration on the innovative 
project, so it does not need to refer to the prototype outcome, as shown in Case 1. In contrast, in 
the case where the tax cut prompts HQ to pursue the innovative opportunity, the allocation 
before the tax cut does not refer to the prototype outcome, whereas the allocation after the tax cut 
does. As shown in Case 2, the tax cut increases the optimal allocation to the high-tax subsidiary, 
under both prototype outcomes. Furthermore, the allocation happens to be the same across both 
outcomes, consistent with Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 4. Finally, in the case where the innovative 
opportunity is already worth pursuing without the tax cut, the tax cut alleviates the incentive 
problem and allows HQ to allocate even more to the low-tax subsidiary (and hence less to the 
high-tax subsidiary), for both prototype outcomes, as shown in Case 4. 
Model 3 allows HQ the option of not fully allocating all the available capital, but results in 
the same optimal allocation as Model 2, because the budget constraints are binding even though 
they can have slack. As a result, the implications from the tax cut for Model 3 are the same as in 
Model 2.  
Model 4 further relaxes the assumption about the Time 4 investment decision so that after the 
prototype succeeds, HQ could assign different allocations depending on the Time 4 investment 
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outcome. Lemma 1.4 states the optimal allocation after the general rate reduction for this model 
specification. One can apply Proposition 2.4 to derive this result with the general reduced tax 
rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘. 
Lemma 1.4 
For Model 4, the optimal allocation after the general tax reduction is characterized by:  
1. If 𝛾 <
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘










𝐿∗ ) is 










𝐿∗ ) = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) 
where  
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘














𝐿∗ )  
= (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘








max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






I then compare the optimal allocation before and after the general rate reduction to derive 
the changes in capital allocation. Proposition 5.4 states this result for Model 4. 
Proposition 5.4 
For Model 4, the capital allocation changes after the general tax reduction are characterized by: 
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1. When 𝛾 <
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, even after the 
general tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile only 
after the general tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 











As with the result of the previous models, the tax cut reduces the tax cost associated with a 
coordination, so HQ starts inducing collaboration on the innovative project after the tax cut, if 
the project meets the inducing threshold after the tax cut as shown in Case 2. However, this 
result differs from the previous models in that the allocation increases only for the failure 
outcome but stays the same for the success outcome. Once HQ observes a success, contractable 
investment allows it to allocate all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary, regardless of the tax-rate 
differential. Another difference from the other models is Case 3. In previous models, the result 
shows that the general tax cut alleviates the internal incentive problem and allows HQ to allocate 
more to the low-tax subsidiary, whereas Case 3 of the current proposition shows that the general 
tax cut has no effect on capital allocation. This is not a surprising result, given that the optimal 
allocation does not refer to the tax-rate differential between the two subsidiaries, as discussed in 
Proposition 2.4 and again shown in Lemma 1.4.  
5.4 Effect of a Specific Rate Reduction – Model Extension  
 In this section, I revisit the results for a rate reduction that is specific to innovation-
related incomes, for the model extensions as outlined in Chapter 4. The effect of a specific rate 
reduction under the extended models differs in several aspects from that of the base model. 
Lemma 2.1 states the optimal allocation after the specific tax reduction for Model 1, when HQ 




For Model 1, the optimal allocation (𝜆𝑘
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1. (𝜆𝑘
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𝜆 
 Like the general rate reduction, the specific tax reduction reduces the tax cost associated 
with inducing collaboration on the innovative project. However, unlike the general rate reduction, 
the benefit of the specific rate reduction is limited to successful innovations. In the model, if the 
prototype fails, the subsidiaries must default to traditional production that does not qualify for 
favorable tax treatment. As discussed in Bradley, Ruf, and Robinson (2018), traditional R&D 
incentives subsidize R&D input regardless of the outcome, whereas the patent-box regime 
rewards only successful outcomes, an important difference between the two types of R&D tax 
incentive. For this reason, the benefit of the specific rate reduction is smaller than the general 
rate reduction, for it has a probability of 1 − 𝑝 not to apply. One can see in Lemma 2.1 that the 
inducing threshold is lower than before the specific rate reduction, but higher than the inducing 
threshold of the general rate reduction as stated in Lemma 1.1. 
I then compare the optimal allocation before and after the specific rate reduction to derive 
the changes in capital allocation in response to the tax policy. Proposition 6.1 states this result.  
Proposition 6.1 
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Except for the difference in its effect on the inducing threshold, the specific rate 
reduction otherwise has the same effect as the general rate reduction on the capital allocation. 
The first effect reduces the tax cost of inducing collaboration on the innovative project. One can 
see from Case 2 that HQ induces collaboration and allocates more capital to the high-tax 
subsidiary after the tax cut if the innovative opportunity meets the new inducing threshold. The 
second effect alleviates the internal incentive problem by allowing HQ to allocate more to the 
low-tax subsidiary. One can see from Case 3 that capital allocation decreases for the high-tax 
subsidiary when HQ finds the innovative opportunity worth inducing even prior to the tax cut.  
I now turn my attention to Model 2, where HQ specifies an upfront contract of capital 
allocations that depend on the prototype outcome and the investment decision being non-
contractable. Lemma 2.2 states the optimal allocation after the specific rate reduction, and 
Proposition 6.2 states the capital allocation changes following the specific rate reduction.  
Lemma 2.2 
For Model 2, the optimal allocation after the specific rate reduction is characterized by:  
1. If 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, even after the 
specific rate reduction, and (𝜆𝑘
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Proposition 6.2  
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1. When 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔




















𝐻∗ < 𝜆𝐻∗. 
 
Compared with the general rate reduction, the specific rate reduction has similar effects, 
namely, the reduction in the coordination cost reduces the inducing thresholds and alleviates the 
internal incentive problem. The second effect allows HQ to allocate more to the low-tax 
subsidiary and less to the high-tax subsidiary. In contrast, the extent to which the inducing 
threshold decreases is smaller for the specific tax cut than the general tax cut. This is because the 
benefit of the specific tax cut applies only to successful innovations.  
Finally, I state the result for Model 4 where HQ specifies an upfront contract of the 
capital allocations that depend on the prototype outcome, and the investment decision is 
contractable. Lemma 2.4 states the optimal allocation after the specific rate reduction, and 
Proposition 6.4 states the capital allocation changes following the specific rate reduction. 
Lemma 2.4 
For Model 4, the optimal allocation after the specific tax reduction is characterized by:  
1. If 𝛾 <
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𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and (𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗, 𝜆𝑘










𝐿∗ ) is 










𝐿∗ )  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) 
where  
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘

















𝐿∗ )  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘








max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆







For Model 4, the specific rate reduction does not change the optimal capital allocation.  
Comparing this result with the optimal allocation under Model 4 prior to the rate 
reduction, one can see that they are the same, both in terms of the inducing threshold and the 
allocation amounts. This is because the tax reduction applies only to the success outcome, and 
the income must be earned in the high-tax subsidiary. However, with the Time 4 investment 
being contractable, HQ allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary for the success outcome. 
As a result, when the prototype is a success, the tax rate of the high-tax subsidiary becomes 
irrelevant, rendering the specific rate reduction ineffective.  
5.5 Summary  
In summary, I consider the tax policy implications of the tradeoff between an MNC’s 
objective to coordinate collaboration and its tax-planning objective. I study two types of tax 
policy that are used to promote innovative activities and attract capital investments, a general 
rate reduction that applies to both traditional and innovative projects, and a specific rate 
reduction that applies only to successful innovations (such as a patent-box regime). I study how 
an MNC changes its capital allocation to these tax incentives depending on its need to coordinate 
internal collaboration across subsidiaries. The model reveals two important insights. First, an 
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MNC does not always respond to a tax incentive, and this occurs under two scenarios. The first 
is when the tax incentive does not alter the costs or the benefits of the above tradeoff, and the 
second is when the tax incentive is not strong enough to reduce the cost associated with 
coordinating collaboration. Second, when the MNC does change its capital allocation in response 
to the tax policy, the change does not always conform to the policy’s intention. The model shows 
that a tax cut from a high-tax country can unintentionally alleviate the internal coordination cost 
for an MNC and thereby allow the MNC to coordinate collaboration with a more tax-efficient 
allocation. This results in the MNC allocating less capital to a subsidiary in the high-tax country 
after the tax cut. These findings hold in the model extensions as well with slight variations. 
These results highlight the importance of the internal management of an MNC in affecting the 




Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Multinational corporations face a unique set of business opportunities and managerial 
challenges. At the same time, the differences in the tax rules and rates across jurisdictions also 
present MNCs with a unique set of tax-planning opportunities. In the context of transferring 
physical goods across borders between subsidiaries, the literature has separately addressed the 
rich managerial implications and tax consequences of the transfer-pricing decision. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, several studies have considered the tradeoff between a managerial objective and a 
tax-planning objective. However, outside the context of the flow of physical goods and the 
transfer-pricing decision, the literature has not considered other important decisions that an MNC 
makes that could have implications in both realms.  
As organizations increasingly rely on innovations and the integration of knowledge to 
derive competitive advantage, managing the flow of intangible resources becomes increasingly 
important. As subsidiaries play a more active strategic role, they gain unique experiences and 
become the owners of their intellectual capabilities. However, it is the collection and integration 
of these different capabilities that form an organization’s overall competitive strategy. As a result, 
the headquarters plays a crucial role in the coordination of subsidiary-specific resources. The 
tacit nature of knowledge, expertise, and intellectual capabilities makes formal processes 
ineffective management tools. Direct monitoring has also been shown to be ineffective to 
facilitate knowledge-sharing, especially when creative effort is involved. In this context, 
subsidiary collaborations facilitate the flow of intangible resources by creating knowledge-
sharing opportunities and promoting interactions within an innovation team.  
In this thesis, I study a situation where the flow of intangible resources occurs through 
collaboration between two subsidiaries. Each subsidiary possesses different expertise that is 
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critical to an innovation opportunity, so they must collaborate on the innovative project for it to 
succeed. The headquarters does not have direct control over each subsidiary’s contribution of its 
intellectual resources. It is the central allocation of capital to the subsidiaries that serves a crucial 
role in achieving a coordinated outcome, as the capital allocation can incentivize both 
subsidiaries to participate in the innovative project. This is the managerial objective of the 
MNC’s capital allocation decision. However, because the subsidiaries reside in different 
jurisdictions that charge different tax rates, the capital allocation decision also has a tax objective. 
The first task of this thesis is to characterize the tradeoff between the managerial and tax 
objectives.  
A tradeoff occurs when the tax-minimizing allocation does not incentivize both 
subsidiaries to contribute to the innovative project. Because each subsidiary can earn a baseline 
return on its own traditional project, the more capital a subsidiary has, the more profits it can 
earn on its own in the traditional project. However, collaboration on the innovative project is 
appealing only if it offers the subsidiary a share of profits greater than the profits it can earn 
alone by itself. Therefore, the headquarters cannot allocate too much capital to either subsidiary 
for collaboration to occur. This concern for collaboration restricts the amount of tax savings the 
capital allocation can generate from the low-tax subsidiary. In this context, the difference in the 
tax rates between the subsidiaries creates a tax cost to the coordination of collaboration. The 
headquarters trades off this cost against the benefit of collaboration on the innovative project and 
would optimally forgo the innovation if the cost exceeds the benefit. 
I first establish the tradeoff in the base model where a subsidiary’s project choice entails 
the contribution of both types of resource. In the model extension, a subsidiary decides whether 
to contribute its intellectual resource and then decides on which project to invest. I accomplish 
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this through introducing a prototype stage to the innovation project. This serves several purposes. 
First, the prototype stage is subject to a risk of failure, but the headquarters does not know 
whether the failure is due to chance or a lack of intellectual contribution. Second, it separates a 
subsidiary’s intellectual contribution, that is most critical during the development stage, from its 
investment choice, that is most critical during the production stage. Finally, the prototype stage 
could produce an observable outcome which the capital allocation can contract upon. These 
extended versions of the model progressively relax the assumptions made in the base model, and 
the basic tradeoff appears in similar fashions in these model extensions.  
The second task of this thesis is to examine how a multinational corporation’s need for 
internal collaboration affects the way it changes its capital allocation because of a tax policy. I 
study two types of tax cut, one that applies to all types of business income and another that 
applies only to income earned from successful innovations. Both types of tax cut have been used 
in various countries to attract capital investments into innovations and promote R&D activities. 
This analysis reveals two important insights. First, although a tax cut reduces the coordination 
cost for an MNC, the MNC does not always change its behavior. This occurs if the cost 
reduction is not high enough or if its internal coordination cost does not depend on taxes to begin 
with. Second, when an MNC changes its behavior, it does not always change in the direction 
intended by the policy. A tax cut offers more profits to be shared in collaboration on the 
innovative project, and thereby alleviates the internal coordination problem and allows the MNC 
to allocate even more to the low-tax subsidiary. In this case, an MNC responds to a tax cut by 
reducing its capital allocated to the country giving the tax cut. These basic results hold across the 
variations of the model with slight differences when the tax cut applies only to income earned 
from successful innovations.  
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This thesis extends our understanding of the interaction between a multinational 
corporation’s managerial considerations and its tax objectives. First, the prior literature has 
examined a tradeoff between the two objectives in a context that involves the flow of physical 
goods. This thesis extends this inquiry by examining a context that involves the coordination of a 
flow of intangible goods in the form of tacit knowledge and expertise. Second, the prior literature 
generally focuses on the transfer-pricing decision between international subsidiaries. However, 
there are other important decisions that a multinational corporation makes that have implications 
in both realms. This thesis contributes to this inquiry by studying the capital allocation decision. 
Third, international business models have shifted from viewing the multinational corporation as 
a vertical hierarchy to viewing the entity as an interconnected network. In this network, each 
subsidiary serves a distinct role and possesses a distinct set of expertise and capabilities. This 
thesis extends our understanding of the coordination role of the headquarters by incorporating 
the lateral relationships among subsidiaries. Finally, this thesis extends the literature that 
examines tax incentives and R&D activities by exploring the innovation process itself and 
various stages throughout the innovation process.  
This study has several implications for both managerial practices and tax policies. From 
the management perspective, while the different tax rates and rules provide multinational 
corporations unique tax-planning opportunities, they also create opportunity costs for internal 
coordination. This tax cost that is external to the corporation is an underexplored area in 
management. From a tax policy perspective, the tax policies that give rise to the tax-rate 
differential between two subsidiaries are likely formed by two independent countries. The tax 
disparity creates a coordination cost for a multinational corporation and affects its allocation of 
capital. Although tax laws are often drafted independently across countries, the subsidiaries that 
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operate in the different countries are interrelated through the MNC’s internal network. Finally, 
the internal coordination concerns may cause an MNC to respond to a tax policy in ways that are 
opposite to the stated policy intention. This thesis thus highlights the importance of 






Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. 1994. "The management of innovation." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109 (4):1185-1209. doi: 10.2307/2118360. 
Akamah, Herita, Ole-Kristian Hope, and Wayne B. Thomas. 2016. Tax Havens and Disclosure Aggregation. 
Working Paper, University of Oklahoma. 
Alstadsæter, Annette, Salvador Barrios, Geatan Nicodeme, Skonieczna Agnieszka, and Vezzani Antonio. 
2015. Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location and Local R&D. IPTS Working Papers on Corporate 
R&D and Innovation. European Commission. 
Altshuler, Rosanne, and Harry Grubert. 2002. "Repatriation taxes, repatriation strategies and 
multinational financial policy." Journal of Public Economics 87 (1):73-107. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00173-6. 
Amabile, T. M., R. Conti, H. Coon, J. Lazenby, and M. Herron. 1996. "Assessing the work environment for 
creativity." Academy Of Management Journal 39 (5):1154-1184. 
Amabile, Teresa M., and Michael G. Pratt. 2016. "The dynamic componential model of creativity and 
innovation in organizations: Making progress, making meaning." Research in Organizational 
Behavior 36:157-183. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2016.10.001. 
Ambos, Björn, and Volker Mahnke. 2010. "How do MNC headquarters add value?" MIR: Management 
International Review 50 (4):403-412. 
Ambos, Tina C., Ulf Andersson, and Julian Birkinshaw. 2010. "What are the consequences of initiative-
taking in multinational subsidiaries?" Journal of International Business Studies 41 (7):1099-1118. 
Arya, Anil, and Brian Mittendorf. 2007. "Interacting supply chain distortions: The pricing of internal 
transfers and external procurement." The Accounting Review 82 (3):551-580. 
Audretsch, David B., Werner Bönte, and Prashanth Mahagaonkar. 2012. "Financial signaling by 
innovative nascent ventures: The relevance of patents and prototypes." Research Policy 41 
(8):1407-1421. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.003. 
Badri, Masood A., Amr Mortagy, Donna Davis, and Donald Davis. 1997. "Effective analysis and planning 
of R&D stages: A simulation approach." International Journal of Project Management 15 (6):351-
358. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(97)00003-3. 
Baldenius, Tim, Nahum D. Melumad, and Stefan Reichelstein. 2004. "Integrating managerial and tax 
objectives in transfer pricing." The Accounting Review 79 (3):591-615. 
Baldenius, Tim, and Stefan Reichelstein. 2006. "External and internal pricing in multidivisional firms." 
Journal of Accounting Research 44 (1):1-28. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00191.x. 
Barney, Jay. 1991. "Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage." Journal of Management 17 
(1):99-120. doi: 10.1177/014920639101700108. 
Barney, Jay B. 2001. "Is the resource-based 'view' a useful perspective for strategic management 
research? Yes." The Academy of Management Review 26 (1):41-56. doi: 10.2307/259393. 
Bartlett, Christopher A. 1998. Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Edited by Sumantra 
Ghoshal. 2nd ed. ed. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press. 
Barton, John H., Robert B. Dellenbach, and Paul Kuruk. 1988. "Toward a theory of technology licensing. 
(Symposium on the Law and Economics of International Technology Licensing)." Stanford 
Journal of International Law 25 (1):229. 
Beaudry, Catherine, and Andrea Schiffauerova. 2011. "Impacts of collaboration and network indicators 
on patent quality: The case of Canadian nanotechnology innovation." European Management 
Journal 29 (5):362-376. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2011.03.001. 
Birkinshaw, Julian. 1997. "Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: The characteristics of 
subsidiary initiatives." Strategic Management Journal 18 (3):207-229. 
122 
 
Birkinshaw, Julian, Neil Hood, and Stefan Jonsson. 1998. "Building firm-specific advantages in 
multinational corporations: the role of subsidiary initiative." Strategic Management Journal 19 
(3):221-242. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199803)19:3<221::aid-smj948>3.0.co;2-p. 
Birkinshaw, Julian, and Mats Lingblad. 2005. "Intrafirm competition and charter evolution in the 
multibusiness firm." Organization Science 16 (6):674-686. 
Birkinshaw, Julian M., and Allen J. Morrison. 1995. "Configurations of strategy and structure in 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations." Journal of International Business Studies 26 (4):729-
753. 
Birkinshaw, Julian, Allen Morrison, and John Hulland. 1995. "Structural and competitive determinants of 
a global integration strategy." Strategic Management Journal 16 (8):637-655. 
Bogers, Marcel, and Willem Horst. 2014. "Collaborative prototyping: Cross-fertilization of knowledge in 
prototype-driven problem solving." Journal of Product Innovation Management 31 (4):744-764. 
doi: 10.1111/jpim.12121. 
Böhm, Tobias, Tom Karkinsky, Knoll Bodo, and Nadine Riedel. 2015. "Corporate taxes and strategic 
patent location within multinational firms." CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics. 
Bolton, Patrick, and David S. Scharfstein. 1990. "A theory of predation based on agency problems in 
financial contracting." The American Economic Review 80 (1):93-106. 
Bradley, Sebastien, Estelle P. Dauchy, and Leslie Robinson. 2015. "Cross-country evidence on the 
preliminary effects of patent box regimes on patent activity and ownership." School of 
Economics Working Paper Series 2015-1, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University. 
Bradley, Sebastien, Martin Ruf, and Leslie Robinson. 2020. "The impact of patent box regimes on the 
M&A market." Drexel University Working Paper. 
Burgelman, Robert. 1983. "A model of the interaction of the strategic behavior, corporate context, and 
the concept of strategic." Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review (pre-
1986) 8 (000001):61. 
Cantwell, John, and Ram Mudambi. 2005. "MNE competence-creating subsidiary mandates." Strategic 
Management Journal 26 (12):1109-1128. 
Caves, Richard E., Harold Crookell, and J. Peter Killing. 1983. "The imperfect market for technology 
licences." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 45 (3):249-267. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0084.1983.mp45003002.x. 
Chandler, Alfred D. 1962. "Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise.." 
The American Historical Review 68 (1):158-160. doi: 10.1086/ahr/68.1.158. 
Chen, Hui, and Mikhael Shor. 2009. "Decentralization, transfer pricing, and tacit collusion." 
Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2):581-604. doi: 10.1506/car.26.2.10. 
Chen, Shannon, Michelle Hanlon, Lisa De Simone, and Rebecca Lester. 2018. "The effect of innovation 
box regimes on income shifting and real activity." Stanford University Working Paper. 
Choe, Chongwoo, and Charles E. Hyde. 2008. "Multinational transfer pricing, tax arbitrage and the arm's 
length principle." Economic Record 83 (263):398-404. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2007.00429.x. 
Ciabuschi, Francesco, Oscar Martín Martín, and Benjamin Ståhl. 2010. "Headquarters' influence on 
knowledge transfer performance." MIR: Management International Review 50 (4):471-491. 
Clausing, Kimberly. 1998. "The impact of transfer pricing on intrafirm trade." NBER Working Paper 
Series:6688. doi: 10.3386/w6688. 
Clausing, Kimberly A. 2003. "Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices." Journal of 
Public Economics 87 (9):2207-2223. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00015-4. 
Clausing, Kimberly A. 2007. "Corporate tax revenues in OECD countries." International Tax and Public 
Finance 14 (2):115-133. doi: 10.1007/s10797-006-7983-2. 




Clausing, Kimberly A. 2016. "The effect of profit shifting on the corporate tax base in the United States 
and Beyond." National Tax Journal 69(4): 905-934. doi:10.17310/ntj.2016.4.09 
Collins, Julie, Deen Kemsley, and Mark Lang. 1998. "Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and earnings 
valuation." Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2):209-229. doi: 10.2307/2491475. 
Cook, Paul W. 1955. "Decentralization and the transfer-price problem." The Journal of Business 28 
(2):87-94. 
Cooper, R. G., and E. J. Kleinschmidt. 1987. "Success factors in product innovation." Industrial Marketing 
Management 16 (3):215-223. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0019-8501(87)90029-0. 
Cooper, R. G., and E. J. Kleinschmidt. 1988. "Resource allocation in the new product process." Industrial 
Marketing Management 17 (3):249-262. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0019-8501(88)90008-9. 
Cooper, Robert. 1998. "Benchmarking new product performance:: Results of the best practices study." 
European Management Journal 16 (1):1-17. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373(97)00069-
8. 
Cooper, Robert G. 1988. "Predevelopment activities determine new product success." Industrial 
Marketing Management 17 (3):237-247. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0019-8501(88)90007-7. 
Cooper, Robert G. 1997. "Fixing the fuzzy front end of the new product process: Building the business 
case." CMA Magazine 71 (8):21-3. 
Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer. 1987. "Dissolving a partnership efficiently." 
Econometrica 55 (3):615-632. doi: 10.2307/1913602. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro, Ram Mudambi, and Torben Pedersen. 2019. "Subsidiary power: Loaned or 
owned? The lenses of agency theory and resource dependence theory." Global Strategy Journal 
9 (4):491-501. doi: 10.1002/gsj.1362. 
De Simone, Lisa. 2016. "Does a common set of accounting standards affect tax-motivated income 
shifting for multinational firms?" Journal of Accounting and Economics 61 (1):145-165. doi: 
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.06.002. 
De Simone, Lisa, Jing Huang, and Linda K. Krull. 2019. "R&D and the rising foreign profitability of U.S. 
multinational corporations." The Accounting Review:0000-0000. doi: 10.2308/accr-52620. 
De Simone, Lisa, Kenneth J. Klassen, and Jeri Seidman. 2020. "The effect of income-shifting 
aggressiveness on corporate investment." University of Waterloo Working Paper. 
De Simone, Lisa, Kenneth J. Klassen, and Jeri K. Seidman. 2017. "Unprofitable affiliates and income 
shifting behavior." The Accounting Review 92 (3):113-136. doi: 10.2308/accr-51555. 
De Simone, Lisa, Lillian F. Mills, and Bridget Stomberg. 2019. "Using IRS data to identify income shifting 
to foreign affiliates." Review of Accounting Studies 24 (2):694-730. doi: 10.1007/s11142-019-
9484-4. 
De Simone, Lisa, and Marcel Olbert. 2019. "Real effects of private country-by-country disclosure." 
London Business School Working Paper 
De Simone, Lisa, and Richard C. Sansing. 2019. "Income shifting using a cost-sharing arrangement." The 
Journal of the American Taxation Association 41 (1):123-136. doi: 10.2308/atax-52142. 
Delany, Ed. 2000. "Strategic development of the multinational subsidiary through subsidiary initiative-
taking." Long Range Planning 33 (2):220-244. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-
6301(00)00029-7. 
Dellestrand, Henrik, and Philip Kappen. 2012. "The effects of spatial and contextual factors on 
headquarters resource allocation to MNE subsidiaries." Journal of International Business Studies 
43 (3):219-243. 
Desai, Mihir A, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines. 2003. "Chains of ownership, regional tax competition, 
and foreign direct investment." In Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of 
Industrial Countries, 61-98. Springer. 
124 
 
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines. 2004. "The costs of shared ownership: Evidence from 
international joint ventures." Journal of Financial Economics 73 (2):323-374. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.001. 
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines. 2006. "The demand for tax haven operations." Journal 
of Public Economics 90 (3):513-531. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.004. 
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines, Jr. 2002. International Joint Ventures and the 
Boundaries of the Firm. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Dharmapala, Dhammika, and Nadine Riedel. 2013. "Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-shifting: 
Evidence from European multinationals." Journal of Public Economics 97:95-107. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.004. 
Dierickx, Ingemar, and Karel Cool. 1989. "Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive 
advantage." Management Science 35 (12):1504-1511. 
Dutta, Sunil, and Stefan Reichelstein. 2003. "Leading indicator variables, performance measurement, 
and long-term versus short-term contracts." Journal of Accounting Research 41 (5):837-866. 
Dyreng, Scott D., and Bradley P. Lindsey. 2009. "Using Financial accounting data to examine the effect of 
foreign operations located in tax havens and other countries on U.S. multinational firms' tax 
rates." Journal of Accounting Research 47 (5):1283-1316. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
679X.2009.00346.x. 
Dyreng, Scott D., and Kevin Markle. 2016. "the effect of financial constraints on income shifting by U.S. 
multinationals." The Accounting Review 91 (6):1601-1627. doi: 10.2308/accr-51420. 
Edlin, Aaron S., and Stefan Reichelstein. 1995. "Specific investment under negotiated transfer pricing: An 
efficiency result." The Accounting Review 70 (2):275-291. 
Edwards, Alexander, Todd Kravet, and Ryan Wilson. 2016. "Trapped cash and the profitability of foreign 
acquisitions." Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1):44-77. doi: 10.1111/1911-3846.12140. 
Egelhoff, William G. 2010. "How the Parent headquarters adds value to an MNC." MIR: Management 
International Review 50 (4):413-431. 
Elverum, Christer W., and Torgeir Welo. 2014. "The role of early prototypes in concept development: 
Insights from the automotive industry." Procedia CIRP 21:491-496. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2014.03.127. 
Ernst, Christof, and Christoph Spengel. 2011. "Taxation, R&D tax incentives and patent application in 
Europe." ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 11-024. 
Farris, George F. 1972. "The effect of individual roles on performance in innovative groups." R&D 
Management 3 (1):23-28. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.1972.tb00992.x. 
Flynn, Francis J. 2006. "'How Much is it worth to you?' Subjective evaluations of help in organizations." 
Research in Organizational Behavior 27:133-174. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-
3085(06)27004-7. 
Foley, Fritz C., Jay C. Hartzell, Sheridan Titman, and Garry Twite. 2007. "Why do firms hold so much cash? 
A tax-based explanation." Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3):579-607. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.006. 
Galbraith, Craig S., and Neil M. Kay. 1986. "Towards a theory of multinational enterprise." Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 7 (1):3-19. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-
2681(86)90019-3. 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Christopher A. Bartlett. 1990. "The Multinational corporation as an 
interorganizational network." The Academy of Management Review 15 (4):603-625. doi: 
10.2307/258684. 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Nitin Nohria. 1989. "Internal differentiation within multinational corporations." 
Strategic Management Journal 10 (4):323-337. 
125 
 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Nitin Nohria. 1994. "Differentiated fit and shared values: Alternatives for 
managing headquarters-subsidiary relations." Strategic Management Journal 15 (6):491-502. 
Gibbons, Michael. 1994. The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in 
Contemporary Societies: Sage. 
Gnyawalị, Devi R., Manisha Singal, and Shaohua “Carolyn” Mu. 2009. "Knowledge ties among 
subsidiaries in MNCs: A multi-level conceptual model." Journal of International Management 15 
(4):387-400. doi: 10.1016/j.intman.2008.02.003. 
Grabner, Isabella. 2014. "Incentive System design in creativity-dependent firms." The Accounting Review 
89 (5):1729-1750. doi: 10.2308/accr-50756. 
Griffith, Rachel, Helen Miller, and Martin O'Connell. 2010. "Corporate Taxes and intellectual property: 
Formulating the effect of patent boxes." Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Note 112. 
Griffith, Rachel, Helen Miller, and Martin O'Connell. 2014. "Ownership of intellectual property and 
corporate taxation." Journal of Public Economics 112:12-23. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.009. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1986. "The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of 
vertical and lateral integration." Journal of Political Economy 94 (4):691-719. doi: 
10.1086/261404. 
Gupta, Anil K., and V. Govindarajan. 1994. "Organizing for knowledge flows within MNCs." International 
Business Review 3 (4):443-457. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0969-5931(94)90033-7. 
Gupta, Anil K., and Vijay Govindarajan. 2000. "Knowledge flows within multinational corporations." 
Strategic Management Journal 21 (4):473-496. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1097-
0266(200004)21:4<473::aid-smj84>3.0.co;2-i. 
Halperin, Robert M., and Bin Srinidhi. 1987. "The effects of the U. S. income tax regulations' transfer 
pricing rules on allocative efficiency." The Accounting Review 62 (4):686-706. 
Halperin, Robert M., and Bin Srinidhi. 1991. "U. S. income tax transfer-pricing rules and resource 
allocation: The case of decentralized multinational firms." The Accounting Review 66 (1):141-157. 
Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore. 1998. Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. Edited by John Moore, NBER 
Working Paper Series 6421. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1988. "Incomplete contracts and renegotiation." Econometrica 56 (4):755-
785. doi: 10.2307/1912698. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1999. "Foundations of incomplete contracts." The Review of Economic 
Studies 66 (1):115-138. 
Hartman, David G. 1985. "Tax policy and foreign direct investment." Journal of Public Economics 26 
(1):107-121. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90041-6. 
Hedlund, Gunnar. 1994. "A model of knowledge management and the N‐form corporation." Strategic 
Management Journal 15 (S2):73-90. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250151006. 
Hiemann, Moritz, and Stefan Reichelstein. 2012. "Transfer pricing in multinational corporations: An 
integrated management- and tax perspective." In Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing 
in Law and Economics, edited by Wolfgang Schön and Kai A. Konrad, 3-18. Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
Hines, James R., and Eric M. Rice. 1994. "Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1):149-182. doi: 10.2307/2118431. 
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1956. "On the economics of transfer pricing." The Journal of Business 29 (3):172-184. 
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1957. "Economics of the divisionalized firm." The Journal of Business 30 (2):96-108. 
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1982. "Moral hazard in teams." The Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2):324-340. doi: 
10.2307/3003457. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1990. "Regulating trade among agents." Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 146 (1):85-105. 
126 
 
Huang, Jing, Linda Krull, and Rosemarie Ziedonis. 2019. "R&D investments and tax incentives: The role of 
intra-firm cross-border collaboration." Contemporary Accounting Research n/a (n/a). doi: 
10.1111/1911-3846.12588. 
Huizinga, Harry, and Luc Laeven. 2008. "International profit shifting within multinationals: A multi-
country perspective." Journal of Public Economics 92 (5-6):1164-1182. doi: 
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.002. 
Hyde, Charles E., and Chongwoo Choe. 2005. "Keeping two sets of books: The relationship between tax 
and incentive transfer prices." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 14 (1):165-186. doi: 
10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00038.x. 
Johannesen, Niels. 2014. "Tax avoidance with cross-border hybrid instruments." Journal of public 
economics 112:40-52. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.011. 
Johnson, Nicole Bastian. 2006. "Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible 
assets." Review of Accounting Studies 11 (2):339-365. doi: 10.1007/s11142-006-9006-z. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., Bernhard E. Reichert, and Michael G. Williamson. 2008. "Measuring and 
motivating quantity, creativity, or both." Journal of Accounting Research 46 (2):341-373. doi: 
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00277.x. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Michael G. Williamson. 2010. "Attracting creativity: The initial and aggregate 
effects of contract selection on creativity-weighted productivity." The Accounting Review 85 
(5):1669-1691. 
Karkinsky, Tom, and Nadine Riedel. 2012. "Corporate taxation and the choice of patent location within 
multinational firms." Journal of International Economics 88 (1):176-185. doi: 
10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.04.002. 
Katz, J. Sylvan, and Ben R. Martin. 1997. "What is research collaboration?" Research Policy 26 (1):1-18. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(96)00917-1. 
Khurana, Anil, and Stephen R Rosenthal. 1997. "Integrating the fuzzy front end of new product 
development." MIT Sloan Management Review 38 (2):103. 
Kim, Jongbae, and David Wilemon. 2002. "Focusing the fuzzy front–end in new product development." 
R&D Management 32 (4):269-279. doi: 10.1111/1467-9310.00259. 
Klassen, Kenneth J., and Stacie K. Laplante. 2012b. "Are US multinational corporations becoming more 
aggressive income shifters?" Journal of Accounting Research 50 (5):1245-1285. 
Klassen, Kenneth J., Stacie K. Laplante, and Carla Carnaghan. 2014. "A model of multinational income 
shifting and an application to tax planning with e-commerce." Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 36 (2):27-53. doi: 10.2308/atax-50817. 
Klassen, Kenneth J., and Stacie Kelley Laplante. 2012a. "The Effect of foreign reinvestment and financial 
reporting incentives on cross‐jurisdictional income shifting." Contemporary Accounting Research 
29 (3):928-955. 
Leiponen, Aija, and Constance E. Helfat. 2010. "Innovation objectives, knowledge sources, and the 
benefits of breadth." Strategic Management Journal 31 (2):224-236. doi: 10.1002/smj.807. 
Leonard, Dorothy, and Jeffrey F. Rayport. 1997. "Spark innovation through emphatic design.(market 
research)." Harvard Business Review 75 (6):102. 
Lippman, S. A., and R. P. Rumelt. 1982. "Uncertain imitability: An analysis of interfirm differences in 
efficiency under competition." The Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2):418-438. doi: 
10.2307/3003464. 
Lunnan, Randi, Sverre Tomassen, Ulf Andersson, and Gabriel R. G. Benito. 2019. "Dealing with 
headquarters in the multinational corporation: a subsidiary perspective on organizing costs." 
Journal of Organization Design 8 (1):12. doi: 10.1186/s41469-019-0052-y. 
Magelssen, Catherine. 2020. "Allocation of property rights and technological innovation within firms." 
Strategic Management Journal 41 (4):758-787. doi: 10.1002/smj.3103. 
127 
 
Mahnke, Volker, and Markus Venzin. 2003. "Governance of knowledge-teams in the MNC: The case of 
HeidelbergCement." MIR: Management International Review 43 (3):47-67. 
Mahnke, Volker, Markus Venzin, and Shaker A. Zahra. 2007. "Governing entrepreneurial opportunity 
recognition in MNEs: Aligning interests and cognition under uncertainty." Journal of 
Management Studies 44 (7):1278-1298. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00730.x. 
Mansfield, Edwin, and John Rapoport. 1975. "The costs of industrial product innovations." Management 
Science 21 (12):1380-1386. 
Markle, Kevin. 2016. "A comparison of the tax-motivated income shifting of multinationals in territorial 
and worldwide countries." Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1):7-43. doi: 10.1111/1911-
3846.12148. 
Markle, Kevin, Lillian F. Mills, and Braden M. Williams. 2019. "Implicit corporate taxes and income 
shifting." The Accounting Review In-Press. doi: 10.2308/accr-52526. 
Martini, Jan Thomas, Rainer Niemann, and Dirk Simons. 2012. "Transfer pricing or formula 
apportionment? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals’ investment and production 
decisions." Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (4):1060-1086. doi: 10.1111/j.1911-
3846.2012.01140.x. 
Mascitelli, Ronald. 2000. "From experience: Harnessing tacit knowledge to achieve breakthrough 
innovation." Journal of Product Innovation Management 17 (3):179-193. doi: 10.1111/1540-
5885.1730179. 
Meyer, Alan D., Anne S. Tsui, and C. R. Hinings. 1993. "Configurational approaches to organizational 
analysis. (Special Research Forum: Configurational Approaches to Organization)." Academy of 
Management Journal 36 (6):1175. doi: 10.2307/256809. 
Morrison, Allen J., and Kendall Roth. 1992. "A taxonomy of business-level strategies in global industries." 
Strategic Management Journal 13 (6):399-417. 
Myers, Stewart C. 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics 5 
(2):147-175. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0. 
Narayanan, V. G., and Michael J. Smith. 2000. "Impact of competition and taxes on responsibility center 
organization and transfer prices." Contemporary Accounting Research 17 (3):497-529. doi: 
10.1506/KAPX-YQTE-GJPT-7D64. 
Nöldeke, Georg, and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1995. "Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the 
hold-up problem." The RAND Journal of Economics 26 (2):163-179. doi: 10.2307/2555911. 
Nöldeke, Georg, and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1998. "Sequential investments and options to own." The RAND 
Journal of Economics 29 (4):633-653. doi: 10.2307/2556087. 
O’Donnell, Sharon Watson. 2000. "Managing foreign subsidiaries: Agents of headquarters, or an 
interdependent network?" Strategic Management Journal 21 (5):525-548. doi: 
10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200005)21:5<525::AID-SMJ104>3.0.CO;2-Q. 
Paterson, S. L., and D. M. Brock. 2002. "The development of subsidiary-management research: Review 
and theoretical analysis." International Business Review 11 (2):139-163. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-5931(01)00053-1. 
Peng, Mike. 2001. "The resource-based view and international business." Journal of Management 27 
(6):803-829. doi: 10.1177/014920630102700611. 
Porter, Michael E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New 
York: Free Press. 
Porter, Michael E. 1986. Competition in Global Industries. Harvard Business Press. 
Porter, Michael E. 1989. "From competitive advantage to corporate strategy." In Readings in Strategic 
Management, edited by David Asch and Cliff Bowman, 234-255. London: Macmillan Education. 
Prahalad, C. K. 1987. The Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision. Edited by 
Yves L. Doz. New York: Free Press. 
128 
 
Prahald, C. K. 1976. "Strategic choices in diversified MNCs." The International Executive 18 (3):20-22. doi: 
10.1002/tie.5060180312. 
Procher, Vivien D., and Dirk Engel. 2018. "The investment-divestment relationship: Resource shifts and 
intersubsidiary competition within MNEs." International Business Review 27 (3):528-542. doi: 
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.10.004. 
Rajan, Raghuram G., Henri; Servaes, and Luigi; Zingales. 2000. "The cost of diversity: The diversification 
discount and inefficient investment." The Journal of Finance 55 (1):35-80. doi: 
doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00200. 
Ram, Mudambi, and Navarra Pietro. 2004. "Is knowledge power? Knowledge flows, subsidiary power 
and rent-seeking within MNCs." Journal of International Business Studies 35 (5):385-406. 
Regnell, Björn, Martin Höst, Fredrik Nilsson, and Henrik Bengtsson. 2009. A Measurement Framework 
for Team Level Assessment of Innovation Capability in Early Requirements Engineering. Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02152-7_7  
Reineke, Rebecca, and Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten. 2020. "Transfer Pricing and location of intangibles – 
Spillover and tax avoidance through profit shifting." WU International Taxation Research Paper 
Series, 2019-01. 
Roth, Kendall, and Sharon O'Donnell. 1996. "Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency 
theory perspective." Academy of Management 39 (3):678-703. 
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model." Econometrica 50 (1):97-109. doi: 
10.2307/1912531. 
Rugman, Alan M., and Alain Verbeke. 2001. "Subsidiary-specific advantages in multinational 
enterprises." Strategic Management Journal 22 (3):237-250. 
Sansing, Richard. 1999. "Relationship-specific investments and the transfer pricing paradox." Review of 
Accounting Studies 4 (2):119-134. doi: 10.1023/A:1009601102396. 
Scharfstein, David S., and Jeremy C. Stein. 2000. "The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional 
rent‐seeking and inefficient investment." The Journal of Finance 55 (6):2537-2564. doi: 
doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00299. 
Schmitz, Patrick W. 2001. "The hold-up problem and incomplete contracts: A survey of recent topics in 
contract theory." Bulletin of Economic Research 53 (1):1-17. doi: 10.1111/1467-8586.00114. 
Schrage, Michael. 1999. Serious Play: How the World's Best Companies Simulate to Innovate: Harvard 
Business Press. 
Schwab, Thomas, and Maximilian Todtenhaupt. 2019. "Thinking outside the box: The cross-border effect 
of tax cuts on R&D " WU International Taxation Research Paper Series 2016-07. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2864304. 
Sheng, Margaret L., and Nathaniel N. Hartmann. 2019. "Impact of subsidiaries' cross-border knowledge 
tacitness shared and social capital on MNCs' explorative and exploitative innovation capability." 
Journal of International Management 25 (4):100705. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2019.100705. 
Simonin, Bernard L. 1997. "The importance of collaborative know-how: An empirical test of the learning 
organization." Academy of Management Journal 40 (5):1150-1174. doi: 10.5465/256930. 
Sinn, H. 1993. "Taxation and the birth of foreign subsidiaries." In Trade, Welfare, and Economic Policies. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Sirmon, David G., Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Ireland, and Brett Anitra Gilbert. 2011. "Resource 
orchestration to create competitive advantage: Breadth, depth, and life cycle effects." Journal of 
Management 37 (5):1390-1412. doi: 10.1177/0149206310385695. 
Smith, Michael J. 2002a. "Ex ante and ex post discretion over arm's length transfer prices." The 
Accounting Review 77 (1):161-184. 
129 
 
Smith, Michael J. 2002b. "Tax and incentive trade-offs in multinational transfer pricing." Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance 17 (3):209-236. 
Smith, Preston G., and Donald G. Reinertsen. 1992. "Developing products in half the time. (includes 
related article) (Book Digest)." Small Business Reports 17 (1):65. 
Son, Seung Yeon, Duck Hyun Cho, and Seung-Wan Kang. 2017. "The impact of close monitoring on 
creativity and knowledge sharing: The mediating role of leader-member exchange." Creativity 
and Innovation Management 26 (3):256-265. doi: 10.1111/caim.12219. 
Spender, J.-C., and Robert M. Grant. 1996. "Knowledge and the firm: Overview." Strategic Management 
Journal 17 (S2):5-9. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250171103. 
Stein, Jeremy C. 1997. "Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources." The 
Journal of Finance 52 (1):111-133. doi: doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03810.x. 
Subramaniam, Mohan, and N. Venkatraman. 2001. "Determinants of transnational new product 
development capability: Testing the influence of transferring and deploying tacit overseas 
knowledge." Strategic Management Journal 22 (4):359-378. 
Szulanski, Gabriel. 1996. "Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best practice 
within the firm." Strategic Management Journal 17:27-43. 
Tallman, Stephen, and Mitchell P. Koza. 2010. "Keeping the global in mind: The evolution of the 
headquarters' role in global multi-business firms." MIR: Management International Review 50 
(4):433-448. 
Tallman, Stephen, and George S. Yip. 2009. "Strategy and the multinational enterprise." In The Oxford 
Handbook of International Business, edited by Alan M. Rugman, Chapter 12(317-348). Oxford 
University Press. 
Teece, D. J. 1977. "Technology transfer by multinational firms: The resource cost of transferring 
technological know-how." The Economic Journal 87 (346):242-261. doi: 10.2307/2232084. 
Teece, David J. 1981. "The market for know-how and the efficient international transfer of technology." 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 458:81-96. 
Terwiesch, Christian, and Christoph H. Loch. 2004. "Collaborative prototyping and the pricing of custom-
designed products." Management Science 50 (2):145-158. 
Thomke, Stefan H. 1997. "The role of flexibility in the development of new products: An empirical 
study." Research Policy 26 (1):105-119. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(96)00918-3. 
Thomke, Stefan H. 1998. "Managing experimentation in the design of new products." Management 
Science 44 (6):743-762. 
Tran, Yen, Volker Mahnke, and Björn Ambos. 2010. "The effect of quantity, quality and timing of 
headquarters-initiated knowledge flows on subsidiary performance." MIR: Management 
International Review 50 (4):493-511. 
Weichenrieder, Alfons J. 1996. "Anti-tax-avoidance provisions and the size of foreign direct investment." 
International Tax and Public Finance 3 (1):67-81. doi: 10.1007/bf00400148. 
Westney, D. Eleanor, and Srilata Zaheer. 2009. "The multinational enterprise as an organization." In The 
Oxford Handbook of International Business, edited by Alan M. Rugman, Chapter 13. Oxford 
University Press. 
Williams, Braden. 2018. "Multinational tax incentives and offshored U.S. jobs." The Accounting Review 
93 (5):293. doi: 10.2308/accr-52008. 
Williamson, Oliver E.. 1985. "The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting." University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial 
Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. 
Zander, Udo, and Bruce Kogut. 1995. "Knowledge and the speed of the transfer and imitation of 




Proof of Proposition 1 
From the budget constraint, 𝜆𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿, and substitute it into the objective function: 
(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) = (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) 
= (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝐿) 
One can see from this expression that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝐿.  
Next, substitute 𝜆𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿 into inequalities (1) and (2), and we have: 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿)       (1′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿      (2′) 
Solving inequality (1′) provides a lower bound of 𝜆𝐿: 
𝜆𝐿 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
⋅ 𝜆 
Rearranging inequality (2′),  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 ≥ (𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)𝜆𝐿      (2′′) 
Case 1: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
, and the right hand side of 
(2′′) is negative while the left hand side is positive. Therefore, constraint (2) is satisfied for any 
𝜆𝐿 and does not impose an upper bound on 𝜆𝐿. However, the budget constraint enforces that 0 ≤
𝜆𝐿 ≤ 𝜆.  
 
With 𝛾 being the upper bound and the expression obtained in (1′) being the lower bound, we 
obtain a feasible range for 𝜆𝐿:  
max {
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 





(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(𝛽 + 𝛾)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
This shows that the upper bound of this range is strictly larger than the lower bound, hence the 
range is non-empty.  
 
Recall that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝐿, so the optimal 𝜆𝐿 takes the upper bound. In 
other words, 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
Case 2: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, we have  𝛾 <
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
, so one can divide 𝛽(1 −
𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ from both sides of (2′′) to derive an upper bound of 𝜆𝐿.  
𝜆𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)





𝜆, and note that (2) is binding when 𝜆𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿.  
 
Together with the budget constraint, one obtains a feasible range of 𝜆𝐿  
max {
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝐿 ≤ min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} 
We first verify that this range is non-empty by computing  
𝑠𝐿 −
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆
=
𝛽𝛾(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)((1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ))
𝜆 > 0 
and 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
 𝜆 > 0 
where we use the case-2 condition that  𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0. This shows the range for 
𝜆𝐿 is non-empty.  
 
The upper bound of 𝜆𝐿 is min {𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} and is the allocation that maximizes the tax savings while 





Next, I derive the two sub-cases where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿 and where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆 by computing 
the difference between 𝜆 and 𝑠𝐿: 
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 =
(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
Because 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0  and 1 − 𝜏 > 0 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿  has the same sign as (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 −
𝜔𝛾. 
 
Case 2.1: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿 ≥ 𝜆, so 𝜆
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆.  
Case 2.2: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 > 0, we have 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿 < 𝜆 , so  𝜆
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿. 
 






 𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
                                   
𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ




𝑠𝐿 , 𝑖𝑓  𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ





One can combine the two cases where 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 because 






𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
> 0 







𝐿∗ can be described with 
𝜆𝐿∗ = {










Proof of Proposition 2 
After determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the innovative project, the 
headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This allows the 
headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
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If the headquarters does not induce collaboration on the innovative project, the total payoff is: 
𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) = 𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝐿) 
Note that the total payoff increases in 𝜆𝐿 because a  higher value of 𝜆𝐿 yields a higher tax saving, 
so the headquarters optimally allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary when it forgoes 
the innovative project. In other words, 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. The optimal payoff is thus 𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆. 
The headquarters compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration as 
given in the two cases of Proposition 1.   
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝐿 = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝐻 = 0, and 
the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is (𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. Inducing collaboration in 
this case has a higher optimal payoff, as (𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿, 
and the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is  
(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) =
(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is:   
(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) − 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔))





𝛽, (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, and the difference is positive if and only if  
(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 
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1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
⋅ 𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜔(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first-best solution is obtained, and the headquarters induces 
collaboration with no additional tax cost. It maximizes tax savings by allocating 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 




𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 , inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. 
Following proposition 1, this optimal allocation is (𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿). 
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the optimal 
allocation is 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.1 
From the budget constraint, 𝜆𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿, and substitute it into the objective function: 
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) 
= 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) 
= 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝐿) 
One can see from this expression that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝐿.  
Next, substitute 𝜆𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿 into inequalities (1) and (2), and we have: 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿)      (1′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝐿       (2′) 
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Notice that (1′) and (2′) are equivalent to inequalities (3) and (4), so the inequalities (1) and (2) 
are redundant. Therefore, the feasible region of LP-1 can be described solely by inequalities (3) 
to (6). Comparing this feasible region with that of LP-Base, one can see that they are the same, 
so the feasible range for 𝜆𝐿 is the same. Furthermore, because the objective function increases in 
𝜆𝐿, the optimal solution takes the upper bound of 𝜆𝐿 . One can refer to the proof of Proposition 1 
to check for the non-emptiness of the range derived for 𝜆𝐿 . It follows that the optimal solution is 
the same as that of LP-Base.  
  
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
As with Proposition 2, after determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the 
innovative project, the headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This 
allows the headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
From the proof of Proposition 2, the optimal payoff for not inducing collaboration is 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆.  
The headquarters compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration as 
given in the two cases of Proposition 1.1.   
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝐿 = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝐻 = 0, and 
the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 . 
Inducing collaboration in this case has a higher payoff, as 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿, 
and the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is   
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿)
=
(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝛽 + 𝑝𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is: 
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(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝛽 + 𝑝𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
− 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)((𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔))





𝛽, (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0. This difference is positive if and only if  
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 





𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜔(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best solution is obtained, and the headquarters induces 
collaboration with no additional tax cost. It maximizes tax savings by allocating 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 




𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 , inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. 
Following proposition 1.1A, this optimal allocation is (𝜆𝐻∗, 𝜆𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿). 
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the optimal 





Proof of Proposition 1.2 





𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 into (3) and (4), and we obtain 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿)      (3′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿       (4′) 




(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
⋅ 𝜆 
Rearranging (4′) by moving all the terms of 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 to the RHS 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 ≥ (𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐿     (4′′)      
 
Case 1: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
, and the right hand side of 
(4′′) is negative while the left hand side is positive. Therefore, constraint (4) is satisfied for any 
𝜆𝑠
𝐿 and does not impose an upper bound on 𝜆𝑠
𝐿. However, the budget constraint enforces that 0 ≤
𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆. 
 
Together with (3′), we obtain the following range for 𝜆𝑠
𝐿.  
max {
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 
We first verify that this range is non-empty by computing that 
𝜆 −
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(𝛽 + 𝛾)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
This shows that the upper bound of this range is strictly larger than the lower bound, hence the 
range is non-empty. Therefore, the optimal 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ takes the upper bound value 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
 
Case 2: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, we have  𝛾 <
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
, so one can divide 𝛽(1 −




𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)







𝜆, and note that (4) is binding when 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 . Together with the 
budget constraint, one obtains a range of 𝜆𝑠
𝐿  
max {
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} 
Let us first verify that this range is non-empty by computing  
𝑠𝐿 −
(𝛽 − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾))(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆
=
𝛽𝛾(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)((1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ))
𝜆 > 0 
and 
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
 𝜆 > 0 
where we use the case-2 condition that  𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0. This shows the range for 
𝜆𝑠
𝐿 is non-empty.  
 
The upper bound of min {𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} for 𝜆𝑠
𝐿  is the allocation that maximizes the tax savings while 
maintaining the Time 4 incentive compatible constraints, so the optimal 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗  takes this upper 
bound.  
 
Next, one can derive the two subcases where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿  and where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆  by 
computing the difference between 𝜆 and 𝑠𝐿: 
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 =
(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
Because 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0  and 1 − 𝜏 > 0 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿  has the same sign as (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 −
𝜔𝛾. 
 
Case 2.1: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿 ≥ 𝜆, so 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆.  
Case 2.2: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 > 0, we have 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿 < 𝜆 , so  𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ =











 𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
                                   
𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ




𝑠𝐿 , 𝑖𝑓  𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ





One can combine the two cases where 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 because 






𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
> 0 







𝐿∗ can be described with 
𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ = {













Rearranging inequality (1) shows that it is equivalent to 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓
𝐿)       (1′) 
This leads to a lower bound for 𝜆𝑓
𝐿: 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 
Rearranging inequality (2) shows that it is equivalent to 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿            (2′) 
Dividing 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) from both sides of (2′), and we have  
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠




Together with the budget constraints, we obtain the range 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ min {
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠










𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ = 0. Substitute into the range for 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 and we obtain that  
max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ min {
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
, 𝜆} 
One can simplify the upper bound by showing that min {
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)(1−𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1−𝜏)




we have 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ≥ 𝛽, and  






Next, let us verify that the range for 𝜆𝑓




This is clearly true because the LHS subtract a positive quantity from 𝜆. 
 
Because higher values of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 results in higher tax savings, the optimal solution 𝜆𝑓






𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 into the range of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿, 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿)




𝐿 ≤ min {
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
, 𝜆} 
One can simplify the two bounds by first recalling that inequality (4) is binding at 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿.  
In other words, when 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 , and 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿, inequality (4) becomes an equality, so we can 
write: 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) =  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿 
Rearrange the two bounds of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 with the above expression to get: 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿
𝜔𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ min {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
, 𝜆} = min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿 
Next, let us verify that this range is non-empty by computing that   
𝑠𝐿 − (𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿
𝜔𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
) =
𝛾(1 − 𝜏)𝜆










𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ)
𝜔ℎ
 
So that  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ = 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) − 𝜔ℎ𝛾 > 0 
Therefore, the lower bound for 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 is strictly less than 𝑠𝐿. Again, a higher value of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 results in 
higher tax savings, so the optimal solution 𝜆𝑓
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿. Note that inequality (2) is 
binding because 𝜆𝑓
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿 takes the upper bound given by inequality (2). Furthermore, inequality 
(1) has slack because 𝑠𝐿 is strictly greater than the lower bound given by inequality (1).  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2 
As with Proposition 2, after determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the 
innovative project, the headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This 
allows the headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
From the proof of Proposition 2, the optimal payoff for not inducing collaboration is 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆.  
The headquarters compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration as 
given in the two cases of Proposition 1.2.   
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 =
𝜆𝑠
𝐻 = 0, and the optimal payoff associated is 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. Inducing 
collaboration in this case has a higher optimal payoff, as 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 , making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration  is 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 =
𝜆𝑠
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , and the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is  
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿)
=
(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝛽 + 𝑝𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is: 
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(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝛽 + 𝑝𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
− 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)((𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔))





𝛽, (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, and the difference is positive if and only if  
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 





𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜔(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, first-best is obtained, and the headquarters induces collaboration 









𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 , inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. 




𝐿∗) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿). 
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the optimal 
allocation is 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆  and 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 . Note that this allocation does not refer to the prototype 












𝐿) = (0, 𝜆, 0, 𝜆) is 
feasible. Inequality (1) and (3) are clearly satisfied because the RHS are zero while the LHS are 
non-negative. For, inequality (2), because 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 ≤ 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and 
𝐿𝐻𝑆 = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 = 𝑅𝐻𝑆 




𝐿) = (0, 𝜆, 0, 𝜆), and we have 
𝐿𝐻𝑆 = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 = 𝑅𝐻𝑆 




𝐿) = (0, 𝜆, 0, 𝜆) is feasible must be optimal. In this 








𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿)  is  feasible. 
Because the solution is feasible to LP-2, it satisfies (5) and (6) at equality, and it satisfies all the 
other constraints that are the same between LP-2 and LP-3.  




𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) is optimal to LP-3.  
Frist, any feasible solution to LP-3 must satisfy 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿. We show this by substituting the budget 
constraint (5), 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 ≤ 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿, into inequality (4).  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)
≤ 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)
= 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝑠
𝐿) 
Rearranging the above, we have 
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏)−𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)𝜆𝑠




𝛽, we have 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, a quantity that can be divided from 





𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
= 𝑠𝐿 
This proves our first claim that any feasible solution to LP-3 must satisfy 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿. 
Second, any feasible solution to LP-3 must also satisfy 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿 . We show it by rearranging 
inequality (2) to the following:  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿       (2′) 
Dividing 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) from both sides, and we have  
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠




Substituting the budget constraint (5), 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 ≤ 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿, into the above expression, we have: 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠




𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠








We have just proved in the first statement that 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿, so we can rewrite the above expression  
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤




𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝑠𝐿)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
 
One can show that the RHS of the above expression is 𝑠𝐿 . Frist, recall that  
𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ
𝜆 
Multiplying (𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ) to both sides, and one obtains 
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)𝑠𝐿 = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 
Adding 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ𝑠𝐿 to both sides, and one obtains 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿 = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝑠𝐿) 
Dividing 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) from both sides, and one obtains 
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𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝑠𝐿)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
= 𝑠𝐿 
This proves the second claim that any feasible solution to LP-3 must satisfy 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿. 





𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿).  
Substitute the budget constraints, 𝜆𝑠
𝐻 ≤ 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 ≤ 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓
𝐿, into the objective function.  
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿)
≤ 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓
𝐿)
≤ 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝑠
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝑓
𝐿) 
Next, substitute the first and second claim, 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿, into the above expression: 
𝑜𝑏𝑗 ≤ 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝑠𝐿) 




𝐿) = (𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) into the objective 
function and show that it achieves the upper bound shown above.  
𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐿) 
= 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) 









Taken together the case when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 and the case when 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we show that the optimal 




Proof of Proposition 1.4 
Recall that Model 3 shows that the budget constraint is at equality because any unallocated 
capital cannot earn any return. This rationale applies in this model as well, so the proof below 
takes the budget constraint at equality.  











𝐿) is also feasible. One can verify that the left-hand side of inequalities (1) to 
(4) are increasing in 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿  while the right-hand side does not depend on 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 . Therefore, if 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿  
increases to 𝜆, the left-hand side is greater while the right-hand remains unchanged, and thus still 
satisfies inequalities (1) to (4).  











𝐿) , because the objective value is increasing in 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 . Therefore, the 
optimal solution must have 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
Next, let us solve for the feasible range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 . Substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 into 










Furthermore, by the budget constraint, we can substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿  into inequality (3) to 
solve for a lower bound for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 : 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 
Furthermore, the budget constraint requires that 0 ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆. Therefore, the range of 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿  has a 
lower bound of max {0, 𝜆 −
(1−𝜔)(𝛽+𝛾)(1−𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1−𝜏−ℎ)
} and an upper bound of min {
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆, 𝜆} . This 
range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿  is non-empty because first, it is clear that 
𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆)





that is equivalent to showing  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 − (𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
) =
𝛾(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝛽ℎ(1 − 𝜔)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
Therefore, we obtain a feasible range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 : 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇










𝜆 ≥ 𝜆, this range becomes 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇







𝜆 < 𝜆, this range becomes 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






One can compute the feasible range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻  by substituting 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 . Because the 
objective function does not refer to 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿 , the optimal solution can take any value of 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿  
within the feasible range. 
Finally, we solve for the optimal value for 𝜆𝑓
𝐻  and 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 . Substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻∗ = 0  and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿∗ = 𝜆  into 










Furthermore, by the budget constraint, we can substitute 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 into inequality (1) to solve 
for a lower bound for 𝜆𝑓
𝐿: 
𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆




Furthermore, the budget constraint requires that 0 ≤ 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆. Therefore, the range of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 has a 
lower bound of max {0, 𝜆 −
(1−𝜔)(𝛽+𝛾)(1−𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1−𝜏−ℎ)
} and an upper bound of min {
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆, 𝜆} . This 
range is non-empty, because first, it is clear that 
𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆




(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆





that is equivalent to showing  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 − ( 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
) =
𝛾(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝛽ℎ(1 − 𝜔)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
Therefore, the feasible range of 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 is: 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑓




Now, because the objective value is increasing in 𝜆𝑓
𝐿, the optimal solution  𝜆𝑓
𝐿∗ must take the 
upper bound. 
𝜆𝑓










𝜆 ≥ 𝜆 , we have 𝜆𝑓
𝐿∗ = 𝜆  and 𝜆𝑓







𝐿∗) = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) , where  𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐿∗  can take any value 













𝐻∗ = 𝜆 −
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆, and the optimal 






𝐿∗)  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇











𝐿∗  can take any value within the feasible range. Note that the tax minimizing allocation can 
be specified only for the success outcome but not for the failure outcome. Hence, this solution is 
not the first best solution.  
Proof of Proposition 2.4 
As with Proposition 2, after determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the 
innovative project, the headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This 
allows the headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
From the proof of Proposition 2, the optimal payoff for not inducing collaboration is 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆.  
The headquarters compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration as 
given in the two cases of Proposition 1.4.   
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑓
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑓
𝐻 =
𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 = 0, and the optimal payoff associated is 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. Inducing 
collaboration in this case has a higher optimal payoff, as 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 , making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔












that results in an optimal expected payoff of 
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) (𝜆 −
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽




= (𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏) + (1 − 𝑝)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝛽 + ℎ𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))) 𝜆 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is 
(𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏) + (1 − 𝑝)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝛽 + ℎ𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))) 𝜆 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
= ((𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝))𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)) 𝜆 
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This difference is positive if and only if  
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝))𝛾 − ℎ𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝)
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾, together with the upper bound that defines case 2, produce a range for 𝛾. 




(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝)
𝛽 =
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)
𝜔(𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝))
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best solution is obtained, and the headquarters induces 









𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 , inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. 












Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(1−𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏)+𝜔ℎ(1−𝑝)
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the optimal 
allocation is 𝜆𝐿∗ = 𝜆  and 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 . Note that this allocation does not refer to the prototype 
outcome, because the headquarters decides not to pursue the innovative opportunity.  
Proof of Proposition 3 
First, compare 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 =
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽  with 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3 =
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ




1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)ℎ
(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
𝛽 > 0 
Therefore, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3. 
Next, compare 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4 =
(1−𝜔)(1−𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏)+𝜔ℎ(1−𝑝)
𝛽  with 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3 , and one 
can see that 
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝)
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ𝑝(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + ℎ)
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝))(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
𝛽 > 0 
Therefore, 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4 > 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−1 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−2 = 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−3. 
Finally, compare 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 with 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4, and one can see that  
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝑝)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏) + 𝜔ℎ(1 − 𝑝)
𝛽
= −
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ((2 − 2𝜏 − ℎ)𝑝 − (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ))





, (2 − 2𝜏 − ℎ)𝑝 − (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0, and the difference is negative, so we have 




, (2 − 2𝜏 − ℎ)𝑝 − (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) < 0, and the difference is positive, so we have 
𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒−4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1 
One can refer to the proof of Proposition 1.2 to see that when 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, solving inequalities (3) 
and (4) gives an upper bound of 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 ≤ 𝑠𝐿.  
Rearranging inequality (2) shows that it is equivalent to  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿       (2′) 
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The LHS of inequality (2′) is increasing in 𝜆𝑠
𝐿, and its maximum value within the feasible range 
of 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 occurs at 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿. In other words, within the feasible region, the LHS of inequality (2′) is 
bounded above by the following expression. 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠
𝐿) = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) 
This expression can be simplified by recalling that inequality (4) is binding when 𝜆𝑠
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿, so we 
have 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿) = 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿 
Now, when the subsidiary perceives that it will be allocated an amount higher than 𝑠𝐿 after the 
prototype fails,  𝑐𝑓
𝐿 > 𝑠𝐿 . However, the LHS of (2′ ) ≤  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿  < 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿 , making 
inequality (2′) impossible to be satisfied. Therefore, the linear program LP-2-C is infeasible.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 
Rearranging inequality (2) shows that it is equivalent to  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿       (2′) 
The LHS of inequality (2′) is increasing in 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 , and its maximum value within the feasible range 
of 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿  occurs at 𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 = 𝜆. In other words, within the feasible region, the LHS of inequality (2′) is 
bounded above by 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. In other words,  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼
𝐿 ) ≤ 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 









𝜆, and one can show that the RHS of (2′)  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑐𝑓
𝐿 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 = 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 
Taken together, the RHS of (2′) is strictly greater than 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, while the LHS is at 
most 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, and thus making inequality (2) impossible to be satisfied. Therefore, 




Proof of Lemma 1 
After the general tax rate reduction, the high tax subsidiary faces a tax rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘, 𝑘 > 0, so its 
tax rate is still higher than the low-tax subsidiary. One can apply Proposition 2 with the new tax 
rate 𝜏 + 𝑘 for the low tax subsidiary to obtain the result of Lemma 1.  
Proof of Proposition 5 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (Proposition 2) and after (Lemma 1) the general rate 
reduction, we obtain the following cases. First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can be 
achieved, both before and after the general rate reduction, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the general rate reduction (in Lemma1) is 
smaller than that before the rate reduction (in Proposition 2) by computing the following. 
(𝜔)ℎ
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘)
> 0 






𝛽 after the general 
rate reduction. This result in two sub-cases.  
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax cut and is 
still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile 
only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case,  when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the tax cut. The optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  




𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0 
Therefore, 𝜆𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗.  
Proof of Lemma 2 
The specific rate reduction applies to the innovative project but not to the traditional one, so the 
problem can be reformulated with the following LP. Solving this LP gives the optimal allocation 






  (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
Subject to.  
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻      (1) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿       (2) 
𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆          (3) 
𝜆𝑘
𝐻, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 0          (4) 
From the budget constraint, we have 𝜆𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 , and substitute it into the objective function: 
(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) = (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
= (𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆 + 𝑘𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
One can see from this expression that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 .  
Next, substitute 𝜆𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  into inequalities (1) and (2), and we have: 
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(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿)       (1′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿       (2′) 




𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
⋅ 𝜆 
Rearranging inequality (2′), we have 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆 ≥ (𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐿        (2′′) 
Case 1: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
, and the right hand side of 
(2′′) is negative while the left hand side is positive. Therefore, constraint (2) is satisfied for any 
𝜆𝑘
𝐿and does not impose an upper bound on 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 . However, the budget constraint enforces that 0 ≤
𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆.  
 
With 𝛾 being the upper bound and the expression obtained in (1′) being the lower bound, we 
obtain a feasible range for 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 :  
max {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 
We first verify that this range is non-empty by computing the following.  
 
𝜆 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝜆
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
This shows that the upper bound of this range is strictly larger than the lower bound, hence the 
range is non-empty.  
 
Recall that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 , so the optimal 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  takes the upper bound. In 
other words, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
Case 2: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 0, we have  𝛾 <
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
, so one can divide 𝛽(1 −
𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 from both sides of (2′′) to derive an upper bound of 𝜆𝑘





𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)





𝜆, and note that (2) is binding when 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
 
Together with the budget constraint, one obtains a feasible range of 𝜆𝑘
𝐿   
max {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≤ min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} 
We first verify that this range is non-empty by first computing that 
𝑠𝐿,𝑘 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆
=
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)((1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ))
𝜆 
is positive. This is because 1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘) ≥ 1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − (ℎ − 𝑘) = 1 − 𝜏 − ℎ > 0, so 
we know that this difference is positive. Furthermore, 
𝑠𝐿,𝑘 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 𝜆 > 0 
because of the case 2 condition  𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0. Therefore, the range for 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  is non-
empty.  
 
The upper bound of 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  is min {𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} and is the allocation that maximizes the tax savings while 
maintaining the Time 4 incentive compatibility constraints, so the optimal 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ takes this upper 
bound.  
 
Next, I derive the two subcases where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿 and where min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆 by computing 
the difference between 𝜆 and 𝑠𝐿: 
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 =
(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 





Case 2.1: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 ≥ 𝜆, so 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝜆.  
Case 2.2: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 > 0, we have 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 < 𝜆 , so  𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿 , 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿. 
 







 𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
                                   
𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘




𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑖𝑓  𝛾 <








One can combine the two cases where 𝜆𝑠
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 because 






𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
> 0 







𝐿∗ can be described with 
𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = {









After determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the innovative project, the 
headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This allows the 
headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
If the headquarters does not induce collaboration on the innovative project, the total payoff is: 
𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) = 𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝑘
𝐿). 
Note that the total payoff increases in 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  because higher value of 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  yields a higher tax saving, 
so the headquarters optimally allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary when it forgoes 
the innovative project. In other words, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0. The optimal payoff is thus 𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆 . The headquarters then compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing 
collaboration, as given by optimal objective value of (LP-Base-S).   
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Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0, and 
the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is (𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. Inducing collaboration in 
this case has a higher optimal payoff, as (𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 −
𝑠𝐿,𝑘, and the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is  
(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘) =
(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is:   
(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘) − 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘)𝛾 − 𝑘𝛽(1 − 𝜔))





𝛽, we have (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, and the difference is positive if and only if  
(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘)𝛾 − 𝑘𝛽(1 − 𝜔) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 





1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘
⋅ 𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝜔(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘)
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, first-best is obtained, and the headquarters induces collaboration 
with no additional tax cost. It maximizes tax savings by allocating 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘






𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 , inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. The 
optimal allocation in this case is the optimal solution to (LP-Base-S), that is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘  and 
𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the optimal 
allocation is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (Proposition 2) and after (Lemma 2) the specific rate 
reduction, we obtain the following cases. First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can be 
achieved, both before and after the general rate reduction, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the specific rate reduction (in Lemma2) is 
smaller than that before rate reduction (in Proposition 2) by computing the following. 
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝛽 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)ℎ)(1 − 𝜏 − (1 − 𝜔)𝑘)
> 0 






𝛽 after the general 
tax rate reduction. This result in two sub-cases. 
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax cut and is 
still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile 
only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case, when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
1−𝜏−(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the tax cut. The optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  




𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now, because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0 
Therefore, 𝜆𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗.  
Proof of Lemma 1.1 
After the general tax rate reduction, the high tax subsidiary faces a tax rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘, 𝑘 > 0, so its 
tax rate is still higher than the low-tax subsidiary. One can apply Proposition 2.1 with the new 
tax rate 𝜏 + 𝑘 for the low-tax subsidiary to obtain the result of Lemma 1.1.  
Proof of Proposition 5.1 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (in Proposition 2.1) and after (Lemma 1.1) the general 
rate reduction, we obtain the following cases. First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can 
be achieved, both before and after the general rate reduction, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the general rate reduction (in Lemma1.1) 
is smaller than that before the rate reduction (in Proposition 2.1A) by computing the following. 
(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔𝑘
𝛽 
=
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔𝑘)
> 0 






𝛽 after the 
general tax rate reduction. This result in two sub-cases. 
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax cut, and 
is still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘






𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile 
only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case, when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the general rate reduction. The optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ =
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Comparing these two values, one sees that 
𝜆𝐻∗ − 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now, because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and   
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0 
Therefore, 𝜆𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗.  
Proof of Lemma 1.2 
After the general tax rate reduction, the high tax subsidiary faces a tax rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘, 𝑘 > 0, so its 
tax rate is still higher than the low-tax subsidiary. One can apply Proposition 2.2 with the new 
tax rate 𝜏 + 𝑘 for the low-tax subsidiary to obtain the result of Lemma 1.2.  
Proof of Proposition 5.2 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (in Proposition 2.2) and after (Lemma 1.2) the general 
rate reduction, we obtain the following cases.  
First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can be achieved, both before and after the general 




𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the general rate reduction (in Lemma 1.2) 




𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔𝑘
𝛽 
=
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔𝑘)
> 0 






𝛽 after the 
general tax rate reduction. This result in two sub-cases. 
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax cut, and 
is still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 inducing collaboration becomes worthwhile 
only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case, when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the general rate reduction. The respective optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓
𝐻∗ =
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Comparing these two values, one sees that 
𝜆𝐻∗ − 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now, because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0 
Therefore, 𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝑠,𝑘







Proof of Lemma 1.4 
After the general tax rate reduction, the high tax subsidiary faces a tax rate of 𝜏 + 𝑘, 𝑘 > 0, so its 
tax rate is still higher than the low-tax subsidiary. One can apply Proposition 2.4 with the new 
tax rate 𝜏 + 𝑘 for the low-tax subsidiary to obtain the result of Lemma 1.4.  
Proof of Proposition 5.4 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (Proposition 2.4) and after (Lemma 1.4) the general rate 
reduction, we obtain the following cases.  
First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can be achieved, both before and after the general 




𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the general rate reduction (in Lemma 1.4) 
is smaller than that before the rate reduction (in Proposition 2.4) by computing the following. 
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘) + 𝜔𝑘
𝛽 
=
𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘) + 𝜔𝑘)
> 0 






𝛽 after the 
general tax rate reduction. This result in two sub-cases. 
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)𝑘
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)+𝜔𝑘
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax cut, and 
is still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 , inducing collaboration becomes 
worthwhile only after the tax cut, and the optimal allocations are:  
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 −
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 > 0 =  𝜆𝐻∗, an increase in allocation for the failure outcome, and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻∗ =
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0, no change for the success outcome.  
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In the final case, when 
(1−𝑝)(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝜔ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both before 
and after the tax cut, and when 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘












Proof of Lemma 2.1 
The specific rate reduction applies to the innovative project but not to the traditional one, so the 
problem can be reformulated with LP-1-S. Solving this LP gives the optimal allocation if the HQ 






  𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
Subject to.  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻                                                                    (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿       (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻      (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿      (4) 
𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆          (5) 
𝜆𝑘
𝐻, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 0          (6) 
From the budget constraint, 𝜆𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 , and substitute this expression into the objective 
function: 
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘




= 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
= 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆 + 𝑘𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆𝑘
𝐿) 
One can see from this expression that the objective function is increasing in 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 . Therefore, the 
optimal objective value is obtained at the upper bound of 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 . 
Rearranging inequalities (1) and (2) obtains  
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿)      (1′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑘
𝐿) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘
𝐿        (2′) 
Notice that these are equivalent to inequalities (3) and (4). Therefore, the inequalities (1) and (2) 
are redundant, and the feasible set can be solely described by inequalities (3) – (6). Comparing 
this with (LP-Base-S), they have the same set of constraints and thus have the same feasible 
range for 𝜆𝑘
𝐿 . Therefore, the optimal allocation 𝜆𝑘















𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 𝜆 
After determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the innovative project, the 
headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This allows the 
headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile.  
If the headquarters does not induce collaboration on the innovative project, the total payoff is: 
𝛽((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑘




Note that the total payoff increases in 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  because higher value of 𝜆𝑘
𝐿  yields a higher tax saving, 
so the headquarters optimally allocates all the capital to the low-tax subsidiary when it forgoes 
the innovative project. In other words, 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0. The optimal payoff is thus 𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆 . The headquarters then compares this payoff with the optimal payoff for inducing 
collaboration, as given by optimal objective value of (LP-1-S).   
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0, and 
the optimal expected payoff associated with this allocation is 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 −
𝜏)𝜆. Inducing collaboration in this case has a higher optimal payoff, as 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 +
(1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆, making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 −
𝑠𝐿,𝑘, and the optimal expected payoff associated with this allocation is  
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘) 
=
(1 − 𝜏) (((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ + (ℎ − 𝑘)(𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)))𝛽)𝛽𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is:   
(1 − 𝜏) (((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ + (ℎ − 𝑘)(𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)))𝛽)𝛽𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
− 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) ((𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))  𝛾 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))





𝛽, (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0, and the difference is positive if and only if  
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))  𝛾 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)) > 0 




(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝛽 
This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 




(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝛽 =
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝜔 (𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, first-best is obtained, and the headquarters induces collaboration 
with no additional tax cost. It maximizes tax savings by allocating 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. The 
optimal allocation in this case is the optimal solution to (LP-1-S), that is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ =
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the 
optimal allocation is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (Proposition 2.1) and after (Lemma 2.1) the specific 
rate reduction, we obtain the following cases. First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can 
be achieved, both before and after the general rate reduction, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the specific rate reduction (in Lemma 2.1) 




𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝛽
=
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + ℎ)(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))) (𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
> 0 







the specific tax rate reduction. This results in two subcases.  
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax 
cut and is still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes 
worthwhile only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case, when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the tax cut. The optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Comparing these two values, one sees that  
𝜆𝐻∗ − 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now, because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and  
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) > 0 
Therefore, 𝜆𝐻∗ > 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗.  
Proof of Lemma 2.2 
The specific rate reduction applies to the innovative project but not to the traditional one, so the 
problem can be reformulated with LP-2-S. Solving this LP gives the optimal allocation if the HQ 










𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 )
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ) 
Subject to.  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻        (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿        (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻        (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿        (4) 
𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆          (5) 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑓,𝑘





𝐿 ≥ 0          (7) 
Let us begin with computing 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ . 
Substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿  into (3) and (4), and we obtain 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 )      (3′) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿      (4′) 




𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 
Rearranging (4′) by moving all the terms of 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿  to the RHS 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆 ≥ (𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿    (4′′)      
 
Case 1: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
, and the right hand side of 
(4′′) is negative while the left hand side is positive. Therefore, constraint (4) is satisfied for any 
𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿  and does not impose an upper bound on 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 . However, the budget constraint enforces that 
0 ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑘




Together with (3′), we obtain the following range for 𝜆𝑠
𝐿.  
max {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆 
We first verify that this range is non-empty by computing that 
𝜆 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 =
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏)(𝛽 + 𝛾)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆 > 0 
This shows that the upper bound of this range is strictly larger than the lower bound, hence the 
range is non-empty. Therefore, the optimal 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗  takes the upper bound value 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
 
Case 2: when 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 0, we have  𝛾 <
𝛽(1−𝜏−𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
, so one can divide 𝛽(1 −
𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 from both sides of (4′) to derive an upper bound of 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 .  
𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)





𝜆, and note that (4) is binding when 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘. Together with the 
budget constraint, one obtains a range of 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿   
max {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘 , 𝜆} 
Let us first verify that this range is non-empty by computing that 
𝑠𝐿,𝑘 −
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) − (1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
𝜆
=
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)((1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ))
𝜆 
is positive. This is because 1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘) ≥ 1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − (ℎ − 𝑘) = 1 − 𝜏 − ℎ > 0, so 
we know that this difference is positive. Furthermore, 
𝑠𝐿,𝑘 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 𝜆 > 0 
because of the case-2 condition  𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ > 0. Therefore, the range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑘





The upper bound of min {𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} for 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿  is the allocation that maximizes the tax savings while 
maintaining the Time 4 incentive compatibility constraints, so the optimal 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗  takes this upper 
bound.  
 
Next, I derive the two subcases where min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘  and where min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} = 𝜆  by 
computing the difference between 𝜆 and 𝑠𝐿,𝑘: 
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 =
(1 − 𝜏)((1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
𝜆 
Because 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 0 and 1 − 𝜏 > 0 , 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿  has the same sign as (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 −
𝜔𝛾. 
Case 2.1: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 ≤ 0, we have 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 ≥ 𝜆, so 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} = 𝜆.  
Case 2.2: when (1 − 𝜔)𝛽 − 𝜔𝛾 > 0, we have 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, and in this case, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 < 𝜆 , so  𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗ =
min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘. 
 







 𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
                                   
𝜆, 𝑖𝑓 𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘




𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑖𝑓  𝛾 <
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘





One can combine the two cases where 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 because 






𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
> 0 







𝐿∗  can be described with 
𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿∗ = {









Next, let us compute 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿∗  and 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ .  
Rearranging inequality (1) shows that it is equivalent to 
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(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 )       (1′) 
This leads to a lower bound for 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 : 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 )
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 
Rearranging inequality (2) shows that it is equivalent to 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 )  ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿             (2′) 
Dividing 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) from both sides of (2′), and we have  
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≤
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘




Together with the budget constraints, we obtain the range 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ max{𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 )
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ min {
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝑘








𝐿∗ = 𝜆 and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0. Substitute into this range, we obtain that  
max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} ≤ 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ min {






𝛽, we have 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ≥ 𝛽, and  






The lower bound for 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  is strictly less than 𝜆. Because higher values of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  results in higher tax 
savings, the optimal solution 𝜆𝑓,𝑘





𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 into the range of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 , 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ max{𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘)









Recall that inequality (4) is binding at 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘. In other words, when 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 , and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 =
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, inequality (4) becomes an equality, so we can write: 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘) =  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
Therefore, the ranges of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  becomes 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ max {𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘
𝜔𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
, 0} 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ min {
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘
𝛽(1 − 𝜏)
, 𝜆} = min{𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆} = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
One can check that this range is non-empty by computing that the following difference is 
positive.  
𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − (𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘
𝜔𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
)
=
(1 − 𝜏) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑘)) 𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 





𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔𝑘)
𝜔𝑘
 
we have 𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 0. Furthermore,  
1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑘) ≥ 1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘 − (ℎ − 𝑘) = 1 − 𝜏 − ℎ > 0 
Therefore, this difference is strictly positive, and the lower bound for 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  is strictly less than the 
upper bound 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Again, higher values of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  results in higher tax savings, so the optimal solution 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 and 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 . Note that inequality (2) is binding because 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘  takes the upper bound 
given by inequality (2). Furthermore, inequality (1) has slack because 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 is strictly greater than 
the lower bound given by inequality (1).  
 
After determining the optimal payoff for inducing collaboration on the innovative project, the 
headquarters compares it with the optimal payoff for not inducing it. This allows the 
headquarters to determine whether pursuing the innovative opportunity is worthwhile. 
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The optimal payoff for not inducing collaboration is 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. The headquarters compares this 
payoff with the optimal expected payoff for inducing collaboration as given in the two cases to 
the solution of (LP-2-S). 
Case 1. 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽 : the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆  and 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 = 0 , and the optimal expected payoff associated is 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 +
(1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆. Inducing collaboration in this case has a higher optimal payoff, as 𝑝(𝛽 +
𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 >  𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆 , making it worthwhile.  
Case 2. 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽: the optimal allocation that induces collaboration is 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘  and 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 , and the optimal payoff associated with this allocation is  
𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘)
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘) + (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝐿,𝑘)
=
(1 − 𝜏) (((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ + (ℎ − 𝑘)(𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)))𝛽)𝛽𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
 
The difference between this payoff and that for not inducing collaboration is: 
(1 − 𝜏) (((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)(ℎ − 𝑘))𝛾 + (1 − 𝜏 − ℎ + (ℎ − 𝑘)(𝑝 + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)))𝛽)𝛽𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘
− 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) ((𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))  𝛾 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))





𝛽, (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 0, and the difference is positive if and only if  
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))  𝛾 − 𝛽(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)) > 0 
that is equivalent to  
𝛾 >
(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))




This lower bound of 𝛾 together with the upper bound that defines case 2 produces a range for 𝛾. 




(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝛽 =
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)
𝜔 (𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘)))
𝛽 > 0 




In summary, when 𝛾 ≥
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, first-best is obtained, and the headquarters induces collaboration 









𝛽 <  𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration has a tax cost, but its benefit 
outweighs the cost, and the optimal allocation induces collaboration at the lowest tax cost. The 





(𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘, 𝑠𝐿,𝑘). 
Finally, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝛽 , inducing collaboration is not worthwhile, and the 
optimal allocation is 𝜆𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆  and 𝜆𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0 . Note that this allocation does not refer to the 
prototype outcome, because the headquarters decides not to pursue the innovative opportunity.  
Proof of Proposition 6.2 
Comparing the optimal allocation before (Proposition 2.2) and after (Lemma 2.2) the specific 
rate reduction, we obtain the following cases.  
First, when 𝛾 >
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, the first best allocation can be achieved, both before and after the general 




𝐻∗ = 0. 
Second, one can show that the inducing threshold after the specific rate reduction (in Lemma 2.2) 




𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ
𝛽 −
(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))
𝛽
=
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + ℎ)(1 − 𝜔)(ℎ − 𝑘)𝛽
(𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) + 𝜔(ℎ − 𝑝(ℎ − 𝑘))) (𝑝(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ) + 𝜔ℎ)
> 0 







the specific tax rate reduction. This results in two subcases.  
First, when 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔(ℎ−𝑝(ℎ−𝑘))
𝛽, inducing collaboration is not worthwhile before the tax 
cut and is still not worthwhile after the tax cut, and in this case, 𝜆𝑘




𝛽 < 𝛾 <
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−ℎ)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽, inducing collaboration becomes 
worthwhile only after the tax cut, and in this case,  
𝜆𝐻∗ = 0 < 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 
In the final case, when 
(1−𝜔)ℎ
𝑝(1−𝜏−𝑘)+𝜔ℎ
𝛽 < 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, inducing collaboration is worthwhile both 
before and after the tax cut. The optimal allocations are: 𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿 and 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ =
𝜆 − 𝑠𝐿,𝑘.  
Comparing these two values, one sees that  
𝜆𝑠
𝐻∗ − 𝜆𝑠,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝐿,𝑘 − 𝑠𝐿 =
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)(ℎ − 𝑘)(𝛽 − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾))𝜆
(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘)(𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)ℎ)
 
Now, because 𝛾 <
1−𝜔
𝜔
𝛽, we have 𝛽 > 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) and   
𝛽(1 − 𝜏) − 𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑘 > 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘) > 0 










Proof of Lemma 2.4 
The specific rate reduction applies to the innovative project but not to the traditional one, so the 
problem can be reformulated with LP-4-S. Solving this LP gives the optimal allocation if the HQ 









 𝑝(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 )
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛽 ((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ) 
Subject to.  
𝑝(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻  
≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻        (1) 
𝑝𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿        (2) 
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻        (3) 
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾) ((1 − 𝜏 − 𝑘)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 ) ≥ 𝛽(1 − 𝜏)𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿        (4) 
𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆          (5) 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆          (6) 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 + 𝜆𝑓,𝑘







𝐿 ≥ 0          (8) 
For the same reason as outlined in the proof of Proposition 4, the proof below takes the budget 
constraint at equality.  











𝐿 ) is also feasible. One can verify that the left-hand side of inequalities 
(1) to (4) are increasing in 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿  while the right-hand side does not depend on 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘




𝐿  increases to 𝜆, the left-hand side is greater while the right-hand remains unchanged, and 
thus still satisfies inequalities (1) to (4).  











𝐿 ) , because the objective value is increasing in 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿 . 
Therefore, the optimal solution must have 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆. 
Next, let us solve for the feasible range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 . Substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 










Furthermore, by the budget constraint, we can substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿  into inequality (3) to 
solve for a lower bound for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 : 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 
Furthermore, the budget constraint requires that 0 ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆. Therefore, the range of 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿  has 
a lower bound of max {0, 𝜆 −
(1−𝜔)(𝛽+𝛾)(1−𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1−𝜏−ℎ)
} and an upper bound of min {
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆, 𝜆}. This 
range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿  is non-empty because first, it is clear that 
𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆




(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)((1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)𝜆 + ℎ𝜆)





that is equivalent to showing  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 − (𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
) =
𝛾(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝛽ℎ(1 − 𝜔)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 




max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘










𝜆 ≥ 𝜆, this range becomes 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘







𝜆 < 𝜆, this range becomes 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






One can compute the feasible range for 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻  by substituting 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻 . Because the 
objective function does not refer to 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿 , the optimal solution can take any value of 
𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻 , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿  within the feasible range. 
Finally, we solve for the optimal value for 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻  and 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 . Substitute 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝜆𝑠,𝐼,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆 into 










Furthermore, by the budget constraint, we can substitute 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻 = 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  into inequality (1) to 
solve for a lower bound for 𝜆𝑓.𝑘
𝐿 : 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≥ 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
 
Furthermore, the budget constraint requires that 0 ≤ 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 ≤ 𝜆. Therefore, the range of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  has a 
lower bound of max {0, 𝜆 −
(1−𝜔)(𝛽+𝛾)(1−𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1−𝜏−ℎ)
} and an upper bound of min {
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆, 𝜆} . This 
range is non-empty, because first, it is clear that 
𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆






(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆





that is equivalent to showing  
𝜔(𝛽 + 𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 − ( 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
) =
𝛾(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜔ℎ) + 𝛽ℎ(1 − 𝜔)
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
> 0 
Therefore, the feasible range of 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿  is: 
max {0, 𝜆 −
(1 − 𝜔)(𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝜏)𝜆
𝛽(1 − 𝜏 − ℎ)
} ≤ 𝜆𝑓,𝑘




Now, because the objective value is increasing in 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿 , the optimal solution 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿∗  must take the 
upper bound. 
𝜆𝑓,𝑘










𝜆 ≥ 𝜆 , we have 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐿∗ = 𝜆  and 𝜆𝑓,𝑘







𝐿 ) = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿∗ , 0, 𝜆) , where  𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿∗  can take 












𝜆  and 𝜆𝑓,𝑘
𝐻∗ = 𝜆 −
𝜔(𝛽+𝛾)
𝛽
𝜆 , and the 







𝐿 )  = (0, 𝜆, 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐻∗ , 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘








𝐻∗  and 𝜆𝑠,𝑇,𝑘
𝐿∗  can take any value within the feasible range. Note that the tax minimizing 
allocation can be specified only for the success outcome but not for the failure outcome. Hence, 
this solution is not the first best.  
181 
 
Proof of Proposition 6.4 
The specific rate reduction does not change the allocation. One can see that the optimal 
allocation for model 4 is the same before and after the specific rate reduction by observing that 
Lemma 2.4 yields the same result as Proposition 2.4.   
 
